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Editorial 
 
Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 
Issue 6: July 2010 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg 
 
 
 
Graham Sansom 
UTS Centre for Local Government 
Australia  
 
 
 
 
Most of the contributions to this sixth issue of the Commonwealth e-Journal of 
Local Governance cluster around the core issue of decentralisation and the role, 
financing and performance of local government in a decentralised system of 
government. 
 
Donna Chiarelli provides an overview of the potential role of local governments 
as agents of development. She discusses the Position Paper on Aid Effectiveness and 
Local Government adopted by the World Council of United Cities and Local 
Governments at its annual meeting in Guanghzou, China in November 2009. The paper 
seeks to give voice to the local government perspective in the continuing deliberations on 
aid effectiveness, and to foster moves towards better incorporating local governments 
into the design and delivery of development programs and processes. 
 
In an interesting counterpoint, Franklin Odoom suggests that, on the available evidence 
from Ghana, that local government expenditures are not inherently pro-poor and their 
actions may not be geared to improving the lives of local people. He therefore questions 
the validity of recent calls for greater decentralisation in developing countries in general 
and Africa in particular.   
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Ron McGill tackles the same issue in a different way, by setting out a framework to 
measure more accurately the performance of local government in making a difference to 
development outcomes, as well as to build local capacity in a systematic way. He 
identifies essential building blocks that must be in place before local government can 
deliver effectively. 
 
Matthew Allen and Zahid Hasnain extend the discussion with a wide-ranging – albeit 
preliminary – assessment of local-level decision-making in relation to development 
planning and, especially, the allocation of state development funds in Papua New 
Guinea. They ask why PNG has performed so poorly with regard to basic social 
indicators and service delivery despite its fortunate resource endowment. The 
evidence points to major shortcomings in the political culture and decision-
making processes, resulting in examples of chronic dysfunctionality in local 
governance and administration of development funds. However, these problems 
are by no means uniform and further research is needed to understand local and 
regional differences.  
 
Brian Dollery and Albert Wijeweera, writing about Australia, and Jude Okafor 
discussing the Nigerian experience, present parallel accounts of central (in both 
cases state) governments limiting local government’s financial autonomy and 
hence capacity to deliver infrastructure and services. Dollery and Wijiweera 
examine the system of ‘rate-pegging’ (capping) in the state of New South Wales. 
They discuss the rationale for rate-pegging and counter-arguments on its 
desirability, and identify a number of deleterious effects. These include a 
substantial ‘dampening’ effect on local government’s financial capacity and 
undermining the democratic bedrocks of ‘local voice’ and ‘local choice’. 
However, given the system’s political popularity, significant change appears 
unlikely. 
 
Jude Okafor considers inter-government financial relations and the financial 
autonomy of local government in Nigeria. He focuses in particular on the 
operation of the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA), through which 
federal funds are intended to be transferred to local governments within a 
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framework of coordinated and co-operative administration. This mechanism is 
intended to reflect accountability and transparency in local governance within the 
principle of separation of powers and the rule of law.  Okafor finds, however, that 
the reality in Nigeria indicates the opposite: state governments interfere with the 
financial autonomy of local councils, and further, divert SJLGA funds for their 
own purposes, contrary to the constitution. This has greatly hampered the 
developmental efforts of local government in that country.  
 
Terry Parker presents a more optimistic scenario in his account of efforts over the 
past six years to rebuild the institutional legitimacy and service delivery capacity 
of Honiara City Council, the local government of the capital of Solomon Islands, 
following the period of national instability around the turn of the century. He 
explores the important linkage between delivery of equitable basic services and 
the potential for prevention of conflict – or reconciliation – and concludes that on 
the evidence of Honiara, local governments are well placed to underpin social stability 
through effective leadership, good governance, proactive community engagement and 
concerted efforts to improve quality of services and life across the population as a whole.   
 
Uttam K Roy and his colleagues provide a case study of the related need for effective 
and appropriate training of local government managers, in this case middle managers of 
the Kolkata Municipal Corporation in India. They describe a training program delivered 
to around 450 staff that focused on ‘attitudinal’ changes towards their service delivery 
responsibilities. For historical reasons, knowledge, skills and attitudes amongst officials 
of Urban Local Bodies in India have been traditionally of a low standard: managers need 
to be re-oriented in leadership, team building and communication skills to facilitate better 
services for citizens. 
 
Jade Herriman and Emma Partridge also discuss an education issue – environmental and 
sustainability education provided by local governments in New South Wales, Australia. 
Their paper outlines the main types of programs being conducted by councils, and the 
target audiences. It highlights the very wide range of activities and approaches that are 
evident in the councils studied. This diversity indicates that councils are seeking to 
respond to the particular needs of their community, but the lack of a prescribed or 
preferred ‘palette’ of activities means that it is fairly resource intensive for each council 
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to develop education programs ‘from scratch’. Also, there is perhaps a lack of clarity 
about the appropriate scope of environmental and sustainability education, such that 
some councils try to be ‘all things to all people’ with very limited resources at hand.  
 
Anne Sharp and Katherine Anderson offer another perspective on community 
engagement. They detail a new model involving establishment of online panels of 
citizens that are then used for consultations and research on a range of local government 
issues over time. Their paper sets out the rationale behind the panels, steps involved in 
their establishment, and what the most effective recruitment methods were to build panel 
membership. The model’s ability to recruit a wide audience of citizens as members, 
including those who would not normally participate in local government matters, is 
examined, as well as citizen expectations of the panel and satisfaction with being a 
member. The results of their research demonstrate that online panels can be used 
effectively in the local government context as a vehicle for consultation and research, 
and can be sustainable in terms of continued participation and high levels of citizen 
satisfaction.  
 
This issue concludes with two very insightful book reviews. Jill Symonds and Brian 
Walliser review Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems, edited 
by Nico Steytler (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009). This is the sixth volume in 
the series A Global Dialogue on Federalism, published on behalf of the Canada-based 
Forum of Federations (forumfed.org) and the International Association of Centers for 
Federal Studies (iacfs.org). 
 
Roger Wettenhall offers a wide-ranging review focused on  Finance and Governance of 
Capital Cities in Federal Systems, edited by Enid Slack and Rupak Chattopadhyay, 
(McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), and also published for the Forum of 
Federations. In particular he acknowledges the pioneering work in this area of federal 
studies by another Canadian, Donald Rowat, who edited The Government of Federal 
Capitals nearly forty years ago. 
 
RESEARCH and EVALUATION 
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Power, pork and patronage: Decentralisation 
and the politicisation of the development 
budget in Papua New Guinea
 
 
Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 
Issue 6: July 2010 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines a number of recent empirical studies of local-level decision-making 
in relation to development planning and, especially, the allocation of state development 
funds in Papua New Guinea. The discussion is framed by the extensive theoretical and 
Papua New Guinea literature on patronage politics and political culture, by the recent 
history of decentralisation reforms, and by the frequently articulated, but largely 
anecdotal, observations about the functioning of district and local-level governance 
processes.In contrast to the anecdotal vision of widespread and chronic dysfunctionality, 
the studies considered here paint a picture of considerable spatial and regional 
variation. We offer some tentative hypotheses to explain this variation, while flagging the 
need for more empirical work. We outline how these preliminary findings have informed 
a program of research that is currently being undertaken at the district and local 
government levels with a view to gaining a better understanding of the extent and nature 
of spatial variation in the local-level governance of state development funds in Papua 
New Guinea. 
 
 
                                                        
1  The authors would like thank two anonymous referees for their useful suggestions on an earlier draft.  We 
also thank a number of colleagues at the ANU and the World Bank, too numerous to name here, for their 
advice and assistance during the preparation of the unpublished background paper upon which this article is 
based.  We acknowledge the World Bank for funding this research.  The opinions expressed herein remain 
our own. 
 
Matthew Allen1 
Postdoctoral Fellow  
Resource Management in Asia-Pacific 
Program, Australian National University 
 
Zahid Hasnain 
Public Sector and Governance Specialist  
The World Bank 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, Papua New Guinea has been variously described as a ‘failed state’, a 
‘weak state’, a ‘broken-backed state’, a ‘fragile state’, a ‘putative state’, and a ‘disorderly 
democracy’. All of these terms have attempted to encapsulate the well-documented 
challenges of economic, political and social development that have confronted the largest 
of the postcolonial Melanesian nation-states.  Indeed despite the recent commodity 
sector-led recovery from the macro-economic shocks and fiscal crises of the mid to late 
1990s, the state has failed to convert resource revenues into development outcomes for 
the country’s predominantly rural populace. Papua New Guinea continues to be the worst 
performing of all the Pacific Island states across a range of development indicators and 
spatial inequality is sharpening, not only between rural and urban areas, but also between 
different rural localities. 
 
Why then, has Papua New Guinea performed so poorly over the three decades since 
independence – particularly in regard to basic social indicators and service delivery – 
despite its fortunate resource endowment? While there is a large literature that 
emphasizes the predominance of patronage politics operating in an environment of 
extreme ethno-linguistic fragmentation as the underlying explanation for this failure, 
there have been relatively few empirical studies of local and district-level governance 
conducted to date that examine how a political culture of patronage is manifested at the 
local level.2 This paper analyses the small number of extant studies which have explicitly 
examined the issue of local-level decision-making around development planning and, 
especially, the allocation of state development funds. While the analysis is primarily 
situated in the Papua New Guinea-specific literature, linkages are also made to 
theoretical debates in comparative political economy. 
 
In contrast to the anecdotal vision of widespread and chronic dysfunctionality, the 
studies examined here paint a picture of considerable geographical and regional variation 
in the functionality of district and local-level processes governing the allocation of 
development funds. While this variation invites explanation and hypothesis, most 
                                                        
2  Papua New Guinea is the most fragmented of all the Melanesian states. Indeed, with approximately 820 
languages and many more autonomous political units commonly described as tribes – around 10 thousand 
according to one informed estimate, many of which are further divided into clans (Ketan 2007:14) – it is 
the world’s most fragmented society in ethno-linguistic terms.   Some commentators have noted that a 
positive outcome of this fragmentation is that it has prevented collective action towards the overthrow of 
democratic rule and enabled PNG to be one of the few postcolonial states to maintain an unbroken record 
of democratic government. 
 ALLEN & HASNAIN: Power, pork and patronage: Development budgets in PNG
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obviously in relation to corresponding variation in the prevalence and intensity of 
patronage politics, we argue that more work is required to better describe and understand 
the full spectrum of spatial variation before a rigorous explanatory framework can be 
proposed. Such work is currently being undertaken by the authors in conjunction with 
colleagues at the World Bank, the Australian National University and the Papua New 
Guinea Institute of National Affairs. This paper is offered as the first in an intended 
series of papers investigating local-level governance in Papua New Guinea, with a 
particular focus on decision-making processes around the allocation of state development 
funds.  
 
The first part of the paper provides a brief overview of political culture in Papua New 
Guinea with an emphasis on the relationships between elections and patronage politics. 
Some regional variation is noted, in particular the general, but by no means immutable, 
distinction between the Highlands on the one hand, and coastal and island regions on the 
other. A number of salient linkages with the international theoretical literature are also 
examined. The second part of the paper examines several case studies of district and 
local-level governance derived from three separate research projects. The case studies are 
framed by an examination of frequently articulated, but largely anecdotal, observations 
about the functioning of district and local-level governance processes. 
 
2. Political culture, elections and patronage politics 
The introduced state and Westminster-style system of government have not replaced 
Papua New Guinea’s pre-existing political structures and systems. The democratic state 
has hybridised with pre-existing political forms to produce syncretic political modes that 
exhibit elements of both Western and indigenous forms. Indeed, many would argue that 
the introduced state in Papua New Guinea has become thoroughly indigenised (Gordon 
and Meggitt 1985, Standish 1992, Ketan 1996, Morgan 2005).  
 
Reviewing literature on the relationships between local political cultures and the formal 
state in Melanesia, much of which is concerned with Papua New Guinea, Morgan 
concludes that “pre-existing social forms pervade the state at almost every level” 
(Morgan 2005:4). For this reason, Morgan eschews political science’s conventional 
preoccupation with the role of formal state institutions in governing political behaviour, 
in favour of an approach that places political culture at the centre of the analysis. He 
defines political culture as “the sets of actions and values that define and guide political 
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behaviour”, a definition that is shared by several other scholars of Papua New Guinea 
(Morgan 2005:3; also see May 2004, Wolfers 1982, Ketan 2000 and Gelu 2000). 
 
There is considerable support in the political science and anthropology literature on 
politics in Papua New Guinea for the proposition that patronage has become a critical 
defining characteristic of the postcolonial political system (May 1982; Standish 1992, 
2007; Stewart and Strathern 1998; Goldman 2003; Ketan 2002; Ketan 2004; Morgan 
2004). A number of scholars have directly linked the failure of governance with the on-
going prevalence of patronage, in addition to poor management and underlying capacity 
and skills constraints (see, for example, Ketan 2000, May 2004:323 and Morgan 
2004:10). What, then, does this system of patronage look like, and what are the factors 
that drive it? These questions are now considered. 
 
The characteristics of patronage politics  
The literature indicates that patronage in Papua New Guinea is a two way interaction. 
This is clearly apparent if we consider the relationships between patronage and national 
elections. Candidates for political office spend increasingly large amounts of  money on 
campaigning, which is distributed both as cash handouts and in the form of ‘gifts’ 
(Standish 1992, 1996, 2007; Strathern 1993; Stewart and Strathern 1998; Ketan 2000, 
2004; Dinnen 2001). This is particularly the case in the Highlands where ‘money 
politics’ is more prevalent and where candidates have been known to spend up to a 
million kina during election campaigns (Ketan 2007:17; Standish 2007:140-142; Haley 
and Anere forthcoming:26).3 A candidate usually targets this expenditure on their own 
village, clan or tribal grouping, colloquially known as their ‘voter stronghold’ or ‘vote 
bank’ (May 2006a). 
 
Localism and clan mobilisation have been enduring features of national elections in 
Papua New Guinea (Hegarty 1983, Saffu 1996, Standish 2007), as has large numbers of 
candidates, meaning that seats have been won with very small proportions of the overall 
vote under the old first-past-the-post system (see Fraenkel 2004, 2005). Votes are 
effectively purchased by candidates – and this continues to be the case under the limited 
preferential voting (LPV) system first employed in a national election in 2007 – which 
                                                        
3  Based on his close observation of elections in Papua New Guinea over a thirty year period, Standish 
notes that campaigning is generally more intense in the Highlands where clan groups are larger and more 
geographically concentrated, and where the numbers of candidates per electorate are much higher, often 
double, on average, the numbers campaigning in lowland areas (Standish 2007:140). 
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creates one of the directional flows in the two-way patron-client interaction: the 
candidate ‘pays’ for the voting patronage of the constituent. The combined effect of clan 
mobilisation and large numbers of candidates is that MPs have been elected with very 
narrow popular mandates. They could be said to represent their primary kin group and, 
particularly in the Highlands, its alliance networks, at the expense of the wider electorate. 
The primary rationale behind the introduction of the LPV system was the hope that it 
would force candidates to campaign beyond their narrow strongholds, thereby 
broadening the representative base of elected MPs (Standish 2006, Reilly 2006). 
 
It is important to note that the clan voting interpretation of electoral politics described 
above provides insufficient explanation for voting behaviour and electoral outcomes in 
all cases (Filer 1996, Saffu 1996, May 2006a, Standish 2007). Observers highlight 
important regional differences which have already been briefly noted above. The key 
distinction is between the Highlands on the one hand, and the lowlands and islands on 
the other. Generally speaking, in the Highlands clans are relatively larger, there are more 
candidates per electorate and, notwithstanding the increasing fracturing of the clan-based 
vote noted below, these candidates usually represent “clan-based voting blocks” (Reilly 
1996:58; also see Saffu 1996, May 2006a and Standish 2007). In the coastal and islands 
regions, by contrast, “societies are comprised of much smaller clan and village 
units…and…candidates must mobilise numerous small social units, sometimes across 
several local vernacular languages” (Standish 2007:141). 
 
The other directional flow in the patron-client relationship relates to the funding of 
electoral campaigns by constituents who understand that ‘their’ candidate, if successful, 
will repay and reward them with various forms of patronage including jobs, 
infrastructure, development projects and contracts (May 1997, Stewart and Strathern 
1998). In this schema, the successful candidate is the patron and the constituent is the 
client. Moreover, even if supporters have not contributed to funding election campaigns, 
they nevertheless harbour a strong expectation of material gain and patronage in return 
for their votes (Hegarty 1983, Brown 1989, May 1997, Morgan 2004, McLeod 2008). 
 
Of course, however, most candidates in national elections are not successful and this, 
coupled with the ever increasing numbers of candidates, has caused the fracturing of 
tribal, and even clan-based, votes in the Highlands, and the associated electoral and post-
electoral violence that has increasingly characterised national elections across that region 
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(Saffu 1996; Stewart and Strathern 1998; Rumsey 1999; Standish 2002, 2003, 2007; May 
2003; Gibbs et al. 2004). Once in office, MPs will tend to use whatever resources they 
can access to repay their debts, reward their supporters and shore up support in their 
voter strongholds to ensure the best possible chance of re-election (May 1997, Stewart 
and Strathern 1998, Morgan 2004, Standish 2007). While all MPs have access to 
constituency development funds (see Ketan 2007), joining the Executive provides further 
opportunities to access resources for distribution, and becoming a minister affords the 
best possible opportunities of all (Morgan 2004:4).  
 
This depiction of the characteristics of patronage politics in Papua New Guinea is in line 
with a number of general conclusions from the more theoretical political science and 
economics literature that has examined elected policy-makers’ incentives for providing 
public goods and improving service delivery. A stylised fact that has emerged in the 
literature is that policies in developing-country democracies generally benefit narrow 
interests at the expense of broad social interests. The older public choice literature (Olson 
1965, Bates 1981) focused on how the greater organizational ability of special interest 
groups led to policy failures, such as destructive agricultural policies in Africa. However, 
this literature’s emphasis on organized interest fails to explain why some democracies 
are more vulnerable to special interests than others. 
 
The strands of the more recent political economy literature that are particularly relevant 
to Papua New Guinea explain under-investment in public goods and a predominance of 
patronage as a result of either a) politicians discounting the future too much; and/or b) 
the electoral benefits from the pubic goods not being internalized by them or, in other 
words, political market failures. On the former, as Olson (1993) noted, political-
economic settings characterized by systemic instability and a high degree of political 
contestation and turnover are akin to ‘roving bandits’, and, since politicians have a short 
time horizon, they have an incentive to ‘loot today’ rather than to ‘invest for tomorrow’. 
On the latter, politicians will have an incentive to provide targeted benefits to their 
supporters in situations where they will not receive electoral benefits from providing 
public goods due to the difficulty involved in mobilising support for public goods across 
ethnic groups (Easterly and Levine 1997, Alesina et al. 1999, Alesina and La Ferrara 
2005, Keefer 2010); the lack of credibility of national political organizations for 
providing these goods (Keefer 2007); or voters’ lack of information about the actions of 
individual politicians (Besley 2006).    
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It is worth spelling out how this literature would explain the failure of public good 
provision and the predominance of patronage politics in Papua New Guinea. Extreme 
social fragmentation manifest in large numbers of candidates means that each elected 
policy-maker has a very limited time horizon and is unlikely to be able to generate 
sufficient political support from clans other than his own by providing public goods to 
them. Moreover, the lack of voter information means that even if clan identity was not a 
primary form of political mobilization, voters would be unable to associate a good 
outcome with the actions of a particular politician, further increasing the incentive to 
provide targeted benefits for which credit can more easily be claimed.  Under-
development of political parties means that politicians cannot coordinate to achieve 
national goals or appeal to voters through partisan platforms, and instead must build 
personal relationships based on providing individual favours. 
 
A further implication of this literature is that once elections are incapable of enforcing 
accountability then the type of politicians seeking office will also change: honest 
competent individuals will be discouraged from seeking office and instead candidates 
who are more inclined towards ‘money politics’, will take over the political arena 
(Besley 2006).       
 
A detailed description of the drivers of patronage politics is not possible here. Suffice to 
say that a survey of the literature points to a number of factors that have combined to 
give rise to a postcolonial political culture in Papua New Guinea that is strongly 
characterised by localism and patronage. The interrelated issues of extreme social 
fragmentation, the lack of commitment to abstract notions of state and nation, traditional 
leadership styles, wantokism, aspects of the colonial legacy, the collapse of state services 
and the non-emergence of strong political parties have all contributed to the prevalence 
of patronage politics in contemporary Papua New Guinea. Above all, however, it is the 
expectations of citizens themselves which have determined the boundaries of acceptable 
political behaviour (especially see May 1997; Ketan 2004, 2007; Morgan 2005; and 
McLeod 2008), 
 
3. Decentralisation and the politicisation of the development budget 
The avowed spirit and intention of the 1995 Organic Law on Provincial Governments 
and Local Level Governments (OLPGLLG) was to ‘bring government closer to the 
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people’, particularly with regard to access to government services. However, the final 
form of the Organic Law, in concert with subsequent amendments, has produced deeply 
contradictory outcomes. Rather than strengthening the role of LLGs in decision-making 
around service delivery issues, LLGs have been increasingly marginalised from planning 
and financial decision-making processes at both provincial and district levels. They have 
also been starved of funding to perform their basic planning and service delivery 
functions (Barter 2004; May 2006b; National Economic and Fiscal Commission 2007; 
Gelu 2009, forthcoming). The 89 open electorate MPs and their associated electoral and 
administrative units – the districts – have eclipsed or overshadowed all other forms of 
local political activity.  Indeed the OLPGLLG and subsequent amendments thereto can 
be interpreted as a successful attempt by national level politicians, particularly Open 
MPs,4 firstly to remove their competitors in the form of elected provincial 
representatives, and then to gradually increase the volume of resources directly 
channelled into the district level over which they have developed significant de facto and 
de jure control. Many observers would agree with Ron May’s assessment that the “real 
objective” of the 1995 Organic Law was “to substantially increase the political role of 
national MPs” (May 2004:202). 
 
LLGs are defined under the OLPGLLG as elective bodies that represent communities. 
They can take a wide variety of different forms from urban authorities or councils 
through to traditional governmental structures. Most of their membership is comprised of 
elected councillors representing the wards in the LLG area. The law distinguishes 
between urban and rural LLGs for the purposes of funding and appointed membership 
(see Kalinoe 2009:16). The president of the LLG can either be elected by all of the 
people in the LLG area, as is often the case in the lowlands; or by a vote of the LLG 
councillors, which is more commonly the case in the Highlands (May 2005b:2).  
LLGs have a large range of functions including: preparing rolling five year plans taking 
account of the equivalent ward plans; preparing annual plans and budgets based on the 
five year plan; constructing and maintaining infrastructure; and facilitating renewable 
natural resource development (Kalinoe 2009:17). LLGs were also given significant 
legislative powers under the OLPGLLG, covering matters such as labour and 
employment, self-help schools, dispute settlement, local environment and local aid posts 
(May 2004:198). The number of LLGs and wards has increased since the introduction of 
                                                        
4  There are 109 seats in the National Parliament.  Twenty of these are Regional seats, sometimes referred 
to as Provincial seats, one for each of the 19 Provinces and the National Capital District. The remaining 
89 seats, known as Open seats, are co-terminous with District boundaries. 
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the Organic Law in 1995. There are currently somewhere between 303 and 313 LLGs 
and 6,003 and 6,137 wards in Papua New Guinea (Anere 2008; Gelu forthcoming). 
 
The OLPGLLG mandated six types of grants to provinces and LLGs to supplement their 
internal revenue sources (principally head tax, fees and fines, petroleum and mining 
royalties and dividends) and the payment of proceeds from certain tax revenues collected 
by the national government (a share of GST). There have been a number of widely 
recognised problems associated with the inter-governmental financial arrangements 
introduced under the 1995 Organic Law. Many of these stemmed from the effective “de-
linking of funding and function” which occurred with the introduction of a system for 
determining the value of provincial grants based on a formula rather than on the actual 
cost of delivering services (National Economic and Fiscal Commission 2003:15). These 
problems associated with fiscal equalisation have recently been addressed through 
reforms to the inter-governmental fiscal transfer regime.5 However, while these reforms 
hold considerable potential for solving some of the administrative and financial 
dysfunctions of the previous system, they will have no effect on the allocation and 
administration of grants allocated under the development budget. 
 
These development grants are under the discretion of the Joint District Planning and 
Budget Priority Committees (JDPBPCs) which, since their establishment by an 
amendment to the OLPGLLG in 1996, have been responsible for overseeing all aspects 
of planning, prioritisation and budgetary considerations at the district level. In addition to 
the MP representing the district as chair, each JDPBPC consists of the heads of the LLGs 
in the district and up to three other members appointed by the MP in consultation with 
the heads of the LLGs. The District Administrator (DA) is the chief executive officer of 
the JDPBPC. These committees are also responsible for the administration of the fifty 
percent of each MP’s District Support Grant that is non-discretionary (Ketan 2007) and 
for a range of other grants that flow directly to the district level via the national Office of 
Rural Development, including the recently ramped up District Services Improvement 
Program (DSIP).The politicisation and unaccountability of these committees in many, 
though importantly not all, parts of the country has been widely commented on (if not 
                                                        
5  For details of these reforms see National Economic and Fiscal Commission (2009) and Gouy (2009).  
In short, the new ‘fiscal equalisation’ regime introduced via amendments to the OLPGLLG and the 
enactment of the Intergovernmental Relations (Functions and Funding) Act 2009 specifically addresses 
the issue of horizontal imbalances in fiscal capacity.  Grants for provinces and LLGs will now be 
determined according to their ‘fiscal needs amount’.  This will be calculated for each province and LLG 
by subtracting its assessed revenues from its estimated costs of service delivery. 
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particularly well documented), leading to recommendations for their immediate abolition 
in two separate recent official reviews (Public Sector Reform Advisory Group 2006, 
Department of Provincial and Local Government Affairs 2007). 
 
The process that was set in train by the 1995 ‘decentralisation’ reform is on-going and 
has recently been described by one informed commentator as “a kind of decentralisation 
race to the bottom” (Whimp 2009:3). This race has been characterised by the progressive 
increase in resources being channelled into the district level and the concomitant 
adoption of both legislative and de facto measures to increase the control that Open MPs 
have over such resources. Hence we have seen, since the original enactment of the 
OLPGLLG in 1995, amendments to it which have: established the JDPBPCs and with 
them District and Provincial Support Grants; removed the Regional MPs from the 
JDPBPCs; and, most recently, removed LLG presidents from provincial assemblies 
arguably providing Open MPs with more power and leverage vis a vis provincial 
governors.6 Alongside these developments was the increase in District Support Grants, 
but not Provincial Support Grants, to a maximum of K1.5 million for each Open MP in 
1999 (though we must also note the bearing that the machinations of parliamentary 
politics have had on the capricious nature of these allocations); and, most recently, the 
dramatic increase in the District Services Improvement Program (DSIP), which was 
introduced in the National Budget as a non-constitutional grant,7 to K4 million, K6 
million and K4 million per district in the 2007, 2008 and 2009 appropriations. 
 
De facto arrangements have been centred around the deliberate marginalisation of LLG 
presidents, and even District Administrators, from JDPBPC decision-making processes, 
meaning that the significant amount of funds now being channelled through the districts 
can be, and are being, used for pork-barrel politics. This comes at the significant cost of 
                                                        
6  It appears that the rationale behind the November 2006 amendments to the OLPGLLG which removed 
LLG presidents from provincial assemblies was that they would instead sit on new bodies which were to 
be called District Authorities.  A bill to establish such authorities was introduced by then Leader of the 
Opposition Peter O’Neil in 2006.  The District Authorities Bill was passed, but has never been gazetted, 
apparently because the Minister did not sign off on it (National Research Institute 2008:60-61). 
Subsequent moves to enact legislation to reinstate LLG presidents to provincial assemblies appear to have 
foundered.  One possible interpretation is that it is not in the interests of Open MPs, who dominate 
parliament and exclusively constitute the National Executive Council (cabinet), to have LLG presidents 
reinstated.  Note that the Supreme Court has recently ruled the 2006 amendment to be unconstitutional, 
which would appear to pave the way for LLG presidents to be reinstated to Provincial Assemblies (The 
National, 7 June, 2010). 
7  Constitutional grants are mandated under OLPGLLG.  They are the District and Provincial Support 
Grants.  Non-constitutional grants are allocated in the development budget as part of the Public 
Investment Program (PIP).  The DSIP is administered at the national level by the Office of Rural 
Development.  Decisions about how the funding is allocated are made at the district level by the JDPBPC 
(Sai’i 2008; also see Government of Papua New Guinea, n.d.). 
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good service delivery outcomes not only because projects are targeted at MPs’ voter 
strongholds at the expense of the wider electorate, but also because there is a strong 
emphasis on capital investments made with scant regard to provincial, district, LLG or 
ward planning processes and, therefore, to on-going operational funding. Peter Barter 
describes this situation as follows: 
In many instances, parliamentarians select projects and disburse funds 
without consultation and cooperation from district officers or LLGs. 
Funds are often allocated with dubious justification to businesses 
belonging to individual families. In other instances, LLGs are saddled 
with maintenance responsibilities for such projects as water supply 
systems for which they are not prepared – because they were 
constructed by parliamentarians with direct-tied grants, but without the 
required consultations and feasibility studies (Barter 2004:140-141). 
 
Barter continues: 
The system bypasses the provincial and local-level planning systems, 
and downgrades the elected LLGs and district public service. The Joint 
District Planning and Budget Priorities Committees do not function. In 
turn, LLG presidents become isolated from their councillors because 
they tend to rubber stamp the National Members’ political wishes 
(Barter 2004:141). 
 
This view of the JDPBPCs is one which is shared by the Public Sector Reform Advisory 
Group (2006) and the Department of Provincial and Local Government Affairs (2007), 
both of which have recommended their abolition in recent review reports. According to 
the former review: 
The structure of the membership enables MPs who represent the open 
electorates to largely control the budget allocation, and override heads 
of LLGs. They are ex-officio members of JDPBPCs. Many chairpersons 
dominate their JDPBPCs, with meetings held irregularly, and sometimes 
outside the district. It weakens the LLGs role to have a politically 
constituted committee that neither belongs to, nor answers to any level 
of government, that makes decisions on budgeting and planning for 
LLGs (Public Sector Reform Advisory Group 2006:31). 
 
Ketan offers the important observation that another way in which MPs can control the 
decisions of JDPBPCs is through their control over the individual members of the 
committees. Ketan states: 
Administrators and community leaders who sit on planning and budget 
priorities committees are often in client-patron relations with the MPs, 
thereby enabling the MP to exert considerable influence over them. 
(Ketan 2007:20) 
 
Ironically, the main argument made in favour of electoral development funds and other 
grants over which MPs have significant control (such as the DSIP) is the deterioration of 
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service delivery, particularly in rural areas. Ketan provides a detailed discussion of the 
arguments made for and against such funding programs (2007:8-14). Supporters of the 
funds argue that they were initially devised as a useful way of capitalising on MPs’ 
intimate knowledge of their electorates and bypassing bureaucratic bottlenecks to fund 
critical infrastructure projects to the benefit of the whole electorate.  
 
The reality is that service delivery has deteriorated to varying extents across the country, 
leading to a “widespread feeling that the 1995 reforms have not solved the problems of 
the decentralised system” (May 2006b:9). According to the government’s Medium Term 
Development Strategy (2004): 
…in the years since the passage of the Organic Law [1995], service 
delivery has deteriorated. On the whole service delivery systems are 
dysfunctional and there remains widespread confusion over functional 
(who does what) and financial (who pays for what) responsibilities 
across the three levels of government. As well, institutional capacity to 
deliver services is at best described as grossly inadequate (Medium 
Term Development Strategy cited in May 2006b:9). 
 
Importantly, Ketan provides a handful of examples of MPs who have used their funds 
responsibly, by allowing funding applications to be properly screened by committees and 
by using the accounting mechanisms of provincial governments to comply with financial 
management guidelines (Ketan 2007:29-31). However, before moving on to examine 
some recent case studies of district level governance, it is important to note Ketan’s 
conclusion that such positive stories comprise the minority of cases. Moreover, three of 
the MPs in question lost their seats in subsequent elections, demonstrating that good 
management of electorate development funds provides no guarantee of continued 
electoral success. 
 
The above-noted marginalization of LLGs highlights the important role played by 
national-level parliamentary politics in driving political dynamics at the lower levels of 
government. An important change in national-level political dynamics brought about by 
the OLPGLLG has been the dominance of the composition of cabinet, known as the 
National Executive Council (NEC), by Open MPs. This is because the OLPGLLG 
stipulates that the Regional MP will normally become Governor of the Province unless 
he or she accepts any national responsibility as a Minister or head of a Parliamentary 
Committee (or becomes Leader or Deputy Leader of the Opposition). Most Regional 
Members have opted to become Provincial Governors, thereby leaving cabinet positions 
to the Open MPs. The control of national-level executive decision-making by MPs who 
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have a strong vested interest in increasing the concentration of resources and power at 
the district level (as well as their significant numerical supremacy in parliament as a 
whole) has arguably informed a succession of decisions and amendments which have 
progressively increased the size of Open MPs ‘slush funds’ and their level of control 
over them and other types of grants that are administered by the JDPBPCs (Whimp 
2009).8  
 
This marginalization of LLGs also extends to administrative authorities.  The OLPGLLG 
effectively abolished provincial public services and removed the power of provincial 
governments and LLGs to employ staff. These provisions have caused significant 
confusion primarily because it is not clear how the provincial-level reporting structures 
and the authority of the Provincial Administrator relate to the “chain of command within 
national departments and agencies” (May 2004:197). The provisions also raise issues 
concerning the accountability of senior provincial staff to their political leadership given 
that the latter have no say in their hiring and firing. 
 
4. Recent case studies of district and local-level governance 
As mentioned previously, there is a paucity of recent published research and analysis of 
the interactions between the lower levels of government and administrative units in terms 
of development planning and financial decision-making. This sub-section draws upon the 
preliminary findings and reports of two recent research exercises to examine case studies 
of these interactions in districts drawn from several different parts of the country. One of 
the projects was undertaken by the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia (SSGM) 
program in conjunction with researchers from Divine Word University and the NRI 
(Haley 2005; May 2005a, 2005b); and the other by the Constitutional and Law Reform 
Commission (CLRC) (Kalinoe 2009, CLRC 20099). A third relevant research exercise is 
the district and LLG profiling work being conducted by NRI (Gelu 2009, Gelu 
forthcoming). This research is on-going and has not thus far reported sufficient data to 
                                                        
8  See Ketan for a detailed discussion of electoral development funds in Papua New Guinea.  Their value 
increased from K100,000 in 1993 to K300,000 in 1994 and K550,000 in 1996.  In a development that 
exemplifies the point being made here, while the Provincial Support Grants to Regional MPs remained at 
K500,000 each, the Open MPs’ allocations in the form of District Support Grants rose to K1.5 million 
each in 1999, before being reduced back to K500,000 in the face of “public outcry” (Ketan 2007:7). 
Ketan also observes that governments have used electoral development grants to maintain power by 
placating government backbenchers who threaten to cross the floor and ‘punishing’ opposition MPs 
(2007:7, 10). 
9  This work is based on surveys in six provinces:  New Ireland, Morobe, Eastern Highlands, Southern 
Highlands, East Sepik and Gulf.  
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support detailed case studies here. However, the general findings of this exercise 
reported to date, which relate only to the Southern Region, are briefly considered. 
 
The districts that are examined in detail are: Kavieng in New Ireland Province (Kalinoe 
2009, CLRC 2009); Madang in Madang Province (May 2005a); Goroka, Unggai-Bena 
and Daulo in Eastern Highlands Province (May 2005a, CLRC 2009); Rabaul and 
Kokopo in East New Britain District (May 2005a); and Mendi and Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago in South Highlands Province (Haley 2005, May 2005a, CLRC 2009). The two 
research exercises in question employed broadly similar methodologies, primarily 
consisting of the collection of qualitative data through semi-structured interviews with a 
range of stakeholders (politicians, civil servants and civil society representatives) in each 
location. However, it is important to note that the research conducted by May et al. 
explicitly considered a wider range of issues than that undertaken by CLRC. The data 
reported in the surveys conducted by May et al. are current as at late 2004/early 2005, 
and that reported by CLRC are current as at 2008/2009. 
 
These case studies demonstrate the considerable variation in the functionality of local 
level planning processes, from the relative good performance and inclusiveness of local, 
district and provincial level planning and funding processes in East New Britain 
Province, to the dysfunctional ‘worst-case scenario’ of Southern Highlands Province and 
New Ireland Province.  In East New Britain, for example, the Rabaul and Kokopo 
JDPBPCs meet frequently and are said to be effective. In both districts, there is 
reportedly close collaboration between the Open MPs, the JDPBPCs and the district 
administrations, and seemingly effective involvement of civil society.  By contrast, in 
Southern Highlands the Mendi and Koroba-Lake Kopiago it is reported that JDPBPCs do 
not meet, there is no involvement of the community, LLGs, or district staff in the 
utilization of the DSIP and other funds, and the discretion of the MP appears to be 
complete. 
 
Madang Province: Madang District 
The past three Open MPs had all come from outside the province and one respondent 
suggested that a “local Madang man would have real problems”. The Open MP at the 
time of the survey was an Engan who lived and maintained his office in Port Moresby. 
The DA at the time was from Manus Province. The JDPBPC had met only once during 
2004 and the DA did not attend the meeting. The Open MP was accused of “stacking” 
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the JDPBPC. The district five year plan was said to have lapsed and interviewers were 
told that “politicians don’t really respect the public servants”. 
 
Eastern Highlands Province: Goroka, Unggai-Bena and Daulo districts 
Respondents reported a general apathy towards the government and politicians, with the 
exception of the Regional MP at the time who was said to have been doing a good job. 
District administration was described as satisfactory, though at least one DA lived 
outside of the district. Relations between district and provincial administrations were also 
described as satisfactory. The functioning of JDPBPCs was variable in terms of the 
frequency and location of meetings, with reports that some meetings were held in Port 
Moresby. Civil society was said to be adequately represented on JBPBPCs. Most districts 
appeared to have five year plans, but rolling plans were described as “under review” or 
“yet to be finalised”. It was reported that many wards did not have plans, more so in the 
less developed districts. 
 
Although there is legislative provision in the province for LLGs to collect head taxes, 
they do not do so, meaning their primary source of internal revenue is from village court 
fines, trade store licenses and market fees. However people are often unwilling to pay 
these due to widespread distrust of the government and accusations of misappropriation 
of funds at both the ward and LLG levels. There were also reports of councillors 
“abusing their powers” and a former provincial premier said that LLG presidents are 
often young educated men who do not understand the realities of village life. 
  
Several respondents claimed that service delivery was poor, particularly in the more 
remote districts, but that civil society was “filling the gaps”. Major communications and 
transport constraints were reported in all districts. Public servants in Daulo and Unggai-
Bena reported difficulties accessing their pay due to the lack of banking services in those 
districts. 
 
Southern Highlands Province: Mendi and Koroba-Lake Kopiago districts 
Both districts were without Open MPs at the time of the survey (in the case of Mendi the 
MP had been removed from office after being found guilty of misappropriating funds; 
and in Koroba-Lake Kopiago the MP had been removed following a technical appeal 
against the 2002 election result).  In Mendi, relations between the district and provincial 
administrations were described as “poor”. The DA was frequently absent and the 
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JDPBPC met infrequently, usually in Port Moresby or Goroka. In the absence of the 
Open MP, the JDPBPC was said to be controlled by associates of the provincial 
governor. 
 
In Koroba-Lake Kopiago, the DA was also said to be frequently absent from the district. 
While relations between the district and provincial administration were said to be 
satisfactory, it was claimed that successive DAs had been political appointments. The 
JDPBPC was said to meet only once or twice a year and even then outside the district in 
Port Moresby or Goroka. One informant stated that LLG presidents had been given 
money to go off and “drink and play the pokies” while the meeting was in progress. It 
was also reported that civil society is not involved in the JDPBPC process.  In both 
districts it was said that LLG presidents and councillors had been politically appointed 
by the provincial government and that this, in conjunction with lack of funds, had 
undermined the LLG system. In both districts there was uncertainty as to the existence of 
district plans and the planning process was said to be highly politicised. 
 
In terms of revenue and expenditures, there were reports in both districts of widespread 
misuse of funds and of MPs using funds to buy support. LLGs do not collect head taxes. 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago is without banking services and public servants travel by air 
transport to Mount Hagen to collect their pay and, according to one respondent, they 
“often get stuck there for months at a time”. Service delivery was said to be 
unsatisfactory in both districts. The poor security situation is a significant impediment to 
service delivery in these areas due to frequent road blocks and the widespread 
breakdown in law and order. 
 
East New Britain Province: Rabaul and Kokopo districts 
Respondents in both districts said that the Open MPs had served the districts well. In 
both cases the JDPBPCs had met several times during 2004 (six times in the case of 
Rabaul and three in the case of Kokopo) and were said to be effective. There was said to 
be close collaboration between the Open MP, the JDPBPC and the district administration 
in both districts. Civil society is represented on both JDPBPCs by women’s, youth and 
churches’ representatives; and civil society (including NGOs, business and village 
communities) is said to play an important role in development at both district and 
provincial levels. 
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All districts in the province have five year plans. In both Rabaul and Kokopo, ward 
development plans were said to be feeding into the LLG and district planning processes. 
Both provincial sectoral staff and civil society groups actively participate in planning at 
the ward level, and LLG presidents submit their LLG plans to the JDPBPC. District 
plans contain summaries of all the LLG plans. The Rabaul DA reported that funding was 
sometimes late or inadequate, but that coordination between government agencies in the 
district was generally satisfactory. The relationships between LLGs and district 
administrations was said to be “very good”.  In both districts it was reported that Open 
MPs have generally allowed JDPBPCs to allocate their District Support Grants. Head 
taxes have been introduced at the LLG level and in Kokopo revenue from these taxes is 
shared between the ward and the LLG. In Rabaul it was reported that communities 
contribute in kind to local projects, for example, by providing carpenters to help build a 
classroom initiated by the JDPBPC.  In both districts access to basic services was said to 
be good, though some respondents said that service delivery had been politicised. Other 
obstacles to service delivery included inadequate funding, manpower shortages, poor 
management skills and logistical constraints. 
 
New Ireland Province: Kavieng District 
From 2002 to 2007, and under the initiative of the former governor, a parallel and un-
regulated system was established for distributing provincial funds to constituents that 
resulted in a considerable deterioration of service delivery in the province.  This parallel 
system, known as the Limus Structure, was essentially the use of the governor’s 2002 
election campaign committees as a vehicle for distributing state resources, entirely 
bypassing the provincial government, district administrations, and local level 
governments.  As a result, there were no budgetary provisions to line departments, and a 
complete lack of functionality of the established provincial and district administrations.   
 
In  Kavieng, the  DA, who had been in the position for around two years, stated that the 
lack of office and housing infrastructure, particularly at the rural LLG sub-districts, was 
a major constraint to the provision of services because field staff were based in town. 
Even in the case of Kavieng District headquarters, which is located in town, there is no 
designated district administrative office, meaning that district staff are scattered around 
different parts of town.  
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The DA also stated that district and LLG grants mandated under the OLPLLG were often 
late in arriving and were not in accordance with the prescribed funding formula. The 
small amount of funding received by LLGs, usually late in the year, is only sufficient to 
pay councillors allowances. The Kavieng Town Mayor (who is the elected head of the 
LLG) and the Town Manager similarly stated that lack of funding was a serious 
constraint. They had not received any funding from the provincial government for the 
past four years and had been entirely dependent on national government grants. 
 
With regard to the Kavieng JDPBPC, the DA stated that it had not been functioning 
effectively for the past four years. On two instances the JDPBPC had met without the 
knowledge or involvement of the DA.  
 
Southern Region: preliminary findings from LLG and district profiling  
The findings from this survey have thus far only been reported in summary form in an 
National Research Institute Spotlight publication (Gelu 2009) and, to a lesser extent, in 
an unpublished conference paper (Gelu forthcoming). The survey collects questionnaire 
data from district and LLG officers, and records the assets and facilities of districts and 
LLGs. To date the survey has only been conducted in the Southern Region (Western, 
Gulf, Central, Oro and Milne Bay provinces).  In the case of the districts surveyed (Rigo, 
Kairuku, Alotau, Tufi, Kerema and North Fly), the following observations have been 
reported in relation to development planning, funding issues and service provision: 
 Inadequate funding is a problem in all districts. 
 There is unclear delineation of authority between districts and provincial 
administrations, particularly in Tufi and Kerema. 
 JDPBPCs are ineffective due to lack of transparency and irregular meetings, 
particularly in Kairuku, Tufi and Kerema. 
 There was a lack of awareness in all districts about the DSIP and how the funds 
were being used. 
 Tufi and Kerema do not have district plans. 
 All districts experience varying degrees of administrative constraints relating to 
staffing, infrastructure and transport. 
 All districts have problems with health and education services including lack of 
staff, materials and supplies. Church-run schools and health centres generally 
have better facilities, supplies and material than government-run services. 
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The following relevant observations have been reported in relation to the LLGs profiled 
(Rigo Central Rural, Mekeo/Kuni Rural, Huhu Rural, Alotau Urban, Kerema Central, 
Kiunga Rural, and Tufi Rural): 
 None of the LLGs have either LLG or ward development plans; 
 Only two LLGs receive sufficient funding to support administration and service 
delivery. These are Huhu Rural LLG, which raises revenue in the form of fees 
from Alotau market; and Kiunga Rural LLG, which receive royalties from Ok 
Tedi mine; 
 The LLGs generally lack administrative capacity and some lack council 
chambers. 
 
The case studies presented above lend significant weight to the generalised and 
frequently cited observations about district and local-level governance that were 
examined in the previous sub-section. This particularly applies to the domineering role 
that many Open MPs play in development planning and financial decision-making at the 
district level, to the exclusion of LLG presidents, ward councillors, and communities and 
civil society at large. However, the case studies also provide a window into the enormous 
diversity and variation in practice that exists across the country. This diversity of 
planning and financial decision-making contexts is directly reflected in the range of 
service delivery outcomes that are observed in different provinces and districts. . Again, 
we can point to East New Britain and Southern Highlands as exemplars of good and bad 
service delivery outcomes respectively. Most local-level contexts in Papua New Guinea 
probably lie somewhere along the continuum between the case study districts examined 
in these two provinces. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As stated in the introduction, empirical field data on the functionality and inclusiveness 
of district and local-level decision-making around development planning and, 
particularly, the allocation of state development funds is too inchoate to be able to start 
developing rigorous frameworks to explain apparent variation. That said, the finding of 
significant spatial variation is in itself important as it challenges the orthodoxy that these 
local-level processes are ubiquitously dysfunctional and the associated assumption that 
all development funds, so-called slush funds, are being used for pork-barrelling in MPs’ 
voter strongholds. Moreover, the apparent extent of spatial variation lends itself to the 
development of hypotheses to explain this variation. One tentative hypothesis is 
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canvassed below. However, more work is clearly required to gain a better understanding 
of the extent and nature of spatial variation in the local-level governance of state 
development funds. As mentioned at the outset, a program of research is currently being 
undertaken at the district and LLG level with a view to doing precisely this.  
 
The bare bones provided by the case studies sketched out here, and the accompanying 
survey of the literature on political culture and patronage, has enabled us to frame this 
research program around some of the relationships that appear to emerge from the 
limited data available to date. The spatial variation in the extent to which MPs 
marginalise LLG presidents in order to control the allocation of development funds 
appears to loosely map onto similar patterns of spatial variation in the intensity of 
patronage politics, money politics, and the traditional and on-going importance of the 
‘big-man’ system.10 The critical, though by no means immutable, distinction is between 
the Highlands on the one hand, and the lowlands and islands on the other; with the 
former characterised by clan-voting and more aggressive and individualistic leadership 
styles, and the latter by a greater emphasis on mediation and group decision-making. 
This provides an initial hypothesis: that functionality is related to the intensity of 
patronage politics. Importantly, however, the evidence of relative dysfunctionality in 
parts of some coastal and island provinces, such as Madang and New Ireland 
respectively, highlights the clumsiness and crudeness of this geographical dichotomy.  
Data from a larger number of districts and LLG areas will enable us to investigate these 
spatial relationships more rigorously, and the field sites have been selected accordingly. 
 
Another important research question relates to the impact of limited preferential voting 
(LPV). The change in the electoral system has raised the potential for significantly 
changing the clan, tribal and patron-client dynamics associated with elections, and 
therefore local resource allocation. The introduction of LPV was an attempt at electoral 
engineering in the sense that it was “intended to change people’s electoral behaviour or 
political culture, and in particular to break down the intense localism found in most areas 
of Papua New Guinea” (Standish 2006:197). Importantly, the preliminary evidence 
relating to the impact of LPV on campaigning in the 2007 election indicates that while 
                                                        
10  The behaviour of politicians in contemporary Papua New Guinea strongly resonates with the 
leadership style of traditional big-men.  Notwithstanding important regional variations, a key defining 
characteristic of traditional big-man politics is the accumulation and distribution of resources to create 
webs of obligation and reciprocity; or, in other words, patron-client relations.  It is this particular aspect 
of the big-man model that finds most resonance in the ‘tactics’ and behaviour of modern Melanesian 
parliamentarians (see Morgan 2005 and McLeod 2008). 
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candidates sought votes and preferences more widely than they have done in the past, the 
basic pattern of campaigning has remained the same (Haley and Anere forthcoming; also 
see May 2008). Moreover money politics intensified in the 2007 election, possibly as a 
consequence of the increased scope for vote buying under the LPV system.  
 
However, one area for cautious optimism relates to campaigning strategies around the 
allocation of preferences (Standish 2006, May 2008, Haley and Anere forthcoming). 
There is evidence to suggest that in five of the ten districts which had previously had a 
LPV by-election, voters during the 2007 election allocated preferences to strong 
candidates with solid track records. This is a promising departure from the widespread 
strategy observed during the 2007 election and in previous LPV by-elections whereby 
candidates asked their primary voters to direct their preferences to minor candidates who 
were unlikely to pose a threat. The selection of districts in our current research program 
will enable us to investigate possible relationships between LPV and patronage politics. 
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Abstract 
This paper details a new model for local government consultation and research.  The 
model involves a local government partnering with a university to establish an online 
panel of citizens that is then used for consultations and research on a range of local 
government issues over time. The model was evaluated across an 18-month pilot 
involving three metropolitan councils in South Australia, each running its own panel.  
This paper details the rationale behind the panels, steps involved in their establishment, 
and what the most effective recruitment methods were to build panel membership.  The 
model’s ability to recruit a wide audience of citizens as members, including those who 
would not normally participate in local government matters, is examined, as well as 
citizen expectations of the panel and satisfaction with being a member.  Finally, key 
learnings from the pilot are identified.   The pilot results demonstrate that such an online 
panel model can be used effectively in the local government context.  The panels 
achieved citizen membership wider than that historically seen in local government 
consultation and research, and were sustainable in terms of continued participation and 
high levels of citizen satisfaction.   Since the pilot, the project has grown to include seven 
councils and almost 2500 citizens.  This is further evidence that this model offers a way 
forward for enhanced citizen participation in local government decision-making and 
policy development. 
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1. Introduction 
Meaningful and effective community consultation and participation have been identified 
as critical for local government in the 21st century, as has improved monitoring and 
evaluation of local government performance.  Coupled with this, has been a call for local 
government to find new ways to build capacity with cited examples including partnering 
with other organisations (Sansom, 2010).  This paper examines the pilot of a model for 
local government citizen consultation and research that goes some way to introducing 
these desired elements. 
 
The pilot was initiated out of frustration with the limitations and expense associated with 
existing methods of citizen consultation and research.  Two large metropolitan local 
governments in Adelaide, South Australia, approached and partnered with a University 
of South Australia-based research institute to trial an alternative approach to community 
consultation and research – an online citizen panel.  Funding from the Local Government 
Association of South Australia supported an 18-month pilot of the model.  The pilot saw 
three metropolitan city councils establishing online panels of citizens with which they 
regularly consulted and conducted research.  Each panel sought wide membership from 
citizens living and working in the local government area and aimed to reach an initial 
critical mass of 300 members. 
 
While many councils and other local government agencies conduct off-line research and 
consultations, these are rarely done through a continuous multiple-purpose panel, built 
specifically for that organisation. Rather, specialist advisory committees or citizen juries 
are used, made up of a small number of citizens for a particular purpose or issue.  Such 
consultation mechanisms are common in the UK and increasingly so in Australia.  As for 
the use of online methods, at the time the pilot was initiated, online research and 
consultation in the local government arena had mostly been limited to one-off research or 
consultation surveys hosted on council web sites on an ad hoc basis, and ongoing online 
citizen panels not been established. 1  The pilot project examined in this paper was the 
first in Australia to establish online panels across multiple councils and with the aim of 
learning and disseminating knowledge about this approach.  It was also the first example 
                                                        
1  Parramatta Council would be one notable exception to this.  The authors would like to gratefully 
acknowledge the time and information shared by Parramatta Council (especially Wade Clark) during the 
project’s development.  Ku-ring-gai Council, north of Sydney, is another example of a council that has a 
multiple-use citizen panel, built specifically for its needs. 
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of local governments partnering with an external organisation (in this case a university-
based research institute) to establish and manage the online citizens panels.  The 
university had its own in-house research field team, including the ability to write, host 
and analyse consultation surveys.  This partnership gave local government access to 
research design and consultation implementation expertise, as well as being able to 
assure panel members of anonymity and confidentiality in their participation.  The 
university gained benefits from being able to build a research agenda around the pilot; 
one that was grounded in practice-oriented research. 
 
2.  Research and consultation in the local government context 
 
Consultation and research: An operating requirement  
Community consultation and research has become an essential aspect of local 
government operations.  In Australia, like many other jurisdictions, local governments 
are required to inform, and often to consult with, their citizens on matters that potentially 
affect them.  The exact requirements vary for different matters and are generally 
governed by state laws and each local government’s consultation policy.  For example, in 
South Australia, under the Local Government Act (1999), there is a statutory requirement 
for local councils to consult with citizens when establishing strategic plans, setting 
annual business plans and budgets, changing rating policies, or considering changes to 
the status of community land.  In addition, there is a requirement to notify citizens of 
such activities and give ‘interested persons’ a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to have input into 
the planning process.  This includes, at a minimum, the publication of notices in the local 
paper, making draft plans publicly available, and considering submissions from members 
of the public when drafting plans. 
 
In addition to these requirements to consult citizens, there is increasing pressure for 
government policy to be informed by research, and for performance, service delivery and 
customer service to be monitored by undertaking research with citizens (UTS Centre for 
Local Government/LGCSA 2007).  In the local government context, research generally 
refers to activities where the aim is to gather reliable, statistically projectable results, 
usually by surveying a sample that is representative of the local population.  Community 
consultation, in contrast, is typically more focused on gathering input or feedback from 
those who are interested in contributing.  At times, the two tasks of research and 
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consultation can have very different, and potentially competing objectives, especially 
when consultation is undertaken as a socio-political task but research is conducted as an 
objective scientific process.  Reconciling these can be a challenging task for local 
government managers. 
 
However, whilst acknowledging that research and consultation are different activities 
with different principles and objectives, both can be considered forms of public 
participation.  The International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) puts forward 
one of the most well known frameworks for categorising community participation.  The 
IAP2 spectrum of participation ranges from ‘informing the public’, through to ‘listening 
to the public’, ‘engaging in problem solving’, and ‘developing agreements’ (for more 
information see HTTP://iap2.org/practionertools/index.shtml).  According to the 
‘spectrum’, the research and consultation examples discussed in this paper would mostly 
be classed as ‘listening’ and this paper evaluates the effectiveness of the online panel 
approach for this task. 
 
Consultation and research: A valued activity 
Citizen consultation and research are valued means of obtaining feedback and input from 
the community, enabling councils to be more responsive and representative in their 
decision-making (City of Tea Tree Gully 2001).  They are also seen as means by which 
to build social capital, through encouragement of broader understanding and ownership 
of decisions and plans (Aukett 2009) and to enhance a council’s reputation as open, 
accountable and willing to listen (Local Government Association of SA 2007). 
 
Over the last forty years, the value of engaging citizens in decision-making and 
governance has been discussed extensively in the planning, public administration and 
governance literature (see Day 1997, Bishop and Davis 2002, or Irvin and Stansbury 
2004 for comprehensive reviews).  There has been a particular focus on the potential of 
citizen participation to improve outcomes and foster good governance.  Community 
consultation is seen as one of the central mechanisms to raise the level of citizen 
participation in decision-making and engage constituents (Brackertz and Meredyth, 
2009), and the last decade has seen a groundswell of support for the concept of 
community input in local government.  This support has been manifest in the 
appointment of ‘community engagement officers’ and the institution of ‘consultation 
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policies’ which outline the range of issues on which local governments will seek input, 
the principles guiding processes, and appropriate methods to be used (see Brackertz and 
Meredyth, 2009 and Local Government Association of South Australia 2007 for reviews 
of policies and practices in various Australian states).  Increased consultation and 
research with citizens are part of this broader trend towards greater community 
engagement and collaboration (Lowndes, Pratchett et al. 2001).  Local government is 
moving away from using consultation activities as a ‘disaster check’ towards actively 
seeking citizen input early in decision-making and policy development processes, and 
most councils in Australia now use a diverse range of methods and approaches for 
working with citizens (Hornby 2007). 
 
In the context of local government, research amongst citizens is valued for its ability to 
monitor and provide reliable feedback to local governments regarding service delivery.  
It is also relied upon to provide local government with a representative snapshot of 
community sentiments on an issue or decision, often when there have been vocal 
objections from a section of the community, or where an impasse has been reached. 
 
The literature does not often acknowledge the challenges managers face in translating 
principles of consultation and research into activities, and how difficult, time consuming, 
and costly consultation and research can be for a local government to implement.  Many 
local governments face capacity issues and do not have the staff or infrastructure to 
design or implement consultation strategies themselves (Lowndes, Pratchett et al. 2001).  
For these reasons, many local governments choose to outsource the design or 
implementation of research or consultation to external providers, making activities costly 
and preventing local governments from learning how to do these things well themselves.  
For many, the purported benefits of citizen consultation and research fall short in reality. 
 
Consultation and research: A frustrating reality 
Local governments face a challenging and frustrating reality when it comes to putting 
consultation policies into practice.  The results of consultation activities are often 
disappointing, both in terms of the number of people engaged and the usefulness of the 
findings for developing policies or aiding decision-making (Cuthill 2001).  Moreover, 
local governments often find consultation activities difficult to sustain over the longer 
term, typically running very effective consultations on just one or two issues (usually due 
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to the dedication of key staff to the process), but lacking the resources, staff, or time to 
do so on a sustained basis.  
 
As Brackertz and Meredyth (2009) point out, the process used to facilitate community 
participation largely determines the outcomes.  A range of different processes or 
approaches are commonly used in local government (see Heylen 2007 for a discussion of 
Australian practices or Lowndes, Pratchett et al. 2001 for a discussion of practices in UK 
councils), all of which have limitations or challenges.  For example, ‘town hall’ meetings 
and public submission processes usually garner extremely limited participation and 
attract mostly people who are highly involved with the issue under consideration and are 
polarised in their opinions.  This is because attending a meeting or writing a submission 
requires citizens to go to considerable effort, and consequently there is a large element of 
self-selection bias.  The handfuls of people who do participate in such processes are 
usually part of a vocal minority opposed to a decision or policy and are therefore not 
representative of community sentiment.  This is problematic for local governments, as 
they must make decisions that take into account the views of the entire community.  This 
pattern of small numbers of unrepresentative, often negative participants can be 
disillusioning to local government staff and decision-makers.  There is scepticism 
amongst managers that consultation will garner any genuinely new ideas or useful 
feedback or that it will amount to anything more than just the ‘usual suspects’ (Brackertz 
and Meredyth 2009). Similarly, surveys designed by councils and distributed to 
community groups or through service contact points are often criticised for being poorly 
designed, not being sufficiently impartial, and for achieving only small, unrepresentative 
samples.  As a result, local government decision-makers tend to be dismissive or 
distrusting of findings gathered through such processes (Wilson 1999). 
 
A more proactive approach, aimed at overcoming the problem of representativeness in 
consultation, is recruiting groups of citizens willing to be consulted on a range of issues, 
rather than recruiting interested citizens on an ad hoc basis to be consulted on a single 
issue. Citizen Advisory Panels are generally set up in this way (Lowndes, Pratchett et al. 
2001), with a select panel being recruited to represent the community and meeting 
regularly to review policy and advise council on a range of issues.  However, the chance 
of these few selected individuals being truly representative is slim, especially given that 
the nature of the advisory process (regular meetings) is likely to attract only politically 
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engaged citizens.  Citizens’ Juries tend to be better in terms of representativeness 
because participants are typically selected through random sampling approaches 
(Hendricks 2002), but require substantial resources to set up.  Managers often lack the 
skills or infrastructure to do so independently, managing them can be time consuming, 
and they too typically only involve a few individuals. 
 
Larger government agencies commonly use telephone and mail survey methods to garner 
the opinions of a broad cross-section of the community, and often engage external 
organisations to implement it to overcome design, implementation and impartiality 
issues.  However the time and expense of such methods is an impediment to using them 
regularly or for many issues.  Even a large city council can only afford to do two or three 
such research exercises a year, leaving many decisions under-informed with respect to 
the views of the community. 
 
There is a clear gap between what local governments would like to achieve in terms of 
citizen consultation and research, and current practice, suggesting a need for innovative 
approaches and new models which overcome time, resource and competency constraints.  
 
3.  Online approaches 
An emerging methodology for consultation and research is online.  The recent growth in 
Internet connectivity means that in most countries a majority of the population can be 
reached online – in Australia, 72% of the population is using the internet regularly 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009).  One of the key advantages of using an online 
approach is that it is easier for citizens to participate.  People can choose to participate 
whenever and wherever is convenient for them.  It is far easier for people to participate 
in an online survey or comment on a forum than to attend a public meeting or write a 
formal submission.  It is also less threatening as people can participate in private, take as 
much time as they need, and can choose to remain anonymous, making full disclosure 
more likely (Holbrook and Krosnick 2010).  By making consultation and research 
processes more accessible to the public, more people should be willing to participate and 
potentially, participants may also come from a more diverse cross-section of the 
community. 
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Some local governments, both in Australia and other Commonwealth countries, are 
already using online approaches.  Surveys or forums are most commonly used and are 
generally focused on a single issue and hosted on the agency’s website.  However, such 
approaches have limitations in that presumably only those people who are already 
engaged with local government affairs or the particular issue tend to notice them and go 
to the effort of visiting the website and participating.  So while the process may be more 
accessible and involve more people, the issues of representativeness and involving the 
silent majority are not really addressed by hosting an online survey on a website.   
 
A more promising approach is to establish a panel of citizens who are interested in being 
consulted on a range of issues to do with their local community and inviting them more 
directly to participate in consultations online.  A panel that is recruited to provide 
feedback on a range of issues will likely be less affected by issue-based non-response 
bias, and more able to represent a community accurately than a sample of respondents 
self-selected themselves to participate in a consultation on a single issue.  If the panel is 
to be predominantly based online then citizens may be willing to join as participating 
will be easy and convenient for them.   
Online panels are widely used by private sector companies and academics to conduct 
research and have been shown to have advantages over telephone and mail surveys in 
terms of their ability to collect a large number of responses relatively quickly and at a 
low incremental cost (see Ilieva, Baron et al. 2002 for a particularly good summary of 
their advantages).  Many research and consumer-orientated companies have been 
successful in establishing large online panels of their customers and using them for 
research (Batinic and Morser 2005 as cited in Joinson, McKenna et al. 2007).   
 
Online panels could be a very promising alternative for local governments wanting to 
conduct research and consult with their community.  There have been some ad hoc 
moves towards this approach in Australia.  As noted earlier, at the time of the pilot at 
least two local governments in Australia had successfully recruited and used citizen 
panels on an ongoing basis, although online components were minimal.  Moreover, 
online panels had not been implemented in a co-ordinated way across multiple agencies, 
nor had they been subject to academic scrutiny.  The approach also had not been run in a 
partnership context between an agency and a research partner.  These were some of the 
motivations behind the pilot project when launched in late 2007. 
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4.  The online panel model in action 
The online panel model was piloted in three metropolitan councils in South Australia.  
The councils publicised widely to their local communities that they were establishing an 
online panel and were looking for citizens to be involved.  They used a variety of 
promotional methods, the effectiveness of which is reported later in this paper.  The 
panels were promoted as a way that citizens could ‘help shape their city’s future’ and 
that, once registered, people would be invited (via email) to participate in between four 
to eight online surveys a year for their local council.  The registration process was 
relatively simple.  The university designed and managed an online survey to collect 
names, contact details, demographic variables relevant to the local government context 
(household composition for example) and information about their prior contact, 
involvement and satisfaction with their local government.  These variables were used to 
evaluate the representativeness of the panels.  It was felt that a simple demographic 
comparison against the Australian Bureau of Statistics profile of the local government 
area would not address of issue of representativeness in terms of attitudes, knowledge 
and involvement in the sorts of issues to be discussed.  So, this fuller range of variables 
was collected on registration and used in the representativeness analyses.  All of this 
information was fed into a database designed by the university to manage responses and 
facilitate the sending of surveys.   
 
Councils notionally aimed to recruit 300 panel members, as this is in the vicinity of what 
a commercial research activity would aim to sample.  Once panels reached 300 they were 
validated against a traditionally used research methodology (telephone interviews or mail 
surveys) by running the same survey in parallel through both methodologies and directly 
comparing results across demographic, attitudinal and behavioural variables.  Results 
were also validated against Australian Bureau of Statistics data for each area.  If deemed 
to be sufficiently representative by the academic researchers at the completion of this 
process (all panels met this requirement), the panel was then used for research and 
consultation.   Even once their panels reached 300 the councils continued to publicise 
them and recruited additional members throughout the pilot period. 
 
An important element of these panels was that anyone living, working, using services, or 
paying rates in the local government area was welcome to join their local panel.  
Members were not selected and membership was not restricted in any way.  
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Correspondingly, tests for representativeness were aimed at establishing the validity of 
the online approach and the panels, rather than obtaining a perfectly matched sample. 
The principle of open membership is an important distinction from panels where 
members are selected on the basis of their credentials or characteristics, or where 
demographic or geographic quotas are imposed.  Open membership was adopted to 
signal the councils’ openness to community input from wherever it came.  Furthermore, 
because the panels were also promoted as an exercise in community engagement by the 
councils, turning interested citizens away would have been counter-productive.  
 
That the panels were to be predominantly engaged online was also a key concern for 
councils, and strategies were implemented to make the panels more accessible: making 
the online surveys available through local library computers, running training sessions 
for citizens not familiar with email or online surveys, and in some cases, making paper 
versions of the survey available to those citizens without access to a computer.  
Interestingly, these paper surveys had extremely low uptake.  From this, it appears that 
online access was not an impediment to participation and that people did have a 
preference for the convenience of the online option. 
 
The panels were managed by the university partner, protecting the anonymity of 
participants, enabling the sharing of database and survey infrastructure costs and 
overcoming issues of capacity and expertise within councils.  The university also 
designed the surveys used for consultations and research, managed the online surveys, 
conducted analysis and reported back survey findings to council managers and elected 
representatives.  This enabled councils without the skills or capacity to do so themselves 
to establish panels and was important to the integrity of the process.  Community 
participants were able to comment honestly, knowing that the university, not the council, 
managed survey responses and that their identity would remain anonymous.  The 
involvement of the university as an external gatekeeper partner also has implications for 
improved willingness of citizens to join a panel in the first place (Heberlein and 
Baumgartner 1978).  That consultation surveys were designed and analysed by an 
external agency gave credibility and independence to the process and ensured councils 
saw the panels as reliable sources of information.  The university also acted as the 
custodian of the panels, advocating on their behalf and ensuring they were not over- or 
under-utilised, a role that was important for the long-term health of the panels.  Because 
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of the university’s academic interest in the panels and its full in-house research services 
ability, resources were available to experiment and provide valued-added services (eg the 
use of pop-ups in surveys) to the panels that would have been prohibitively expensive 
and not offered in as flexible a way if a commercial research partner had been involved. 
 
Each council conducted between five and seven research or consultation surveys over the 
course of the 18-month pilot.  Consultations were scheduled every three months 
(approximately), or conducted as need arose.  The frequency of consultation was one of 
the issues on which feedback from panel participants was sought at the completion of the 
pilot.  Council managers and elected members determined what issues were put to the 
panels and the council retained ownership of the panel.  Although all communications 
were sent via the university’s software and servers, everything was branded as being an 
initiative of the individual council in collaboration with the university partner and as part 
of a broader cross-council program (‘Community Panel’), giving consistency to the 
process. 
 
5.  Evaluating the online panel model 
Through the pilot the feasibility and sustainability of an online panel model was tested in 
the local government context.  The most effective recruitment methods were determined 
and the time it took to build a panel of a size sufficient for research and consultation 
established empirically.  Participant data was analysed to determine if the panels were 
able to engage citizens who had not previously participated in community consultations, 
and whether community participants were satisfied with the model.  The results from this 
evaluation are discussed below.  
 
Results: Panel membership numbers 
A key question for the pilot was whether the local councils could recruit a panel of 
sufficient size for conducting research and consultation.  Table 1 details the number of 
panel members each council had recruited by the end of the 18-month pilot. 
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Table 1: Panel membership numbers 
Local Council Panel Members Area Population 
(ABS Census 2006) 
Panel as % of 
Population 
A 732 42 000 1.8 
B 684 95 000 0.7 
C 437 45 000 1.0 
 
As the results illustrate, each of the local governments exceeded the notional 300-
member ‘threshold’ by the close of the pilot, recruiting between 400 and 700 members 
each.  Although the local governments varied in population from 42 000 to 95 000 
residents, each panel represented about one percent of the local government’s residential 
population.  Whilst this may seem too few to be considered effective representation, it is 
a vast improvement on public meetings that typically engage fewer than 50 participants, 
or even commissioned phone surveys that typically include only 300 to 400 participants. 
Hence, the participating councils judged the panels a success in terms of their ability to 
engage more citizens than traditional approaches. 
 
How long it took councils to build their panel to the ‘threshold’ size of 300 members 
varied from as little as four months to just over six months.  Council B had more than 
500 members within five months; however, Council A recruited just 262 members in the 
same time period.  A controversial local issue then saw an additional 150 people join that 
panel in a single week, growing the panel to 416 members after six months of 
recruitment.  This raises the issue of the potential for a particular issue to skew a panel 
which, while not empirically examined in this paper, is important.  Council C grew to 
400 members within four months and then remained stable for the remainder of the pilot.  
On the basis of these results, it seems that local governments can build a usable citizen 
panel quite quickly – most certainly within six months of establishment.  
 
Results: Recruitment methods 
The pilot trialled a range of recruitment methods in order to evaluate their effectiveness 
in growing panel membership.  The effectiveness of recruitment methods was captured 
through a (prompted) question in the registration survey asking new members how they 
heard about the panel.  As the trends were the same across all three panels, the results are 
aggregated and are shown in Table 2.  The total number of panel members reported in 
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Table 2 is less than the number of panel members overall, as only the top five methods 
are listed. 
 
Table 2: Top 5 recruitment methods  
Recruitment Methods n % 
Flyer with rates notice 794 43 
Advert in council newsletter 314 17 
Article in the local newspaper 200 11 
Promotion on council website 131 7 
Flyer at the library/ council offices 126 7 
 
Recruitment methods with very broad reach, like a sending a flier to all ratepayers with 
the council’s quarterly rates notices, were found to be most effective.  Advertisements in 
council newsletters or articles in the local paper were the next most effective methods, 
primarily because they are circulated to every business and household.  Other somewhat 
effective methods included promoting the panel on the council’s website, at the council 
offices and library, and encouraging members to tell their friends.  As these methods are 
fairly low cost to implement, they are probably worthwhile, although they recruit 
proportionally fewer members.  Interestingly, recruitment methods that entailed 
additional resources or management time, like having staff hand out fliers at local events, 
tended not to result in much membership growth (less than three percent in total).  That 
many of the most effective recruitment methods were ‘off-line’ is particularly notable 
and is likely to be important for the representativeness of such online panels.   
 
Results: Engaging the ‘silent majority’ 
Another research question for the pilot was whether an online panel approach could 
engage more than just the ‘usual suspects’ and effectively reach a wider audience of 
citizens.  For this reason, two of the panels (A and B) were surveyed about their prior 
engagement with council and asked if they had previously attended a council meeting 
(and if so, how recently) or participated in any council consultations previously (no 
timeframe was set). Response rates were high, although not 100%, with 330 members of 
Panel A and 353 members of Panel B completing these survey questions, the results of 
which are reported below in Tables 3 and 4.  
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Table 3: Panel participants – attendance at council meetings 
 Panel A 
% 
Panel B 
% 
Never attended a council meeting 62 68 
More than 12 months ago 28 26 
Recently (in last 12 months) 9 5 
Unsure 1 1 
Total 100 100 
 
 
Table 4: Panel participants – previous participation in council consultations  
 Panel A 
% 
Panel B 
% 
No, never participated before 63 72 
Yes, have participated in the past 28 16 
Unsure 9 12 
Total 100 100 
 
As the results in Tables 2 and 3 illustrate, the online citizen panels were able to engage 
people who had never been involved with their council before.  Almost seven in 10 panel 
members had never attended a council meeting and most of the almost three in 10 who 
had, had done so more than a year before.  Most panel members had not participated in 
local government consultations in the past either, suggesting the panels were reaching a 
new audience and engaging those citizens who had been silent.  It is important to note 
that both of these councils had been proactive in their approaches to community 
consultation, running major community-wide consultation processes in the years 
preceding, so the results in Table 3 do not reflect a lack of effort on the part of councils, 
but rather the genuine difficulty in engaging the community.  
 
Qualitative feedback from panel members supports the conclusion that online panels can 
effectively engage a new audience of constituents who have not participated in local 
government consultations before, and confirms the limitations with traditional 
approaches.  The following quotes come from panel members via the survey seeking 
their feedback on the online panel model: 
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A good way to have a say. I am usually quiet and do not have an 
opportunity to say what I think in a big group of people. 
 
I’ve never previously felt I have a real voice in the council because my 
only option has been to go to council meetings. I prefer to comment in my 
own time after having considered a summary of issues. 
 
I'm in favour of doing this on-line, means I actually get a chance to 
participate, which I wouldn't if I had to go into council or attend a 
meeting. 
 
Results: Consultation and research activities 
During the course of the pilot, 18 consultations or research activities were undertaken 
across the three council panels in the form of short online surveys.  The topic of each 
survey is detailed in Table 5 in chronological order according to council.  The response 
rate for each survey is also listed, along with the number of panel members at the time of 
the survey’s launch.  Multiplying the response rate and the number of panel members 
gives an approximation of the number of participants in each survey, but is not exact as 
new members continued to join during each survey period.  In each instance, an email 
was sent to all registered panel members, inviting them to participate in the survey by 
visiting a linked website, and a reminder email was sent a few days later to any panel 
member who had not yet completed the survey.  
 
Table 5: Topics and response rates 
Local 
Gov Topic (in chronological order) 
Starting 
Members 
Response 
Rate 
Panel  n % 
A Consultation Preferences  193 72 
A Strategic Plan  216 81 
A Facilities  539 84 
A Service Quality & Performance 598 70 
A Panel Participant Satisfaction 682 58 
A Council asset  744 58 
A Annual Business Plan & Budget 755 40 
B Annual Community Survey 302 86 
B Library Services  608 74 
B Community Art Show Standards 609 60 
B Annual Community Survey 634 70 
B Panel Participant Satisfaction 617 55 
B Annual Business Plan & Budget 684 50 
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C Council Performance  259 88 
C Environmental Initiatives  418 69 
C Council Communications 428 61 
C Annual Business Plan & Budget 439 50 
C Strategic Plan & Environment Initiatives 447 51 
 Average 513 66 
 
As Table 5 illustrates, the online panels were used successfully to conduct research and 
consultations on a wide range of topics – from service quality evaluations to strategic and 
annual business plans, council facilities and environmental initiatives.  All of these 
surveys were used to collect qualitative and quantitative information that was then 
reported back to council.  
 
Response rates for these surveys were generally high; the average response rate of 66% 
far exceeds the response rates reported in the literature for online surveys with email 
notification (see Ilieva, Baron et al. 2002 for a meta-analysis).  These response rates were 
calculated controlling for bounce-backs to each survey (as these respondents never saw 
the invitation to participate).  The number of bounce-backs was low, on average 4% for 
any given survey.  The consistently high response rates also demonstrate that an online 
panel approach can garner enough responses to provide councils with a diversity of 
opinion on any given topic.  And ensuring high response rates was a key focus; the 
university partner did not want non-response bias to undermine the representativeness or 
usefulness of the panels.  The response rates were achieved by following best practices in 
online survey research such as pre-notification and reminder emails, personalised 
invitations, incentives for participation, and simple survey designs (see Mehta and 
Sivadas 1995 or Dillman, Tortora and Bowker 1998 for further discussion of design 
principles).  
 
Response rates did vary for different survey topics, probably because some topics were 
seen as less salient to citizens (the impact of topic salience on response rates is firmly 
established by researchers such as Martin 1994).  Across all three panels, response rates 
appear to fall over time. This may be related to the appeal of consultation topics: the 
lowest response rates were recorded for annual council business plan consultations and 
surveys where panel members were asked about their satisfaction with the panel process.  
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These are surveys that may have been less interesting or relevant to panel members (the 
satisfaction survey being seen not to relate to council issues but rather the university’s 
research agenda on methodology development). The fall in response rates may also be a 
consequence of the panels ageing and some members becoming ‘inactive’ or ‘worn-out’, 
but this hypothesis requires further investigation.  
 
Surveys were usually available to panel members (and the wider public, provided they 
registered as a new panel member first) for between seven and ten days, although one 
consultation survey (Art Show Standards) was left open for just four days.  When the 
panels were initially established, it was thought that a consultation period this long was 
necessary to ensure that all panel members had sufficient time to access the surveys and 
respond.  However, it was found through the pilot that approximately 60% of those who 
participated in a survey did so in the first 48 hours after it was opened and participation 
rates only increased once reminders were sent (Reynolds, Sharp and Anderson 2009).  
On the basis of this evidence, a survey period of four days may be sufficient if a 
reminder email is sent on the third or fourth day to those panel members who have not 
participated. 
 
Incentives, such as movie passes and gift vouchers, were offered by some councils for 
some surveys to encourage participation, but the effect on response rates was not clear.  
Additional evidence from the pilot suggests that providing feedback on the survey results 
and outcomes has a greater impact on participant motivation and survey response rates, 
at least over the long term.  
 
Results: Satisfaction of participants 
The purpose of the pilot was to evaluate the online panel model from all perspectives, 
including that of citizen participants.  At the close of the pilot, participants from two 
panels were surveyed to see how satisfied they were with the model and the initiative.  
Almost 700 panel members participated in this survey and over 85% indicated they were 
‘satisfied’ with the panel experience overall.  The mean average rating was 8.6 on an 11-
point satisfaction scale where ‘0’ denoted ‘not at all satisfied’ and ‘10’ ‘completely 
satisfied’. The comments received also demonstrate participants’ satisfaction with the 
online panel model: 
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This is a great way of being able to provide feedback to council at a 
time that is convenient. 
 
I believe that the council has already gleaned important information 
through this forum. It is an excellent medium for honest feedback. 
 
It is very important to gain community feedback. Online surveys are a 
simple and effective method. 
 
Enjoy the opportunity to express my views and keep local government 
'local'. 
 
Furthermore, 60% of those who responded indicated that participating in the online 
citizen panel had improved their perceptions of their council.  It seemed particularly 
effective in mitigating feelings of mistrust in council decision-making. 
I've been involved in community affairs in [Council B] for several years 
and have been a constant critic of the lack of transparency in the way 
they do business and the priorities they give various issues.  This 
seemed like a positive way to perhaps have some input into the process. 
 
An interesting finding from the model evaluation by panel members was just how 
important hearing about the results and outcomes of consultations was for motivating 
them and keeping them engaged.  It suggests a need for regular communications back to 
the panel regarding the results of consultation and research surveys and how council uses 
them.  In the pilot, the feedback mechanism was regular newsletters, emailed to online 
panel members four times a year (usually after a survey), as well as updates on the 
respective council websites about the activities of the online panel.  While it was not 
difficult to report back on survey findings, articulating how citizen input had influenced 
outcomes or decisions of council was more difficult, particularly when there was a long 
time lag between the survey and the decision.  
 
During the model evaluation, panel members were also asked how frequently they would 
like to be asked to participate in research and consultation online.  Almost two-thirds 
indicated they would like to participate in a consultation at least once a month, and 
around a third indicated they would like to participate every few months. Throughout the 
pilot, the councils conducted consultations less frequently than this, but there was no 
evidence in the panel member feedback that this adversely affected the quality of 
consultations or satisfaction of panel members.  These results suggest scope to consult 
quite frequently with citizens through an online panel if a council so wishes.  Consulting 
with the community as frequently as once a month would require local governments to 
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think about the range of issues they consult the community on, as well as how they 
structure consultations and spread them throughout the year.  For example, rather than 
just conducting a major consultation, a council could collect ideas for new projects or 
initiatives before it begins the process of drafting the budget, then seek input from the 
panel to prioritise the proposed projects, before finally seeking feedback on the 
allocations of budget.  In this way a council could build up a picture of what the 
community wants over time and demonstrate directly back to the community how their 
feedback is (or is not, as the case may be) shaping the council’s plans.  Indeed, the 
feedback received in the pilot was that citizens prefer this more iterative approach to 
research and consultation.  Panel participants do not just want to endorse or provide 
feedback on already formulated plans.  The practical advantage of an iterative approach 
is that each consultation survey only has a few questions and is thus kept to a 
manageable length for participants.  
 
6.  Conclusions and key learnings 
The overall conclusion from the pilot is that online citizen panels are a viable alternative 
to traditional methods of community consultation and research.   Local governments can 
build online citizen panels of sufficient size to conduct research and consultation in a 
relatively short timeframe, using straightforward, cost-effective methods of recruitment.  
Online panels can effectively engage a new audience, satisfy community participants and 
improve citizens’ perceptions of local governments. Once established, the online citizen 
panels can be used to conduct research and consultations on different topics, collecting 
qualitative and quantitative information useful for local government decision-making, 
and in a timely manner.  Online panels have definite advantages for local government in 
terms of their ability to engage large numbers of citizens over an extended period of 
time, in a fairly cost-effective way.  
 
All of the topics on which councils typically conduct research or consult the community 
can be handled through online surveys, although it may require outside expertise to do 
so.  Certainly the university faced a significant challenge in developing online surveys 
that were both appealing and accessible to citizens on topics like annual business plans 
and budgets, as these were topics that had only been explored in a face-to-face context in 
the past.   
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The pilot also demonstrated the value of a coordinated approach involving multiple 
councils.  Local governments tend to conduct consultations and research surveys on 
similar topics, providing scope for them to compare approaches, share learnings and 
benchmark results.  And this certainly occurred, but more so after the pilot, as networks 
between the council members strengthened and the feeling of being part of a community 
of councils was developed. 
 
The online approach is, however, not without challenges.  One of the main challenges 
was gaining internal council support for the model.  Elected members were concerned 
about the potential for special interest groups to ‘hijack’ the process, whilst council 
managers worried that elected members might try to influence the outcomes by 
‘stacking’ panels with their supporters.  Both were nervous whether citizens, particularly 
older ones, would be interested in engaging with their local council online, on a sustained 
basis. However, the sheer number of citizens who participated, the eagerness of all 
residents (including older ones) to engage in this way, and continuous growth of the 
panels over time assuaged these fears.  In the course of the 18-month pilot, there was 
only one instance with one panel in which 150 people joined in the wake of a 
controversial issue.  However, the panel approach meant that these people were easy to 
identify and track over time.  The objections outlined above were overcome by having 
senior managers willing to act as strong internal advocates for the model at each council.  
These managers educated their colleagues, secured access to elected members and 
advocated for the panels.  Once the panels were established, these senior managers 
played a key role in planning the council’s use of the panel and working with other 
managers to design and coordinate consultations.  
 
Once established, the panels were another ‘tool’ or mechanism available to council 
managers and elected members for conducting public consultations, and provided 
another way for citizens to have a say on issues important to them and their way of life.  
The ability to collect a representative snapshot of community sentiment on issues in a 
timely manner was seen as a key benefit of an online panel approach.  Whilst the panels 
did not replace all of a council’s consultation and research activities, by the completion 
of the pilot they had been adopted by all three as the main method for doing so. 
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Significantly, each participating local government saw its citizen panel purely as a 
‘consultative’ mechanism.  They used their panels to seek input or feedback from the 
community, listening and incorporating it into their planning and decision-making, but 
responsibility for decisions still rested with council managers and elected members.  
Communicating this option clearly to councils at the outset of the project was 
fundamental to obtaining their support for the pilot, and communicating this intended 
role of the panels to the public was important in managing community expectations.  
Whilst the citizen panels could have been used collaboratively or empowered with 
decision-making authority, a consultative role fitted best with the current needs and 
structure of the councils, and with the place the activities were seen to sit on the IAP2 
participation spectrum.  Giving the panels a consultative role did not threaten the 
authority of elected members because they were free to decide how much weight to give 
to feedback from their panel, and were able to act against the sentiments of the panel if 
they saw good reason.  Whilst some might dismiss the process as tokenistic, feedback 
indicates that the local communities involved are satisfied with a consultative role for the 
panels.  Certainly most citizen engagement takes the form of consultation (Bishop and 
Davis 2002), and this is the role where citizen panels are likely to gain the most traction, 
so it is valuable to understand how effective they are in this role. 
 
Since the pilot ended in May 2009, the project has grown to include seven city councils 
across metropolitan South Australia and to engage almost 2500 citizens.  The councils 
and the university continue to work in partnership, sharing learnings and developing the 
model further.  Further information about how the project is progressing is available at 
http://www.communitypanel.com.au 
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Abstract 
Rate-pegging has been in place in NSW for more than thirty years with broad support 
from all sides of politics. However, in late 2008 the NSW Government commissioned 
IPART to report on the adequacy of rate-pegging. IPART produced a Draft Report and 
then a Final Report, which has not yet been released by the NSW Government. 
Nevertheless, the NSW Government has made some changes to local government finance 
by way of capping developer charges, allowing IPART to make annual rate-pegging 
determinations, and enabling IPART to consider special variations in rate-pegging. 
Against this background, this paper considers the principles and practice of rate-pegging 
in NSW, the rationale for rate-pegging and counter-arguments on its desirability, as well 
as its economic effects on NSW local government finance relative to other Australian 
local government jurisdictions. 
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1. Introduction 
New South Wales (NSW) is alone amongst Australian states in employing a policy of 
rate-pegging designed to limit increases in property taxes that can be levied by local 
councils in that state.1 In essence, the term ‘rate-pegging’ refers to the imposition of state 
government determined upper annual bounds on the annual rate of increase in property 
taxes levied by municipalities. This policy has been an ongoing source of bitter 
controversy in NSW itself and the cause of much bemusement in the broader 
Australasian local government community (Dollery, Crase and Johnson 2006). While 
NSW had employed a form of rate-pegging between 1901 and 1952, which was 
discontinued due to its ‘impracticality’ (NSW Local Government and Shires Association 
2008:16), the genesis of the modern method of rate-pegging may be found in the 1976 
state election campaign, where rapid increase in rates had become the subject of political 
controversy. Under the Local Government (Rating) Further Amendment Bill, an interim 
type system of rate-pegging was re-introduced by the victorious Wran Labor 
Government in 1977 and further refined into its contemporary form in 1978. The timing 
of the introduction of rate-pegging legislation into the NSW Parliament should be seen 
against the historical backdrop of economic developments in NSW in the 1970s; over the 
period 1973 to 1976, rates had increased on average by 188 per cent, largely as a 
consequence of increased local government expenditure, whereas average weekly 
earnings over the same period rose by 75 per cent and the rate of inflation was 56 per 
cent (Johnson 2001:5).2 
 
While the mechanics of the rate-pegging process have been adjusted periodically, the 
basic principle has remained unchanged to the present day. However, on 27 October 
2008, (then) NSW Premier Nathan Rees announced to the annual New South Wales 
Local Government Association conference that the NSW government had given serious 
thought to removing rate pegging. This followed an earlier instruction to the NSW 
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) in May 2008 to investigate the 
operation of rate-pegging and report on its findings. In July 2009, IPART released a draft 
Review of the Revenue Framework for Local Government. This Draft Report proposed 
two alternative approaches for a revised system: Option A would retain rate-pegging for 
                                                        
1  An exception resides in the fact that the Northern Territory joined NSW in imposing rate-pegging for a 
transitional three-year period beginning 2008 while extensive structural reform was put in place 
(Productivity Commission, 2008, p.97).  
2  Increases in rates in other Australian local government jurisdictions over the same period were 
substantially lower than in NSW (Radbone and Robins, 1980).  
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all councils, but link it to a new local government cost index and establish a ‘medium 
term’ cap on rates to allow for some revenue certainty. Option B would add to Option A: 
under Option B councils which demonstrated sound financial performance (as measured 
in accounting terms) would be exempted from rate-pegging altogether for periods up to 
four years.  
 
After a period of public submissions on the Draft Report, IPART handed a Final Report 
of Review of the Revenue Framework for Local Government to the NSW Government in 
December 2009. As at July 2010, the NSW Government had still not released the Final 
Report to the public, nor had it responded formally to the Final Report of the Review of 
the Revenue Framework for Local Government. However, as part of the 2010/11 NSW 
budgetary process, the NSW Premier Kristina Kenneally announced ‘sweeping changes 
to local government charges on new housing development’ which involved some 
modification in the manner in which rate-pegging would be applied in NSW local 
government in future (Keneally 2010). As part of its $44 million Comprehensive 
Housing Supply Strategy, aimed at securing ‘additional land releases, lower levies and 
faster planning decisions’, the NSW Government set out the following measures: (a) A 
‘hard cap’ of $20,000 per lot for council developer charges, known as Section 94 
contributions in NSW, imposed on new developments, and (b) a constraint on council 
Section 94 charges to be limited to ‘essential infrastructure’ which was ‘necessary for the 
development to happen’, like road works and stormwater management.  Since (a) and (b) 
would inevitably intensify financial distress in local government, the NSW Government 
recognised that they would place upward pressure on rate-peg variation claims from local 
authorities. As a consequence, it retained rate-pegging, but it modified the process of 
rate-pegging. In the first place, the NSW Government transferred the determination of 
the rate-peg to IPART, which would devise a new Local Government Cost Index to 
employ in setting the annual rate-peg.  Secondly, IPART was also placed in charge of 
deciding ‘special rate variation requests’ by councils, as well as ‘variations for essential 
and community infrastructure’.  
 
These requests, through which councils sought permission to levy rate above the rate-
peg, had hitherto been considered by the Minister for Local Government directly. No 
further detail has been forthcoming from the NSW Government on the mechanics of the 
new process and it remains to be seen how it will work in practice.  
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Without getting involved in the minutiae of the two IPART recommendations, which 
have yet to be accepted or rejected, or the proposed new method of IPART implementing 
the rate-pegging process, it thus seems an opportune time to consider the nature of rate-
pegging, the arguments surrounding its desirability, and its economic effects on NSW 
local government. This forms the main aim of the present paper.  
 
The need for a satisfactory and stable rate-setting regime in NSW local government has 
been heightened by the Local Government Amendment (Planning and Reporting) Act 
2009, which introduced an Integrated Planning and Reporting (IPR) framework. From 
the financial year 2010/11 onwards, the IPR framework will oblige local councils to 
prepare a long-term (minimum 10-year) Community Strategic Plan, a 4-year Delivery 
Program to implement that plan, plus annual Operational Plans and Annual Reports. The 
planning time horizon for local government has thus been substantially extended and 
consequently councils will require greater certainty on future rate increases. This makes 
debate on the current system of setting rates in NSW especially relevant. 
 
The remainder of this paper is divided into five main parts. Section 2 provides a synoptic 
description of the principles and practice of rate-pegging. Section 3 considers the 
rationale for rate-pegging and various arguments on this question. Section 4 seeks to 
evaluate the impact of rate-pegging on trends in rates in NSW relative to other Australian 
state local government jurisdictions. Section 5 provides a synoptic description of various 
suggestions which have been proposed for improving the rate-setting system in NSW, 
including those contained in the IPART Draft Report. The paper ends with some brief 
concluding remarks in section 6. 2.  
 
2.  Principles and Practice of NSW Rate-Pegging  
In terms of the Local Government Act 1993, NSW local authorities have six main 
sources of revenue: rates, charges, fees, grants, borrowings, and investments. With 
respect to income from property, under Section 493 of the Local Government Act 1993 
local councils calculate and distribute rates among four defined categories of rateable 
properties in their respective local jurisdictions; farmland, residential, mining and 
business. Section 492 of the Act makes provision for two types of rates: ordinary rates 
and special rates. Section 494 of the Act stipulates that every council must strike and 
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levy an ordinary rate each year on all rateable land within its jurisdiction. By contrast, a 
local council can exercise discretion on whether or not to levy a special rate under 
Section 495 of the Act. Special rates are aimed at the finance of particular projects, such 
as specified local infrastructure, but must be applied to all ratepayers if the project will 
benefit the entire local government area (Department of Local Government 2007). 
 
For each category of property, rates can be calculated in one of three ways: Entirely on 
the land value of the property (calculated as an amount per dollar of unimproved land 
value); on a combination of the land value of the property and a fixed amount per 
property; and entirely on the land value, but subject to a minimum amount. Land values 
are set by the Valuer General at the Department of Lands under the Valuation of Land 
Act 1916 every four years (Department of Local Government, 2007). 
 
Part 2 of Chapter 15 of the Local Government Act 1993 allows the relevant Minister to 
impose limits inter alia on a council’s ‘general income’.3 With respect to the mechanics 
of rate-pegging, the NSW government sets a ceiling on the total amount of income that 
each council can raise from its rates and charges on land. This limit is termed the ‘rate-
peg percentage’ and it is prescribed prior to each fiscal year by the Minister for Local 
Government. As a consequence of rate pegging, a given council’s overall rates revenue 
cannot increase by more than the percentage increase approved by the Minister. Indeed, 
even if land values in a local government area rise in aggregate, local councils may have 
to reduce or otherwise adjust the amounts levied per dollar so that total revenue does not 
increase by more than the percentage increase stipulated by the Minister (Department of 
Local Government 2007).  
 
In terms of the Local Government Act 1993, ‘general income’ does not include various 
rates and charges, including rates on water supply and sewerage, annual charges for 
waste management and storm water management services.  Other sources of revenue are 
                                                        
3  In addition to rate-pegging, other budgetary and legislative constraints affect the ability of local 
councils to set rates in NSW.  These also operate in other Australian local government jurisdictions.  
They include the land and property valuation methods stipulated by state governments, constraints on the 
ability of local authorities to impose differential rates on different categories of ratepayer, exemptions 
made for various classes of ratepayers (sometimes offset by reciprocal tax arrangements), and 
concessions that must be applied to certain categories of ratepayer (sometimes offset by reimbursements).   
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also not covered under ‘general income’, such as user charges, interest, grants, developer 
contributions, donations, and other forms of revenue, like fines and business activities.  
As we have seen, councils can apply to the Minister for Local Government for 
permission to increase their general income by more than the rate-peg limit, a process 
which has now been transferred to IPART. This is called a special variation application. 
Guidelines for such applications have thus far been issued each year by the Department 
of Local Government, and councils applied for a special variation for one year only or 
for several years. A council had to include details of its intention to apply for a special 
variation in its draft management (corporate) plan and consider any submissions received 
from the public. If approved, the Minister specified the percentage by which the council 
could increase its general income, as well as the period of time over which rates may 
exceed the rate-peg. Whether the new IPART process follows this path remains to be 
seen. 
 
To date, the process of rate-pegging has involved an annual limit on rate increases, 
typically set in March each year. In principle, ‘this percentage reflects the projected 
annual increase in costs that a typical council delivering services at levels comparable to 
the previous year is likely to incur this year’ (IPART 2008:48). Following this 
announcement, individual councils submitted requests for a special variation to the 
Minister for Local Government, who made a final determination on each submission by 
June. This enabled local councils to strike their rates to take effect by 1 July of each 
financial year.  
 
Given the proposition that the rate-peg percentage is supposed to reflect the ‘projected 
annual increase in costs’ faced by councils, it is interesting to compare the rate-peg with 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the past ten years. Figure 1 compares the annual 
rate peg with the CPI over the fiscal years 1998/99 to 2008/09: 
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Figure 1: Annual Rate Peg Percentage and Change in CPI, 1998/99 to 2008/09 
NSW: Annual rate peg percentage and change in the CPI, 
1998/99 to 2008/09
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Source: Amended Table 7.1 (IPART, 2008, p.48). 
The information contained in Table 1 indicates that, in general, the rate cap exceeded the 
change in the CPI over the previous financial year; this is true for all years, except 
2002/03 and 2007/08. It should be noted that the CPI for 2001/02 contained in the 
2002/03 column in Table 1 reflects the impact of the introduction of the new  
 
General Sales Tax (GST) on goods and services of 10 percent by the federal government, 
making it an unusual year. A second feature of the data contained in Table 1 is that, by 
way of a general trend, the rate cap and the CPI track each other closely. Finally, it 
should be stressed that the CPI is a measure of the rate of increase of a given basket of 
goods and services, weighted to reflect Australian consumption patterns, rather than a 
measure of production costs. It is thus not a good measure of the rate of increase in the 
costs faced by councils.  
 
3. Rationale for Rate-Pegging 
Rate-pegging represents a sub-set of a larger category of public sector regulation dealing 
with state-imposed limitations on the expenditure and taxation by local government, 
including property taxation (see, for example, Temple 1996 for a synoptic review of this 
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literature). This kind of regulation has given birth to a theoretical and empirical literature 
which has an overwhelming American institutional bias. State-wide limitations on local 
taxes, fees and charges, including property taxes, are comparatively common in the 
United States and often put to electorates in the form of referenda (see, for instance, 
Figlio and O’Sullivan 2001). However, little is known about either the effects of explicit 
tax and expenditure constraints on local government or the determinants of voter support 
for fiscal limitations. In common with earlier work, Temple (1996) found evidence 
which suggested that state-wide limits on property taxes induced a relatively larger 
reduction in local services than local administration. By contrast, Vigdor (2004) has 
argued that tax limitations have succeeded because they allowed voters to lower tax rates 
in communities other than their own where they hold property, invest or work, but have 
no vote. Unfortunately, this American literature has little bearing on rate-pegging in 
NSW since there is no provision for referenda on local taxes. Moreover, the significant 
differences between Australian and American local government, not least the much 
narrower range of functions in Australian local government, render most of this literature 
irrelevant to the NSW case.  
 
The economic rationale for rate-pegging derives from the normative prescriptions of 
standard economic theory: local government enjoys a monopoly in the provision of 
essential local services. Accordingly, like all other monopoly providers, it will provide 
these services at excessive prices and/or inefficiently and thus warrants regulation by 
higher tiers of government to ensure efficient and equitable outcomes (Bailey 1999). 
However, it is important to immediately add the caveat that regulation must be carefully 
applied since bad regulation can make matters worse than no regulation at all (Hillman 
2005). The validity of this general proposition is recognised in the NSW debate over 
rate-pegging (see, for example, NSW Treasury 2008).  
 
With respect to economic efficiency, optimal regulation should seek to secure allocative 
efficiency, where the mix of local services provided must coincide with local community 
preferences, and productive efficiency, where local services must be produced in the 
most cost effective manner. In addition, regulation should also try to ensure that equity 
objectives are met. For example, essential local services should be provided to poor 
households by local councils at affordable prices. The effective application of regulation 
is difficult in all spheres of economic activity, including the operation of the local 
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government sector (Bos 1994). Moreover, regulation is further complicated in the local 
government sphere due to the fact that local councils possess the legal authority to tax; a 
monopoly power missing in both the private sector and in most other public utilities. 
Finally, in the special case of local council revenue regulation through rate-pegging, the 
regulatory agency faces additional problems since it is not regulating the prices of 
particular local services but rather the ‘tax-price’ of a whole genre of local public goods 
and services that are mostly unpriced. 
 
Against this background, IPART (2008:55) has summarised the arguments surrounding 
rate-pegging that have been employed in the NSW debate. In terms of the case for rate-
pegging, four separate arguments are identified:  
 
a) Revenue regulation through rate-pegging prevents the abuse of monopoly power 
in the provision of basic local services;  
b) Rate-pegging assists in controlling ‘cross-subsidisation’ and imposes restrictions 
on the ‘provision of non-core services and infrastructure that might prove 
unsustainable to ratepayers’; 
c) Rate-pegging manages the risk of poor governance in the local government 
sector; and 
d) Rate-pegging limits the ability of councils to divert funds from essential 
infrastructure to other projects as well as expenditure on ‘marginal services’ that 
are better provided by the private sector. 
 
Some of these arguments are less than convincing. For example, it is not at all obvious 
that rate-pegging can have any positive influence on the supply of local services under 
argument (a); indeed it seems more likely to curtail their supply by restricting funding. 
Similarly, in terms of (b), it hard to appreciate why rate-pegging will dampen cross-
subsidisation. Quite the opposite may occur if fees and charges are increased to 
counteract the impact of rate-pegging. Along analogous lines, argument (b) does not 
meet with empirical reality regarding ‘non-core’ local services. For instance, Dollery, 
Wallis and Allan (2006) have demonstrated that an ongoing shift in all Australian local 
government jurisdictions has taken place away from ‘services to property’ towards 
‘services to people’, including NSW. Much the same objection can be levelled against 
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argument (d). The NSW Treasury (2008:13-14) also found all four arguments largely 
unconvincing. 
 
An additional argument for rate-pegging is adduced later in Revenue Framework for 
Local Government: Issues Paper (IPART2008:63). This contends that local government 
accountability is improved through rate-pegging because ‘the process of assessing and 
making determinations on applications for special variation’ ensures that the 
‘reasonableness of all applications is scrutinised’ which may ‘enhance councils’ 
accountability’. But this argument is partly undermined by that fact that only a small 
proportion of NSW councils – only 26 councils out of 155 local authorities in 2008/09 
(IPART 2008:56, Table 7.3) – actually applied for special variation; a point taken up 
later in this paper. 
 
Two further implied arguments for rate-pegging were put forward in the Independent 
Inquiry into the Financial Sustainability of NSW Local Government (Allan et al 2006). 
Firstly, rate-pegging had worked well, compared with other Australian local government 
jurisdictions, if its primary aim was to constrain rises in council rates; an observation 
supported by both the Productivity Commission (2008) and the NSW Local Government 
and Shires Association (2008), which we will examine more closely in this paper. 
Secondly, rate-pegging may have forced NSW local government to become more 
efficient than it would otherwise have been, especially in the domain of corporate 
overheads and administrative costs (Allan et al 2006:245-257). 
 
An alternative public choice argument for rate-pegging has been advanced by Dollery, 
Crase and Byrnes (2006). Invoking Wittman’s (1995) model of democratic efficiency, 
they asserted that the pervasive nature of the phenomenon of ‘local government failure’ 
in Australian local government meant that electors had demanded state government 
oversight of local councils, especially in pecuniary affairs. Thus, in Australian states, 
‘“watchdog” institutions will form an agency relationship with local government voters 
to demystify fiscal illusion by monitoring council revenue and expenditure decisions on 
behalf of voters (Dollery, Crase and Byrnes 2006:350). In NSW, this ‘watchdog’ role has 
occurred inter alia in the form of rate-pegging, which has enjoyed strong public support 
(see IRIS Research 2005).  
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IPART (2008:55) identified four separate arguments employed in the debate against the 
use of rate-pegging: 
a) Rate-pegging limits councils’ ability to provide local services; 
b) Rate-pegging prevented infrastructure backlogs from being addressed; 
c) Rate-pegging led councils to impose higher user pays charges which could result 
in pricing inequities; and  
d) Rate-pegging contradicts the principles of democracy and accountability of local 
government.  
 
Most of these arguments seem to carry weight. In particular, argument (c) appears 
especially convincing. In this regard, the NSW Treasury (2008: 14) has noted that 
‘constraints on general revenue distort revenue raising sources and result in higher user 
charges’. Argument (a) also seems valid. After all, if the net effect of rate-pegging has 
indeed been to constrain total council income, then it follows that it must have limited 
local services as well. Argument (d) rests on normative grounds rather than on economic 
observation; it would appear obvious that regulation of rate-setting must diminish local 
democratic autonomy since it arbitrarily limits local decision making. 
 
However, argument (b) does not meet available empirical evidence. For instance, the 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) National Financial Sustainability Study of Local 
Government found that not only was a large number of local councils in all Australian 
local government jurisdictions financially unsustainable in the long run, but that most 
councils confronted a massive local infrastructure backlog, regardless of the rate-setting 
regime in each state. Moreover, Byrnes, Dollery, Crase and Simmons (2008), Dollery, 
Byrnes and Crase (2007), and others, have demonstrated that the magnitude of this 
backlog is so substantial that it is now beyond the present capacity of any Australian 
local government system to remedy without outside financial intervention. Since this 
problem is endemic to all Australian jurisdictions, and does not appear to be 
comparatively more acute in NSW, it would thus seem that the NSW local infrastructure 
backlog cannot be ascribed simply to rate-pegging. The abolition of rate-pegging in 
NSW cannot therefore be expected address this problem. 
 
The Local Government and Shires Associations of NSW (2008) developed a further and 
more general argument against rate-pegging couched in political economy terms. One 
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aspect of this argument is that rate-pegging has an unintended and broader ‘dampening’ 
effect on rates than simply the pegged limit. In this vein, the Association (2008: 14) 
contended that ‘one likely explanation for the dampening effect is that rate-pegging 
provides a public framework and creates public expectations about maximum rate 
increases, placing political pressure on councils to stay within the limit and not seek 
special variations’. A second dimension of this general argument is that rate-pegging 
provides a useful mechanism for local councils in NSW to engage in politically 
expedient ‘blame shifting’ onto the state government. The Association (2008: 15) argued 
that rate-pegging ‘provides an easy default option from both a political and managerial 
perspective’ since (a) all rate increases can be attributed to the state government; (b) the 
need for community consultation to justify rate rises diminishes; (c) sticking to the rate-
peg limit avoids the problems contingent on special variation applications; (d) ‘councils 
can blame the state government for their financial deficiencies’; and (e) the existence of 
rate-pegging enables councils to avoid long-term planning. The net result of these factors 
has been the ‘under-provision of community infrastructure and services’, the emergence 
of a local infrastructure backlog and ‘undermining’ the financial sustainability of 
councils.  
 
4. Impact of Rate-Pegging 
The impact of rate-pegging on the NSW local government sector is best assessed not in 
isolation, but rather in comparison with the experience of local government systems in 
other Australian state jurisdictions which do not have any regulatory ceiling imposed on 
rate increases. In other words, the unique use of rate-pegging in NSW allows analysts to 
treat it as a kind of ‘natural experiment’ in Australian local government. A comparative 
exercise of this kind faces several difficulties, quite apart from the ubiquitous problem of 
data comparability. The most important of these difficulties in the present context are 
twofold:  
  
First, there are substantial differences in relative significance of different sources of 
revenue in the different states (Worthington and Dollery 2001; 2002). For example, 
IPART (2008: 25) observed that ‘there tends to be an inverse relationship between 
taxation revenue and revenue obtained from the sale of goods and services’. Thus ‘states 
with greater reliance on taxation revenue (South Australia (57.9 per cent), Victoria (47.2 
per cent), and Western Australia (43.5 per cent)) collected less revenue from the sale of 
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goods and services, whereas states with less reliance on taxation revenue (Tasmania 
(32.2 per cent) and Queensland (26.0 per cent)) obtained greater revenue from the sale of 
goods and services’. By contrast, the NSW local government sector ‘is close to average, 
with a relatively even split in terms of its reliance on either revenue source’. However, in 
the present context, this problem is ameliorated by the fact that we are not concerned 
with absolute differences in the level of rates between NSW and other state local 
government jurisdictions, but rather in the rates of change in property tax revenue 
through time. 
 
Second, considerable variation exists in the functions of local government in the different 
jurisdictions (Worthington and Dollery 2001 2002), which affect both expenditure and 
revenue patterns. For instance, in Queensland, Tasmania and non-metropolitan NSW 
(outside of the greater Newcastle-Sydney-Wollongong conurbation served by Sydney 
Water and Hunter Water), councils provide sewerage and water supply services, which 
earn an income, in contrast to the other state local government jurisdictions. In addition, 
there is an ongoing shift in local government functions away from ‘services to property’ 
towards ‘services to people’ (Dollery, Wallis and Allan 2006), which further distorts 
comparison; unless it is heroically assumed that this shift has occurred in a uniform 
manner across all states. However, because we are chiefly concerned with trends through 
time in rate rises, both of these problems become less acute.  
 
These variations are compounded by the fact that large disparities in the capacities of 
individual local councils to raise rate revenues also exist within given state jurisdictions, 
as vividly illustrated in the Productivity Commission’s (2008) Assessing Local 
Government Revenue Raising Capacity, especially Table 3.1 in this Report. While these 
disparities are in part attributable to the socio-economic characteristics of different local 
government areas, particularly local disposable incomes and their impact on the ability of 
householders to pay rates, numerous other influences are obviously at play, notably 
‘differences between urban, rural and remote councils, in population, rating base and the 
ability or willingness of councils to levy user charges’ (DOTARS 2007: 12). 
 
With these caveats in mind, we now seek to determine the impact of rate-pegging in 
NSW local government in the larger Australian local government context. Figure 2 
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illustrates trends in local government rate revenue per capita by state and territory 
jurisdiction over the period 1998/99 to 2005/06, expressed in constant 1998/99 dollars. 
 
Figure 2: Local Government Rate Revenue per Capita, 1998/99 to 2005/06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DOTARS, 2007, p. 15. 
 
A glance at Figure 2 demonstrates that the average per capita rate revenue funding gap 
between NSW and the other Australian jurisdictions has grown over the seven-year 
period in question. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that NSW also has ‘the lowest council 
rates per capita of any jurisdiction in Australia other than the Northern Territory’ (Allan 
et al 2006: 207).  Similar insightful data have been assembled by Allan et al (2006: 207, 
Table 9.4), reproduced here in Table 1 (which reinforce the information in Figure 2).  
Table 1: Total Percentage Rate Increases by Jurisdiction, 1995/96 to 2003/04 
 
State or territory Per cent increase 
NSW 29.2% 
ACT 35.2% 
Tasmania 36.3% 
South Australia 55.1% 
Queensland 55.6% 
Western Australia 64.8% 
Victoria 66.1% 
Gross domestic product 61.8% 
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It is evident from Table 2 that the percentage increase in rates was substantially lower in 
NSW than in the other states; indeed, it amounted to less than half of the rate rises 
experienced in Western Australia and Victoria. From this and other data, Allan et al 
(2006: 2007) concluded that ‘rate-pegging has been a constraint on [NSW] councils’ 
revenue-raising capacity causing it to fall behind other states, notwithstanding NSW’s 
relatively strong property market over this period compared with Australia as a whole’. 
The Productivity Commission (2008: xxxiii-xxxiv) drew very similar conclusions from 
its deliberations. After stressing that ‘the rate of growth in rates revenue in NSW has 
been among the lowest of all jurisdictions over the past seven years’, it noted that NSW 
‘also has rate revenue per person below that of most other jurisdictions’. It thus found 
that ‘rate-pegging in NSW appears to have been restricting revenue raised from rates, 
notwithstanding scope for councils to seek variations to mandated rate increases’. The 
Local Government and Shires Associations of NSW (2008: 14) reached an analogous 
conclusion: ‘If the objective of rate-pegging was simply to constrain council rate 
revenues, rate-pegging has been a success’ since ‘NSW rate revenue growth is lagging 
other jurisdictions’.  
 
In addition, as we have seen, the Associations (2008:14) contended that rate-pegging had 
several other unintended effects. They asserted that rate-pegging has reduced investment 
in infrastructure maintenance and renewal – an argument which does not appear to 
accord with the evidence garnered by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006). A much more 
important argument in the present context resides in their claim that the special variation 
option is under-utilised, which suggests that the rate-pegging system has had a more 
general ‘dampening’ effect than the stipulated rate peg itself.  
 
This proposition is worth considering in more detail. Table 2 provides information on the 
number of special variation applications submitted over the past seven years and the 
number of these applications that were approved by the Minister. 
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Table 2: Total Special Variation Applications Submitted and Approved, 2002/03 to 
2008/09 
 
 
 
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10
Rate peg 
percentage 
 
3.3 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.5 2.6 
Number of 
applications 
for special 
variation 
received 
30 23 25 42 46 34 30 28 
Number of 
applications 
for special 
variation 
approved 
23 23 22 30 39 30 18 N/A 
Total 
number of 
Councils 
172 172 152 152 152 152 152 152 
 
Source: IPART (2008: 56); Allan et al (2006: 50): pers. comm. Mark Hely, Principal Finance 
Officer, NSW Division of Local Government, Premier’s Department, 17.06.10 
 
The information contained in Table 2 seems to vindicate the observations made by the 
NSW Local Government and Shires Association (2008), considered earlier in this paper, 
regarding the broader ‘dampening’ effects of rate-pegging. Thus in the 2008/09 special 
variation round, only 26 councils applied - a mere 17 per cent of all councils – of which 
24 were successful. Put differently, while only a small proportion of councils actually 
apply under the special variation system, a very high faction of these applications prove 
successful, ranging from a low of 71 per cent in the 2005/06 round to a high of 100 per 
cent in 2003/04. In other words, even though the great majority of special variation 
applications are approved by the Minister, comparatively few local authorities apply; a 
fact which thus must be ascribed to factors other than the prospects of success of an 
application.  
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A final aspect of special variations is their net effect on aggregate increases in rates in 
NSW local government through time. Figure 2 compares the long-term trends in the rate-
peg with actual outcomes after special variations had been approved.  
 
Figure 2: Growth in Actual Rates Relative to Pegged Rates, 1995/96 to 2003/04 
0
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40
60
80
100
120
140
1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04
NSW Pegged Rates NSW Actual Rates  
Source: Amended Figure 9.7, Allan Report (2006, Figure 9.7, p.208) 
 
The data contained in Figure 2 demonstrate that the impact of special variations on actual 
outcomes is minor; the observed final growth of rates diverges minimally from the rate-
pegged trend line. Allan et al (2006: 207) drew the same general conclusion: ‘additional 
revenue allowed’ as a consequence of the special variation system has ‘not been large as 
a proportion of the total increase in the rate peg limit’.  
 
5. Suggested Improvements to NSW Rate-Setting 
Over the years there has been no shortage of suggestions on how to improve the 
operation of rate-setting in NSW. For example, a Rate Pegging Taskforce, established by 
the NSW Local Government and Shires Associations in 2001, called for a ‘compromise’ 
two-tiered rate-pegging system (Centennial Consultancy, 2004). Tier 1 would employ an 
annually determined index of local government costs, which would apply to all NSW 
councils, which would accurately reflect the real costs impinging on local councils much 
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more precisely than the CPI used at present. Tier 2 would replace the current special 
variation system with a method that took the circumstances of individual councils into 
account and allow councils to make their own variations above Tier 1 levels up to some 
stipulated maximum.  
 
Allan et al (2006: 210) also presented a ‘compromise’ proposal to revise the rate-pegging 
system. This Report argued that ‘the view of this Inquiry is that the peg should be made 
less discretionary (i.e. not subject to Ministerial fiat), be based on explicit criteria (e.g. 
local government unit costs), and be made more transparent (i.e. be published in full). 
Moreover, ‘any variations to the peg with respect to a particular council should be more 
fully disclosed and explained in terms of rational criteria that are applied consistently 
across all councils and not subject to capricious change’.  
 
At a more general level, in its Revenue Framework for Local Government, IPART (2008: 
63-65) presented five alternative regulatory frameworks that could replace the current 
rate-pegging system. A detailed evaluation of these options falls outside the scope of this 
paper and would require empirical simulation exercises using ‘realistic’ data on 
particular types of local authorities to try to model their characteristics and impact of the 
alternative regulatory frameworks.  However, it is nonetheless worth briefly outlining 
these possibilities. Option 1 would retain existing rate-pegging arrangements, but publish 
the economic basis for the peg, modify the special variations process, and leave all other 
charges unregulated. Option 2 would develop a more ‘disaggregated form of rate-
pegging’ using specific pegs for specific categories of council. Option 3 would ‘reduce 
the scope of rate-pegging to cover only local government revenue needed to fund 
operating expenditure’, thereby excluding capital expenditure and all other charges 
unregulated. Option 4 would retain rate-pegging but exempt individual councils, 
provided they could demonstrate financial prudence and operational efficiency in various 
stipulated ways. Finally, Option 5 would remove mandatory rate-pegging and 
simultaneously ‘enhance accountability to the local community’ using several criteria 
and the threat of a ‘default rate cap’.  
 
A detailed analysis of the characteristics of these five options has been conducted by the 
NSW Treasury (2008). It has also suggested several additional feasible approaches to 
NSW council rates regulation. Amongst all these alternative regulatory methods, the 
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NSW Treasury (2008: 27) argued that the objectives of the current NSW rate-pegging 
regime could best be achieved at the least cost by retaining the existing rate-pegging 
system, but with ‘improved criteria’.  
 
Given the historical reluctance of the NSW state governments to make significant 
changes to the rate-pegging system, and the current NSW Government’s new 
‘minimalist’ modifications to the rate-pegging process, it would seem that these 
suggested reforms will remain hypothetical.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Against the background of the IPART (2009) Review of the Revenue Framework for 
Local Government, this paper has considered the nature of rate-pegging, the arguments 
surrounding its desirability, and its economic effects on NSW local government. We 
have seen that the case for rate-pegging seems to hinge only on three convincing 
arguments. In the first place, as we have demonstrated in this paper, rate-pegging has 
achieved its basic objective of slowing increases in NSW council rates over time relative 
to other Australian jurisdictions (Allan et al 2006). Secondly, a prima facie case exists 
which suggests that the constraints imposed on council revenue by rate-pegging may 
have enhanced the administrative efficiency of NSW councils and reduced their 
overheads, at least in comparison with the NSW state government departments (Allan et 
al 2006). Finally, rate-pegging has enjoyed ongoing and strong public support (IRIS 
Research 2005), which appears to demonstrate the operation of an efficient ‘political 
market’ in NSW (Dollery, Crase and Byrnes 2006: 397) in the Wittman (1995) sense.  
 
By contrast, several cogent arguments have been advanced against rate-pegging. Firstly, 
it has depressed the rating effort by NSW councils more than it intended since it has had 
a broader ‘dampening’ impact on rates in particular and local government finance more 
generally due to the limited use of the special variation option. Secondly, the existence of 
rate-pegging has partly absolved local councils of full responsibility for their own 
financial affairs, with numerous deleterious consequences, not least a lack of long-term 
planning, which is an essential part of the new IPR framework within which NSW local 
government must operate from the fiscal year 2010/11 onwards. Finally, rate-pegging 
has undermined the democratic bedrocks of ‘local voice’ and ‘local choice’ in local 
government and thereby reduced local autonomy. 
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The reluctance of the NSW Government to both release the Final Report of Review of the 
Revenue Framework for Local Government and to formally respond to its 
recommendations, as well as its recent decision to retain rate-pegging but shift the 
process to IPART, suggests that, despite the announcement by (former) NSW Premier 
Rees that the NSW government had considered the abolition of rate-pegging, rate-
pegging seems set to continue in NSW, albeit in a slightly amended form. Moreover, its 
continuing popularity seems to indicate that, at best, marginal efforts will be made to 
improve the operation of rate-pegging and thereby at least ameliorate some of its harmful 
effects, rather than abolish it. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper describes in brief the findings of a research project undertaken by the Institute 
for Sustainable Futures (ISF) at the University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. The 
research was commissioned by and undertaken on behalf of the New South Wales 
(NSW) Department of Environment, Climate Change and Water (DECCW). The aim of 
the project was to investigate current practices of environmental and sustainability 
education and engagement within local government in NSW. The research was 
commissioned by DECCW as the preliminary phase of a larger project that the 
department is planning to undertake, commencing in 2010.  
 
An explanation of the Institute’s approach to the project is provided, and the research 
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questions that were developed to guide it are outlined. The practice note then outlines in 
detail the findings about the main types of programs and practices being carried out by 
councils, and the audiences that these programs are targeting. It focuses on describing in 
detail the types of programs and activities; by theme, by the sector targeted, and in terms 
of whether the activities are place based or event focused. The paper concludes by 
reflecting briefly on some of the implications – both positive and less so – of the 
incredibly wide range of activities and approaches that are evident in the councils 
studied. A more detailed analysis of the research will be written up in a future article. 
 
2. Methodology 
Eight local councils were chosen by DECCW as potential partners in the proposed larger 
project. Officers at these councils were first contacted by telephone and then sent an 
email link to an electronic ‘background information form’. Participants completed this 
form, providing initial information about their council’s relevant activities. This 
background information helped the researchers develop a basic understanding of the 
situation at each council, and informed the development of the interview framework. 
Semi-structured interviews of between 25 and 75 minutes were then conducted with the 
eight participants. Interviews sought to draw out more detail about the issues covered in 
the background information form, as well as exploring some of the more complex or 
subjective research questions. During the data analysis phase, the interview material, and 
the data provided on the background information forms, was subjected to a series of 
standard qualitative data analysis techniques, including a series of structured coding 
exercises. 
 
Reviewing a number of key documents and considering the results of a previous Local 
Government and Shires Associations (LGSA) survey on a similar topic provided useful 
background for the research and informed the development of the research tools.  
A number of limitations of the research are noted. Firstly, the findings are intended to 
provide only a ‘snapshot’ of current practice in this area, seen through the lens of the 
experience of the selected councils – this snapshot is not intended to be representative of 
the 152 councils in NSW. Secondly, researchers relied primarily on information provided 
by only a small number of people at each council – usually one or two – so the 
information provided may be incomplete. Finally, the research used a self-reporting 
methodology and did not seek to evaluate activities mentioned.  
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Terminology 
Both within the literature and among practitioners there is a range of terminology used to 
describe the practices and activities that this research project is interested in. Some use 
the term ‘environmental education’ (EE), others refer to ‘education for sustainability’ 
(EfS), while the United Nations uses ‘Education for Sustainable Development’ (EfSD) 
(UNESCO 2009). Still others prefer terms focussed on ‘engagement’ or ‘behaviour 
change’ rather than ‘education’. In its work in this area, the DECCW also uses the term 
‘Community Education and Engagement for Sustainability’ (CEE). For the purposes of 
this paper, these terms are used interchangeably to refer to the widest possible range of 
activities that councils undertake in providing members of their community with 
information, resources, tools or opportunities that enable and encourage them to live in 
more environmentally sustainable ways. Mostly the paper uses the term 
‘environmental/sustainability education’ as a convenient shorthand. 
 
Approach and Research Questions  
In investigating environmental/sustainability education within the eight councils, the aim 
was to describe both the nature and range of different approaches and activities, and the 
status of such activities within the councils. Accordingly the research looked not only at 
the activities themselves, but also at related decision-making processes, resourcing 
issues, attitudes towards these activities, and their level of integration and prioritisation 
within council plans, organisational structures and cultures. 
 
The research questions that were developed at the outset to guide the project were as 
follows: 
 What kinds of education and/or community engagement for 
environment/sustainability are taking place in the selected councils? 
 How are environmental/sustainability education programs determined?  
 What staff and other resources are allocated to support community education 
and engagement strategies on environmental or sustainability issues? 
 Is EfS/EE part of the councils’ formal program commitments? 
 How do the different parts of the councils perceive EfS/EE activities? 
 To what extent is EE/EfS integrated across the councils’ business? What are 
the drivers for integration/participation and buy-in across each council? 
 What are the drivers and barriers to undertaking education and community 
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engagement for sustainability? 
 Is there an organisational culture in these councils that supports EE/EfS? 
 Do the councils’ education activities take an integrated approach? 
 
3. Findings 
 
Range of activities being undertaken 
Councils are undertaking an enormous range of activities that can be characterised as 
fitting under the broad definition of environmental/sustainability education and 
engagement. Interviewees mentioned a large number of projects – many of which are 
noted below. Some of these focus on single issues and others on multiple issues. Taken 
together, the activities, projects and programs mentioned by these eight councils cover an 
extremely wide range of environmental/sustainability topics. It seems that over time 
there has been an increase in the number and variety of issues that councils are 
concerned with or are active on.  
 
 
Snapshot of topics:  Examples of sustainability ‘issues’, desired behaviours or 
themes of interest that councils are targeting through education and engagement 
programs 
  
o Water efficiency / conservation/ demand management – in homes, schools and 
businesses 
o Waste – how to best use recycling services, organic waste, composting, waste and 
consumption, sustainable living, litter 
o Toxics/ pollution prevention –  green cleaning (in homes and preschools), 
stormwater pollution prevention 
o Energy efficiency – in the home, in schools, in business 
o Climate change – general awareness as well as how to respond  
o Coastal ecosystems, estuarine ecosystems, learning, monitoring, protection 
o Terrestrial ecosystems - bushland restoration and protection (eg through the 
Bushcare program), monitoring and appreciating local biodiversity (focus on key 
threatened species) 
o Transport – active transport and facilities, health links 
o Gardening – native gardens, community gardens, permaculture, sustainable 
gardening, kitchen gardens, sustainability dimensions of food production 
 
 
Within each of these ‘topic areas’, the kinds of activities being undertaken are very 
varied. The following comments of an interviewee provides a flavour of the diversity of 
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activities offered in relation to the single issue of coast care: 
[The activities] are basically wrapped around coast care. So they might be 
snorkelling or talks, slideshows about animals or they might be walks 
along the coast with some university lecturers that have particular 
knowledge in coastal systems. …There’s a guy who does a lot of 
presentations about safe surfing and talks about the way oceans work and 
sand movements and all that sort of thing.  
 
‘Education’ is not always planned and ‘branded’ as such. Environmental/sustainability 
education not only happens within councils’ major planned education strategies, but is 
also an ongoing part of many officers’ roles – for example, when they respond to various 
queries and requests from the community, as this interviewee suggests: 
We have some fairly substantial core projects  that are directly linked to 
particular issues that are happening in our area. But there’s probably quite 
a lot of ad hoc, at call things, like attendance at festivals and providing 
one-off workshops or hosting events that other organisations have 
developed, like the Green Plumbers and things like that.… responding to 
queries from local teachers or children, in relation to assignment work and 
things like that. So just that kind of other stuff that actually happens and 
we want to help and support them.  
 
Educators were conscious of the different kinds of ‘education’ and learning, and had 
obviously given considerable thought to where on the spectrum of educational 
approaches their various programs and activities might sit. As a generalisation most 
councils appear to take a flexible and pragmatic approach, believing that a variety of 
approaches is most likely to be appropriate, and pointing to activities that range from 
information provision, to experiential learning, to explicit behaviour change strategies, 
all of which have some kind of ‘educational’ intent and effect. 
 
The list below provides a flavour of the range of projects mentioned by the various 
councils:  
Marine/Coastal 
o CoastCare summer activities program (eg. talks, walks, presentations  
o whale education project 
 
Climate/energy 
o climate change education, awareness and engagement 
o school energy audits and activities focused on water use and biodiversity 
o participation in the Nature Conservation Council Climate Consensus Project, 
including community workshops 
o energy conservation covered in sustainability workshops 
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o participation in Rotary ‘sustainability expo’, with water and energy saving focus 
o home energy saving workshops – both as part of the Australian Conservation 
Foundation’s (ACF) Green Home project, and independently 
 
Water 
o community engagement on water demand management 
o education as part of water demand management strategies, eg. encouraging people 
to install water efficient hardware 
o water education support for high school students and teachers 
o delivery of water education as part of classroom program in schools 
o development of materials and programs for primary schools including a website 
called Blue Planet Primary Schools; and managing a water education program for 
primaries schools called Central Coast Watertight 
o school education and water audits 
o dam / water efficiency tours 
o wastewater tours 
o participation in Rotary ‘sustainability expo’, with water and energy saving focus 
o water quality monitoring with schools 
o ‘localising’ of Sydney Water rebate programs 
o home water saving workshops –as part of ACF Green Home project 
o Collaboration with the local Catchment Management Authority (CMA) on water 
education and resource efficiency programs 
 
Biodiversity and Bushland 
o participation in the Bushcare program and support of Bushcare members e.g. by 
producing seasonal newsletters 
o biodiversity and botany focused education programs for schools. eg the Coffs 
Harbour botanic garden offers curriculum linked education experiences for high 
school and primary school excursion groups 
o bushland education through use of local wildflower garden (primarily for school 
children) 
o education based on specific high profile species, such as talks to schools and 
community members on flying foxes and koalas, raising awareness of vertebrate 
pest species (eg foxes and Indian mynas), community education and survey work 
on Little Terns 
o wetlands workshops 
o Parks Alive program, community tree planting 
o programs linked to local land use/natural resource issues such as the education 
component of Wyong’s Estuary Management Plan 
o Native Haven, schools planting program 
 
Food 
o involvement in establishing a Local Food Futures Alliance, which will have an 
action plan that will include community education 
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Waste 
o waste and recycling focused education initiatives linked to Councils waste 
contract (most if not all councils mentioned this) 
o educational use of a resource management centre for residential and in some cases 
for industry (eg. Orange City Council is planning this kind of work with 
NetWaste) 
o recycling centre where old bikes are fixed and donated to charity for less 
privileged residents to use for transport 
o waste workshops (composting, worm farming) as part of ACF Green Home 
project 
o organic waste trial in cafes 
o Wastewatchers program in schools, ‘rubbish free lunch’ challenge 
 
Transport 
o bike safety awareness, promotion of bike racks, literature on safe bike riding 
o Bike Week activities 
o ‘Transport Challenge’ encouraging year 11 school students to use public transport 
to get around the city 
 
 
 
Programs for different sectors 
As well as covering a wide range of topics, and encompassing a diversity of activities, 
councils are also targeting a variety of different audiences, from children to adults, 
residents to businesses, individuals and groups. Councils mentioned a wide range of 
tailored programs for different sectors. For example, in the case of the City of Sydney, 
specialised programs range from an energy program for commercial offices, to a waste 
program for small business, a collaboration with Housing NSW (the state government 
department) on issues for low income earners and public housing tenants, a residential 
environmental actions strategy with a focus on residents of high density dwellings, to 
more ‘general public’ events like the annual Live Green event, and a series of ‘City 
Talks’.  Some of the sector-specific activities mentioned are summarised below. 
 
 Schools-based 
School-based programs were a high focus for Bankstown City Council, as a result of 
receiving a grant and dedicating a staff position to work with and in schools. This work 
covered a range of activities, for example, delivering face to face education in 
classrooms, running the Tree Troopers program (combining tree planting and 
educational elements), schools bushcare programs, and organising school excursions. 
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Randwick City Council organises an annual ‘networking afternoon tea’ with the Mayor, 
for local primary and secondary school teachers, to enable schools to meet council staff 
and learn more about the wide range of council activities that they might be able to 
incorporate into the curriculum, and the various ways that council might be able help 
them. 
 
Examples of other activities identified by participating councils included: 
o General schools education support – distribution of newsletter quarterly, 
competitions for primary schools  
o Responding to inquiries from students working on school assignments  
o Green Schools Funding Program – provide up to $500 to schools to undertake 
environmental education/improvement works  
o School water audits  
o Development of materials and programs for primary schools including Blue 
Planet Primary Schools website; and managing a water education program for 
primary schools called Central Coast Watertight  
o Schools exchange – children exchange between city and country schools, to learn 
about each others’ different environments  
o Native Haven, schools planting program  
o Hosting tours for school students of sites demonstrating water, wastewater, 
resource recovery technology  
o Facilitating a forum where teachers can discuss and share resources.  
o Wastewatchers program in schools, ‘rubbish free lunch’ challenge.  
 
 Early childhood sector 
Activities in this sector included: 
o Links with early childhood educators – for example, a number of events for early 
childhood/lower primary school aged children, and a workshop for the NSW 
Early Childhood Environmental Education Network  
o Preschool education programs and staff support – including regional water 
education program with preschool staff, professional development workshops for 
early childhood educators. ( The Little Green Steps preschool education program 
runs as a regional program with resources available for others to use – originally 
made possible with funding from the NSW Department of Education and 
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Training.) 
o Delivery of programs for children in childcare.  
 
 Residential sector 
Many councils run some kind of education/engagement program for residents, focussed 
on home-based pro-environmental actions. These often take the form of a series of 
workshops on different ‘sustainable living’ topics. For example, Randwick City Council 
runs an extensive series of ‘sustainable urban living’ workshops in partnership with the 
local community college, on topics ranging from sustainable gardening, to 
biodiversity/bushcare and energy, water and waste issues in the home. These workshops 
attract between 15 and 40 people, who form connections with each other that can help to 
extend their learning and involvement beyond the actual course. Other examples of this 
type of activity include ‘non-toxic living workshops’ run by Mosman Council, 
Bankstown City Council’s participation in the Australian Conservation Foundation’s 
Green Home program of workshops, and Wyong Shire Council’s support of the Vox 
Bandicoot Sustainability Street program. 
 
 Business sector 
It appears that, at least in the past, when it comes to environmental/sustainability 
education and engagement, councils have had less of a focus on the business sector 
compared to the residential sector. However a number of examples of 
educational/engagement activities targeted at businesses were mentioned. These include 
a sustainable business workshop to promote and support the Sustainability Advantage 
program, and a Green Leaders program for small business. Some councils had also 
recognised a need to increase their engagement with the business sector in the future. For 
example, Orange City Council has plans for a program for business that will allow 
businesses to ‘adopt’ a section of creek, engage them in tree planting, and link to 
promotions for their business. 
 
Place and event based activities 
A number of education/engagement strategies can be described as place-based or as 
organised around a particular facility. These include public place recycling education, 
use of an environmental education centre for schools, or of a wildflower garden as focus 
for education. Another approach is to create opportunities for the community to view 
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some of council’s various environmental activities, and to turn these into educational 
opportunities for people to ‘learn by seeing’. Randwick City Council takes this approach, 
organising ‘Sticky Beak Days’ when various council sites are open for people to view – 
including the council nursery and the stormwater recycling facility. Orange City Council 
also conducts tours of the local wastewater treatment plant and resource recovery centre. 
There are also two examples of a facility having been specifically built for the purposes 
of environmental education and community engagement, namely the Environmental 
Learning Facility at Orange, and the Watershed in Sydney (a joint initiative between and 
the Council of the City of Sydney and Marrickville Council). 
 
Many councils use local festivals or fairs as opportunities to conduct 
environmental/sustainability education activities. Some incorporated these activities in a 
regular community event – such as the incorporation of water conservation, sustainable 
building and waste reduction education at the Mosman Festival. However, others have 
found it challenging to incorporate environmental education activities into a standard 
event: 
There was a big event on Australia Day. We do this annually every year. 
It’s huge, 30,000 people. We don’t do any environmental education at that 
event. We’ve tried it in the past. But it’s just – it’s too big. People aren’t 
there for the sort of things that we would be doing, whether it be a plant 
giveaway or a small stall or something. But we support it in a different 
way, in that we funded turning it into a carbon neutral event and getting 
them to promote that and facilitating recycling at the event.  
 
Other councils have created new, specifically badged events as conscious attempts to use 
a major public event as an educational opportunity for a large number of local residents. 
The two high profile examples of this are the City of Sydney’s Live Green event, and 
Randwick Council’s Eco-Living Fair.  Many councils also participate in and coordinate 
local events and activities for annual national or state wide programs – such as Clean Up 
Australia Day, Recycling Week, Water Week, Bike Week and National Tree Planting 
Day. 
 
4. Conclusions 
It is difficult to neatly summarise the wide range of approaches identified by this 
research, or to generalise about ‘the current approach’ to environmental/sustainability 
education in NSW. Indeed, the small number of councils interviewed, while diverse and 
displaying a range of different characteristics, were not intended to be representative of 
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NSW councils in general. Nevertheless the research was able to access the views and 
ideas of a group of people who are significant in the field. Many of the interviewees have 
developed a high level of experience and significant knowledge in environmental and/or 
sustainability education, gained through their work over many years and in multiple 
councils. This recognised expertise perhaps lends some additional weight to the findings. 
One central observation is that it is striking that such a diverse range of activities were 
being undertaken across the participating councils. There were many different 
dimensions of this diversity, from the topic or content areas addressed by the activities, 
to the types of activity, the delivery methods, the target audiences and so on. Clearly, if 
the participating councils are anything to go by, local councils are engaged in an 
extremely broad range of environment/sustainability education activities, and while there 
are some similar programs being run in different councils, there is clearly no ‘one way’ 
for local councils to deliver this kind of education and no standard approach. The 
participating councils are undertaking a multiplicity of activities and while many 
identified individual officers or work units for whom environmental/sustainability 
education is a main focus, it was also common for education to occur in the activities of 
staff across the organisation. 
 
This lack of a standard approach creates a high degree of flexibility for councils to 
develop programs that suit their community, that respond to community needs and 
interests and local environmental data, and that are feasible within councils’ own 
resource constraints. This flexibility is positive, and indeed essential if councils are to 
develop education strategies that are context-appropriate. However, it is also possible 
that the lack of a prescribed or preferred ‘palette’ of programs and activities means that it 
is fairly resource intensive for each council to develop these kinds of programs ‘from 
scratch’. One possibility worth exploring with local councils is whether there might be 
support for a more coordinated approach to program development. This could involve a 
number of councils working together to develop programs or modules that could be 
implemented (with local adjustment if necessary) in each of their communities. This 
might be an especially rewarding approach for smaller councils that could benefit from 
pooling resources. Some of the participants are already taking this approach – in 
‘piggybacking’ some of their educational activities onto existing state government 
programs for example, or researching successful programs used in other jurisdictions and 
adapting them for local needs. 
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Another observation is that there is perhaps a lack of clarity about the appropriate scope 
of council environmental/sustainability education activities. Coupled with the funding 
and staffing constraints faced by many councils, the potentially enormous scope of such 
work poses ongoing challenges. A number of participants discussed this issue, including 
questioning their role as education providers (in schools for example), the amount of 
resources and staff time they should be dedicating to these activities, and ‘where to draw 
the line’ on the whole range of environmental issues that communities are interested in 
learning about. This challenge for councils in trying to be ‘all things to all people’ is only 
likely to grow as community awareness of and interest in environmental/sustainability 
issues (notably climate change) continues to increase, while at the same time many 
councils’ operating environments remain characterised by severe financial constraints 
and competing priorities. 
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Further information  
(All websites accessed July 2010) 
 
ACF Green Home:  
<http://www.acfonline.org.au/default.asp?section_id=86> 
 
Blue Planet:  
<http://www.blueplanet.nsw.edu.au> 
 
Bushcare:  
<http://svc018.wic008tv.server-web.com/page.asp?pID=80> 
 
Central Coast Watertight program:  
<http://gwcwater.nsw.gov.au/index.php/education/210> 
 
Clean Up Australia Day:  
<http://www.cleanup.org.au/au> 
 
Coastcare:  
<http://www.coastcare.com.au> 
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Environmental Learning Facility (Orange City Council):  
<http://www.netwaste.org.au/projects/envLearnFac.htm> 
 
Estuary Management Plan (Wyong Shire Council):  
<http://www.wyong.nsw.gov.au/environment/tuggerah_estuary_study.html> 
 
Live Green (Council of the City of Sydney):  
<http://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/environment/LiveGreen/WhyLiveGreen.asp> 
 
Little Green Steps (Wyong Shire Council):  
<http://www.wyong.nsw.gov.au/environment/preschool_environmental_edu.html> 
 
Local Food Futures Alliance (Coffs Harbour City Council):  
<http://www.coffsharbour.nsw.gov.au/www/html/4069-overview.asp> 
 
National Recycling Week:  
<http://recyclingweek.planetark.org> 
 
National Water Week:  
<http://www.nationalwaterweek.org.au> 
 
National Tree Day:  
<http://treeday.planetark.org> 
 
Nature Conservation Council Climate Consensus Project:  
<http://nccnsw.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2488&Itemid=1133> 
 
NetWaste:  
<http://www.netwaste.org.au> 
 
Non-toxic living (Mosman Municipal Council):  
<http://www.mosman.nsw.gov.au/events/1199/non-toxic-living> 
 
NSW Bike Week:  
<http://www.rta.nsw.gov.au/usingroads/events/bikeweek/index.html> 
 
NSW Early Childhood Environmental Education Network:  
<http://www.earlychildhoodaustralia.org.au/nsw_branch/eceen.html> 
 
Sustainability Advantage:  
<http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/sustainbus/sustainabilityadvantage.htm> 
 
Sustainability Street:  
<http://www.voxbandicoot.com.au/sustainability_street.html> 
 
Sustainable Urban Living courses (Randwick Council):  
<http://www.randwick.nsw.gov.au/Looking_after_our_environment/Sustaining_our_city/cours
es_and_events/Sustainable_Urban_Living_courses/index.aspx> 
 
Watershed (Council of the City of Sydney and Marrickville Council):  
<http://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/Environment/TheWatershed/Default.asp> 
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1. Introduction 
This paper looks at the practitioner’s challenge of building capacity for local government 
to perform. It does so by ways of responding to some of the policy recommendations put 
forward at the Commonwealth Local Government Conference (CLGC) held in the 
Bahamas in May 2009.  
 
It is suggested that capacity building in local government, particularly in the least 
developed countries (LDCs),2 is riddled with rhetoric. There is no common reference 
point for the concept. The following text is therefore drawn from practice: that of a local 
government practitioner – the author – with experience in diverse countries (Scotland, 
England, Malawi and Tanzania), and of an organization wedded to the fundamental 
importance of local government to local development,3 and with sound understanding of 
capacity building interventions – the United Nations Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF).  
                                                        
1  The author was a senior technical adviser with the United Nations Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF) in New York from 2001 to 2009. He is now the program budget adviser to Ethiopia’s finance 
ministry. 
2  http://www.un.org/esa/policy/devplan/profile/index.html  
3  http://www.uncdf.org/english/local_development 
 
 
Ronald McGill1 
 
Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
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The capacity building challenge is summarized in Table 1. It is argued that the five 
elements of this challenge, explained below, represent the building blocks for local 
government’s successful performance. They are the fundamental interventions to allow 
higher-order policy decisions to gain purchase within the local government system. 
 
Table 1: The challenge of building capacity 
 Main aspects of capacity building 
 
Practical implications 
1 Institutional development 
 
The context, structure and processes to allow 
functions to be performed 
 
2 Measuring performance in providing 
infrastructure and services 
The economy, efficiency and effectiveness of 
delivery 
 
3 Getting local government to deliver Minimum capacity thresholds 
 
4 Building blocks for building capacity Capacity interventions 
 
5 Integrated service delivery system Understanding the pivotal role of local 
government in local development 
 
 
At the CLGC, working group number 5 generated five issues and responding 
recommendations. At a strategic level, the group’s main concern was with Millenium 
Development Goal (MDG) indicator number 12: “the proportion of seats held by women 
in national parliament”. The group lamented that there was no equivalent indicator for 
women’s political representation in local government. For the participants, this suggested 
a lack of understanding of and belief in local government at the very highest level of 
policy debate in international development. This conclusion was therefore the 
springboard for five policy-based recommendations: 
 
1) MDG-3’s indicator number 12 reads: Proportion of seats held by women in national 
parliament. ISSUE – there is no reference to political representation at the local 
government level. RECOMMENDATION: That local government’s political 
representation be targeted at a minimum of 30% of all seats/wards by women and by 
a figure exceeding that percentage, as soon as possible. This was and is a most 
obvious policy intervention at the global level. It makes a modest but crucial change 
to the MDG indicators so that local government is given due recognition in the first 
place. Secondly, women would then be given the space (and domestic support) to be 
active members in the local development process through the political and 
administrative machinery of local government itself. 
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2) ISSUE – Implementation capacity is a bane of local government, especially when 
development funds actually become available. RECOMMENDATION: That all 
local government development projects be subject to an initial assessment, to include 
explicit capacity-building elements, in the fundamental areas of planning, budgeting, 
procurement, construction management, and financial management (including 
accounting and auditing). This simply reinforces the last main section of this text; 
the ‘binding address’ of infrastructure and service delivery. The contention is that 
local government should be the location’s local development agency, harnessing 
energy and resources from all sectors, both in formulating an integrated development 
plan and making spending decisions to support every ‘player’s’ part of that plan 
(explained further in the last section of the paper). 
 
3) ISSUE – There is a desperate shortage of engineers in developing countries; a key to 
success in local development practice. RECOMMENDATION: That national 
governments in developing countries increase their investment in the education of 
civil engineers by 50% and that scholarships be awarded to those willing to serve at 
least two years in a local council after graduation. Engineers, surveyors, architects 
and (urban and regional) planners are the professions most closely concerned with 
the local development process. In addition, planners have a tradition of advocating in 
favour of community-based involvement in the local development process. That 
cluster of capacity demands is explained further below. 
 
4) ISSUE – It is often impossible to recruit professional and other staff to councils 
outside the main urban centres because of a lack of incentives such as the availability 
of housing for staff and education for their children. RECOMMENDATION: That 
national governments introduce a policy and provide supporting resources for 
councils classified as remote and not being able to attract staff, to provide housing 
and primary education, free, in these locations. How often has it been reported that 
central government staff members have been posted to outlying or remote regions 
and that they either go reluctantly or they resign; a loss to the public service? It 
should be within the scope and imagination of governments committed to local 
development, to recognise the need to build incentives for staff members to move. 
Free housing and education would seem the most basic incentives that a government 
could provide. For example, in Sierra Leone, one of the major obstacles to progress 
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in decentralisation was that there was no housing and local education capacity to 
accommodate the envisaged staff numbers that would have to move to the UNCDF 
programme location of Kenema District; the focus of a decentralisation assessment, 
that scored a miserable 4% towards achieving the decentralisation of functions from 
central government to the district. Indeed, there was no formal system of planned 
housing plot provision, whether serviced or un-serviced. Land allocation was locked 
in the hands of the traditional leaders. 
 
5) ISSUE – Councils often recognize potential sources of local revenue but are not 
permitted, in law, to raise such revenue. RECOMMENDATION: That national 
governments introduce or amend local government legislation to permit councils to 
raise such additional revenues as they deem possible and practical, subject to the 
appropriate council resolution and subsequent by-laws being passed. This is a case 
of attempting to remove two restrictions. One is the simple matter of unblocking the 
blockages to local government being able to show initiative and harness potential for 
additional revenue. The other is to stop central government ‘clawing back’ the 
identified additional local revenue by reducing its fiscal transfers by the same 
amount. If central government feels that strongly, it should develop a formula 
whereby local government retains the majority but agrees to transfer a portion of that 
additional revenue to the centre. Some argue that all local governments should be 
self-financing. This seems fanciful let alone inequitable, in that much of local 
government’s expenditure generates the external economies for the private sector to 
be able to perform: roads, sanitation, water. Some regions will always be poorer so 
an equalisation dimension to central government fiscal transfer systems remains 
legitimate. 
 
While these five policy recommendations are laudable, perhaps even crucial in 
themselves, the truth is that they can only work if the fundamentals of local government 
capacity building introduced in Table 1 are met.  
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2. Institutional development: the macro-perspective 
 
Government reform  
In government reform, the agenda for change boils down to (a) an understanding of the 
current and desired functions of government, and (b) the translation of the these functions 
into the: 
 Policy, legal and regulatory context 
 Organisational structures, the deployment of personnel and their training needs 
 Planning, budgeting, implementation and review processes, including their 
supporting information systems. 
 
The shorthand for this is the institutional development (ID) agenda (1995a). The ID 
process to achieve locally understood and determined reform involves care in the 
facilitation of the change itself (McGill, 1999).  The central point is that the ID agenda of 
context, structures and processes, to perform the functions, should be mutually inclusive. 
This optimises the potential for the economical, efficient and effective delivery of 
infrastructure and services. If one part of the agenda is ‘out of step’, it limits the potential 
for full performance from the particular institution being reformed. An example best 
illustrates this point.  
 
In Malawi in 1989 to 1991, government was committed to transferring responsibility for 
the related functions of town planning and both housing development and management to 
the four city councils: Lilongwe, Blantyre, Mzuzu and Zomba. While part of the context 
(policy) was in place, the legal and regulatory framework was not. Legislation and 
supporting regulations therefore had to be drafted and approved by parliament. There 
was no structure (a department with trained personnel). This had to be created and staff 
recruited from scratch. While the process of town planning could be transferred from the 
Office of the President and Cabinet, there was no city-based manual to explain the 
development and management of housing areas, previously the responsibility of the 
Malawi Housing Corporation. The Municipal Development Program helped Lilongwe 
city council develop such a manual. In short the triumvirate of the institutional 
development agenda (of context, structures and processes) to perform the (to be) 
transferred functions had to be in place before the detailed questions of capacity could 
even be considered. These turned on the twin questions of local government performance 
and local government capacity to perform. 
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The lesson here was that the ‘form’ of the institution (in this case, Lilongwe city council) 
needed to be determined by the ‘functions’ it was attempting to perform; the adage 
therefore being the familiar one of form follows function (McGill, 1997 and 1996). Thus, 
once the institutional framework of context, structures and processes is in place, one can 
drill down to the levels of practicality; local government performance, its capacity to 
perform, and the organisational building blocks required to establish that capacity. 
 
3. Performance: measuring local government delivery 
The demand for infrastructure and services confronts every local government in the 
developing world. The weakness of local government compounds the enormity of the 
challenge (McGill, 1997 and 1996). The fundamental importance of access to 
infrastructure and services, as a means of supporting both economic development and to 
impact on various parts of the poverty spectrum, is now accepted in common parlance. 
The key point is that we are seeking to establish ‘what difference local government is 
making out there?’ with the money it is spending. One method for measuring such 
delivery is through performance budgeting  (McGill, Ed, 2006 and McGill, 2001a). 
 
Performance budgeting (PB) is founded on the principle of delivering infrastructure and 
services, economically, efficiently and effectively; the 3-Es. This is the notion of value 
for money (VFM) in government (McGill, 1984). Each 3-Es measurement criterion is 
explained in turn. 
 
Economy of inputs 
Any organisation’s leader knows that if you budget X, you should spend X and that you 
should deliver what you promised. Variance analysis is the first technique in measuring 
the economy of inputs. Thus, if the item of infrastructure or the targeted service to be 
delivered costs 10,000, the following is already assumed: 
 That the budgeted figure is technically accurate 
 It is based on experience (if service delivery, dominated by personnel costs) or 
an engineer’s ‘bill of quantity’ (if a capital project) 
 It anticipates any cost fluctuations, say, because of the prospect of cost inflation. 
Thus, the first score in measuring PB performance is:  
 
(1)  = Economy of inputs (where T = 100%) 
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Here, ‘T’ is the target of 100%. So, if the budget is 10,000 and the actual is 10,000 then 
we are on target; a score of 100%. If at the end of the year, only 5,000 are spent, then the 
score is 50% and so on. The basic intellectual principle is that of common sense. 
 
Efficiency of outputs 
Any organisation’s leader knows that if you budget to deliver outputs (a road, primary 
health care etc), it is that for which you are most obviously accountable. This is 
especially so if you have told the public that ‘these are the things we intend to deliver 
next year’.  In order not to drown PB in data, only two generic criteria are advocated for 
measuring the delivery of outputs. So, beyond the number (the target) to be achieved, 
these criteria are A = % specification, and B = % time. 
 
If the output is through capital expenditure, then there is always a technical specification 
of what is to be constructed (a new school, the rehabilitation of X kilometres of road etc). 
If there are 20 items in the technical specification (the bill of quantities or ‘BoQ’), all 
have to be satisfied. If all are satisfied, then the specification is fully satisfied, so 100% 
(divided by 2 because this is only half of the output measure). 
 
The other half is of time.  If the output is to be delivered in 60 days and it takes 60 days, 
you are on target. If more, then you are over-budget in terms of time and the score is less, 
accordingly.  If the output is through recurrent expenditure, then the test is different. We 
have to define what standard of service is to be delivered. For example, in education, 
how many pupils should a teacher teach in the course of the year? In health, how many 
people should the health clinic be able to service, comfortably? In agriculture, what 
should the extension service be providing through routine events and when? Putting 
measures for recurrent expenditure is more difficult but again, for experienced 
practitioners, it really is a matter of applied common sense.  
 
To assess on-time performance, a basic timetable for any particular service can be 
established. A school must provide three terms of schooling in a year: has this been 
achieved? In a clinic: has the service been available as intended? In agricultural 
extension: has the service been made available in accordance with the annually agreed 
timetable?  Experienced practitioners also know that the output being delivered as part of 
any program is that which is directly attributable to the program’s owner. Basic 
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accountability is therefore assured. Thus, the second score in measuring PB performance 
is:  
 
(2) = (A+B)/2 = Efficiency of outputs (where T = 100%) 
 
Here again, ‘T’ is the target of 100%. So, if the specification is fully satisfied and 
everything has been delivered according to time, then the score for each of A and B is 
100%, which is then divided by two, to give the aggregate score for that deliverable. 
Again though, the basic intellectual principle is that of common sense. 
 
Effectiveness of impact 
Any organisation’s leader knows that the economy of inputs and the efficiency of 
outputs, ultimately, have no practical meaning if there is no effective impact. At the 
annual level, there are two basic criteria to measure this impact. These are:  
  
C = % occupancy rate/use of facility 
D = % assessment of 'problem solved' 
 
Whether delivered through capital or recurrent expenditure, the result of the asset created 
or the service delivered has to be in terms of a basic impact question: is the school or 
clinic satisfying the need? Is the new market being fully used? What is the ‘bottom-line’ 
here? Has the original problem been solved?  Anyone in any community is able to define 
a problem to be solved. Equally, anyone is able to assess, from a user’s perspective, if the 
problem has indeed been solved. Table 2 illustrates this issue of problem definition and 
suggests how to assess whether or not the problem has been addressed successfully. 
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Table 2:  Problem definition and ‘raw’ project proposal 
Perceived 
problem 
Elements of the problem Project 
response 
Recurrent service and resourcing 
No 
education 
Nearest education 10 km away 
380 school-age children need the 
service, hence viability of a new 
school 
New school 
building 
Teachers and supplies, through the 
education ministry 
No health 
care 
Nearest clinic 10 km away 
Malaria 
No basic preventive health care 
Health post Staff and medical supplies, co-
funded by health ministry and 
community 
Inadequate 
water  
Nearest main source 7 km away 
- Shallow wells 
No catchment systems 
Deeper wells 
and catchment 
terracing to 
retain the water 
table 
Maintenance of wells and catchment 
locations, through community 
initiatives 
No vehicle 
access in 
bad 
weather 
Seasonal problem 
Flooding 
Culverts and 
fords 
Regular maintenance through 
community programmes 
No market Nearest market 10 km away 
 
Area and basic 
structures 
Maintenance through owner levies 
and community supervision 
Lack of 
food 
Available fertile locations  
Available underground water 
sources 
(Relate to 
inadequate 
water proposal) 
N/a 
 
It is at the level of ‘effectiveness’ that the client – the recipients of the service – are best 
placed to inform the providers of the new capital asset or the delivered service. So the 
question: ‘has the problem been solved?’ is answered by responding to the two right-
hand columns.  Finally, experienced practitioners know that the output being delivered as 
part of any program must have a positive (i.e. a declared, desired) impact on those for 
whom the infrastructure or service is being delivered. This encourages public 
accountability. The third score in measuring PB performance is therefore:  
 
(3) = (C+D)/2 = Effectiveness of impact (where T = 100%) 
 
Again, ‘T’ is the target of 100%. So, if the customers are satisfied with the infrastructure 
or the service, then the score for C is 100%. If the answer is ‘yes’ to the second question: 
‘has the original problem has been solved?’, then again the score for D is 100%. The 
combined score is also divided by two, to give the aggregate score for that output’s 
impact. For fear of repetition, the basic intellectual principle is that of common sense. 
 
Total program performance measurement 
Total program performance is economy (1), efficiency (2) and effectiveness (3), divided 
by three, to give the final percentage score, as follows: 
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T = (1+2+3)/3 = Total performance 
 
In this approach to PB performance, equal weight is given to the ‘3-Es’.  An example 
again best illustrates the idea. 
 
A donor offered the Malawi Government a new produce market for Lilongwe’s capital 
city centre. The offer was welcomed, subject to the condition that the market was located 
in a land-use zone adjacent to the centre itself; the proposal being considered 
‘inappropriate’ for the capital’s new city centre! This was accepted, reluctantly. The 
market was built according to budget (the economy of inputs was satisfied). It was built 
to specification and to time (the efficiency of outputs was satisfied). However, the 
original problem (in truth, the opportunity) was not satisfied; the asset was not fully used. 
In fact, it was never more than 15% used (the effectiveness of impact was not satisfied). 
Performance budgeting’s measurement therefore gave the ‘process of delivery’ credit for 
being economical and efficient (both capacity tests in themselves), but there was little 
effectiveness; the expenditure made ‘very little difference out there!’ In short, PB 
measurement is holistic in the sense that it is concerned with both the process of delivery 
as well as the impact of its results. 
 
If performance budgeting is accepted as a practical basis for measuring local government 
performance, then the next step is to establish tests for local government to be able to 
perform in the first place. 
 
4. Capacity: Enabling local government to deliver 
There are certain fundamentals that every local government should have, by way of 
capacity, to allow it to perform. Assuming for the moment a district council, then there 
should be: 
 A current district development plan and budget 
 A functioning district council and district administration 
 A functioning financial management system 
 The establishment of a local development fund (i.e. capital funds) account 
 Key district staff in place. 
 
Table  3  presents  not  only  these  five minimum  conditions  but  also  their  capacity 
targets  and  weighting,  for  scoring.  The  argument  is  that  in  order  to  deliver  (to 
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perform), local government must have certain key prerequisites in place (and these 
items  are,  of  course,  an  absolute minimum).    One way  or  another,  these  capacity 
requirements cannot be achieved unless the building blocks themselves are put  in 
place. 
 
Table 3:  Enabling local government to deliver 
 
Minimum 
conditions 
Capacity Targets Percentage 
weight 
Actual score 
% 
 
Existence of a 
district development 
plan and budget. 
Max = 20 
 
- Approved development plan, 
through community participation 
(3-5 years)  
- Approved annual budget to 
implement that year’s portion of the 
plan 
10  
10  
Functioning district 
council and district 
administration. 
Max = 20 
 
- Full council and committee 
meetings timetable honoured in full 
- Women’s participation quota met  
- Accurate ‘minutes’ produced within 
two weeks of any such meeting 
5  
10  
5  
Functioning 
financial 
management system. 
Max = 20 
- Daily accurate financial records by 
CoB. 
- Monthly bank reconciliations, 
within two weeks of month-end 
- Quarterly financial reports within 
two weeks of quarter end 
10  
5  
5  
Establishment of a 
local development 
fund (i.e. capital 
fund) account. 
Max = 10 
 
- Functional capital account 
 
10  
Key district staff in 
place. 
Max = 30 
- Administrator 
- Finance officer 
- Planner  
- Five technical supervisors 
(Education; Agriculture; Health; 
Women; Capacity) 
5  
5  
5  
15  
100  100  
 
 
5. Organisation: The building blocks for basic capacity 
It is recognised that no infrastructure and services can be delivered without people in 
local government. An immediate focus for intervention is therefore, to get people in 
place to do the work. Table 4 presents an example of a framework for assessing capacity. 
This happens to include measuring progress in applying gender equitable local 
development (GELD) principles (UNCDF 2008) in building a local authority. 
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Table 4:  The building blocks for basic capacity  
Generic functions  
of a district council 
Number of 
posts required 
(% of women 
according to 
national 
standards). 
(See Note 1) 
Number of 
posts 
established (% 
of women 
according to 
national 
standards) 
(See Note 2) 
All 
established 
posts to 
perform each 
devolved 
function filled 
in the district? 
(See Note 3) 
All 
established 
personnel 
fully trained 
to perform the 
devolved 
functions? 
(See Note 4) 
Facilities: 
accommo-
dation (gender 
sensitive, 
including 
hygiene 
arrange-
ments), plus 
furniture, 
systems, 
equipment 
and transport 
provided? 
(See Note 5) 
Assessment of 
productivity: 
i.e. 
performing 
economically, 
efficiently and 
effectively in 
the 
performance 
of the 
function? (See 
Note 6) 
Total score of 
‘capacity to 
perform the 
function’ 
(including % 
of women 
according to 
national 
standards)?  
(See Note 7) 
  % n/a 10% 10% 10% 30% 40% T = 100% 
‘Line’ Functions (those that do the actual delivery) 
Education, Youth, 
Sport and Culture               
Health, Gender, 
Family Promotion                
Economic 
Development                
Infrastructure, Land, 
and  Planning               
‘Staff’ Functions (those that support the people that deliver, such as finance and human resources) 
Administration and 
Good Governance               
Financial 
management, Human 
resource development 
and so on               
Mayor and executive 
or central policy 
committee                
Total Score               
 
Notes from Table 4: 
1) The question to be asked is: how many people will be required to perform the specific 
service in the district? This has to include the question of the quota of women (ideally, 
the quota comes from the appropriate legislation). The answer to the number of people 
should be followed by a basic understanding of the ‘level’ of post or posts required, 
including any hierarchical relationship. Once the number of posts is known, assessing the 
‘measurable progress’ can start. 
 
2) If the estimate of the number of posts is accurate, the district will ensure that the 
‘authorised establishment’ (i.e. the approved number of posts) is altered to accommodate 
the extra posts. This accommodation must include the quota for women. 
  
3) The recruitment process is known to all. It must be open and transparent. 
 
4) Whatever the minimum requirements to fill a post, it is often (but not always) necessary 
to provide training so that the new personnel are able to perform. Affirmative action, 
through additional training, may be required to ensure that the women recruited are able 
to perform as well as men.  
 
5) ‘Facilities’ is so obvious, it should not need to be defined and yet, it is so often 
overlooked: office space, furniture, equipment and supplies. This is where sensitivity is 
required to support women’s specific needs. These can include adequate sanitation 
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facilities, personal safety, and child care where possible. Too often, people are blind to 
these gender-specific needs. 
 
6) Performance is measured according to the principles of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
 
7) The total score is the simple addition for each row because the weighted score can only 
add up to 100% maximum. The council’s total score is then the addition of all rows, 
divided by the number of rows. 
 
 
What we have here is the bottom line of capacity measurement, on the simple test of 
getting people in post to be able to perform. Yet, even this bottom line cannot deny the 
institutional development (ID) framework within which all capacity interventions will 
have to fit. If the ID framework is contorted or disjointed (e.g. the structure and 
processes are not aligned), then the capacity interventions are going to be less than 
efficient and effective. 
 
6. The ‘binding address’ of infrastructure and service delivery 
Capacity-building interventions are a means to an end and not an end in themselves. That 
end is the ‘binding address’ of local government’s development planning, strategy and 
budgeting. This is the foundation for delivering infrastructure and services; the key to 
successful local development. The emphasis needs to be placed on adopting a suitable 
process to generate that infrastructure and service delivery. 
 
The concept of an institutionally integrated development plan means that the local 
government concerned is responsible for ensuring the preparation of a spatially defined 
plan through which all ‘players’ – the private, including community sector; central 
government, including its parastatals; and local government itself, whether single or two 
tier – come to an agreement as to what is best for their community. This is where 
development (i.e. investment recommendations) is – or should be – allocated equitably, 
so that poorer localities and groups get more, in order to bring them to a level of equality 
(at minimum) in terms of the MDGs. Each organization, including local government, 
then prepares its strategy and budget (its investment decisions) for the things it is directly 
responsible for implementing, to ensure the provision of infrastructure and resulting 
services, economically, efficiently and effectively. This idea can be illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1:  Integrated development planning and budgeting 
 
This diagram highlights four key points.  First, is the inter-sectoral and therefore, inter-
agency, spatially defined development plan.  The idea is that all organizations, 
coordinated by local government, should contribute to both its formulation and its 
implementation; spending money to achieve things. Second, is the primary classification 
of the institutional environment; simply, the private/community sector, local government 
and central government. Third, this classification is broken down to one more level; in 
essence the spending organizations. Finally is the simple categorization of that spending; 
for the private sector, its individual spending decisions; for government, through budgets.  
 
The point is to recognise where equitable allocations will be the primary concern; in 
development planning. Economic, efficient and effective delivery is through an 
organisation’s strategy and budget (its performance budget). That is to say, we are 
allocating proposals spatially (for infrastructure and services) unequally, in order to bring 
the more deprived localities to a point of reasonable equality; the heart of equitable 
allocations. Such equality is judged through the prism of the MDGs.  
 
 
Integrated district development plan 
(inter-organisational and spatially defined) 
Equitable allocation of development proposals 
 
Private sector Local government Central government 
Communities/ 
NGOs  Business  Districts  Regions 
Deconcentrated 
departments; 
parastatals 
Ministry 
HQs 
Spending decisions 
 
Performance budget 
Organisationally 
specific 
 
Development proposals 
delivered economically, 
efficiently and 
effectively. 
 
Performance budgets 
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The allocated proposals are then delivered economically, efficiently and effectively 
through the organisationally specific performance budget. The assumption and 
practicality is that in any location, there are many players (many funders) in the local 
development process. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has presented the five main aspects of capacity building (see Table 1 above). 
It has argued that these must be seen as means to an end and not an end in themselves. 
The true goal is the ‘binding address’ of local government’s (coordinated) development 
planning and (individual) strategy and budgeting. These are the foundations for 
delivering infrastructure and services; the key to successful local development. Without 
local development, through the empowerment of households and communities (however 
defined), there will never be sustainable socio-economic progress in the developing 
world. The local institutional development paradigm seeks to create that empowerment. 
Otherwise, why decentralise? 
  
We should also recognise that overseas development aid (ODA) is never going to answer 
fully the seemingly intractable challenges in the developing world. For that, decisions 
made in the private and community sectors will be the key to ultimate success. The 
under-rated report Unleashing Entrepreneurship (UNDP 2004) was an attempt to present 
this very argument. Local government should therefore be a key not only to that desired 
empowerment, but also to creating the conditions (ensuring the provision of the essential 
external economies, such as passable roads, electricity, schools and clinics) that will 
allow local economies to flourish. Thus, as Figure 1 illustrates, local government should 
be seen as part of a wider institutional and investment (spending) framework that 
supports socio-economic development. 
 
In a public meeting with local citizen and business leaders in a Mozambique province 
about five years ago, this author asked: what are the two most fundamental things that 
UNCDF can achieve, in support of local development in this location?. The answer was 
simple to the point of brilliance: We need roads that are passable in the rainy seasons so 
that we can get our produce to market! We need funds to capitalize new and recapitalize 
old businesses shattered by the civil war! These were two fundamental blockages within 
the system that needed to be removed. Both could be within the purview of empowered 
local government. Building local government capacity in developing countries is thus a 
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perennial concern, but we need better frameworks to make capacity building effective. 
This paper has sought to show how those frameworks can be established.  
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1. Introduction  
This paper discusses a program of attitudinal orientation courses provided for 
functionaries of a large municipal corporation in India. Almost 450 Assistant Managers 
from the Kolkata Municipal Corporation took part in the training, which was held at the 
Administrative Training Institute (ATI) of the Government of West Bengal, India.  
 
Under the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, Indian Municipalities/Corporations 
(Urban Local Bodies) are empowered and entrusted to perform planning, development 
and governance for the city/ town and to provide services to the citizens.  The change in 
outlook towards the local government reflected in the Act has highlighted the need for 
ROY, GHOSH, 
CHAKRAVARTI, SOM: Attitudinal orientation of first level managers
 
 
 
            CJLG July 2010 108
 
greater awareness and a better attitude amongst municipal staff as well as elected 
representatives towards service delivery.  Good governance can be achieved through the 
overall performance of officials of an organization, provided they possess the necessary 
knowledge, skills, attitudes and competencies.  For historical reasons, knowledge, skills 
and attitudes amongst officials of Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) in India have been 
traditionally of a low standard.  Willingness to perform better in the role of municipal 
service delivery is not common. Therein lies the need for training for improvement in 
service delivery, especially for organizations like large municipal corporations and 
municipalities. 
 
ATI is the apex-training institute of Government 
of West Bengal, India. It has been imparting 
quality training for more than two decades to 
various officials of West Bengal and other 
states.  Its Urban Management Centre (UMC) 
provides training to a broad cross section of 
employees of the ULBs. Until 2004, the 
Government of India or the state government 
funded most of the courses, but from 2004-05 
major changes took in delivery of training.  Now most courses are provided to meet 
specific demands emerging from the ULBs or their apex department (the Municipal 
Affairs Department of the Government of West Bengal).  Courses are conducted at the 
institute itself as well as at the ULBs. A systematic approach to training has been adopted 
(taken from Ghosh, 2004), as shown below:  
 
Figure 1:  A systematic approach to training as adopted at UMC, ATI 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
 
 
                  
                            Main Building – ATI, Kolkata 
1 
Assessment of   
Training Need 
4 
Evaluation 
Training 
3 
Implementation 
2 
Designing and 
Planning of 
Training 
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2. Capacity Building Programme for Kolkata Municipal Corporation 
Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) is one of the largest municipal authorities in the 
country.  Approximately 5 million people live in the KMC area. KMC is a large 
organization and has around 37,000 employees working in 141 wards and 15 borough 
offices.  To apply the changed perspective of citizen-centric governance, the whole 
organization needed reform. Internal communication among functionaries and external 
communication with citizens have been given much emphasis in improving the service 
delivery and capacity of the corporation (KMC 2006).  
 
In 2006, KMC received major funding for training and capacity building from the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID). It approached ATI to provide 
training to its Assistant Managers, who play significant roles in the service-delivery 
system.  The Corporation also has its own training cell named the Institute of Urban 
Management (IUM), which trains both staff and elected members. IUM collaborated 
with UMC, ATI to deliver the training and capacity building programs reported in this 
paper. 
 
3. Profile of Participants 
Almost 450 Assistant Managers were identified for training. All of them had been 
promoted from the clerical grade.  Most were in the age group of 45 to 55 years, and had 
graduate or higher secondary qualifications.  They had experience of various functions 
and in different urban zones through lateral transfers at 3-4 yearly intervals between 
departments such as water supply, assessment-collection, building, licensing, advertising, 
establishment, library, accounts, general administration, pension, conservancy, electricity 
etc. Assistant Managers are the first-
level managerial layer of KMC.  They 
are supposed to lead a team consisting 
of 5-30 subordinates to execute service 
delivery in the various fields. They 
needed to be oriented in leadership, 
team building and communication 
skills to facilitate service delivery to 
citizens. 
     A group photo of a mix group of KMC managers 
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Most Assistant Managers had received previous training at IUM for short periods while 
at clerical grades in subjects like assessment-collection, licensing etc, but some had not 
received any training before.  Also some, who were on the verge of retirement, were 
initially apathetic towards training. 
 
4. Strategy and Approach  
Identified training needs included knowledge inputs in urban planning, principles of 
management, municipal governance and service delivery, as well as organization 
development, leadership, communication and soft skills for self-development.    
The following topics had been identified by KMC: 
 Management of municipal bodies - an overview 
 Fiscal and financial management 
 Infrastructure planning and development 
 Tax administration 
 Contract and logistic management 
 Management of human resources 
 Managerial leadership and team building 
 Communication and interpersonal relationships 
 Citizen servicing and responsiveness 
 Values and ethical issues 
 Stress management 
 Managerial and organization excellence-related  issues 
Considering the diverse group and age profile, it was decided that the course should be 
residential and conducted in the UMC in 
order to benefit from the ambience of the 
training institute. Further, methodologies 
such as group discussions and presentations, 
case studies and guided exercises would be 
used in abundance in addition to lecture 
mode. Emphasis was placed on promoting 
attitudinal change. Management experts and 
professionals would conduct the training.  
 
 
           Participants in a typical lecture session 
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The course was designed to be for one week (six days), with of a maximum of 25 
participants in each group. To assess and to reinforce learning, a ‘vertical interactive’ 
session was proposed on the concluding day, bringing in senior representatives of KMC. 
After assessing the training need analysis, the training was divided into four learning 
units with inputs as detailed below. The second half of the course focused principally on 
attitudinal issues. 
 
Participants during group exercise 
 
 
Table 1: Module of Training adopted 
 
Learning 
Unit (LU) Subjects  
Contact 
Hours Method Faculty 
(I)  
 
Urban 
planning, 
management 
and 
governance  
Introduction to 
Urbanization 
Total 
 5 hrs 
Lecture, 
discussion, 
demonstration 
UMC 
History of Kolkata 
Municipal Corporation KMC 
Legislative and 
Constitutional Framework 
of ULBs 
UMC 
Urban planning, 
management and 
governance 
(II) 
 
Municipal 
service 
delivery 
Right to Information Act 
and Citizens Charter 
Total 
 7 hrs 
Lecture, 
discussion, 
guided 
exercise 
UMC 
JNNURM: Reforms and 
concepts 
Servicing the customer Management Expert 
Managing change in 
municipal service delivery 
UMC/Govt of 
W.B. 
(III) 
 
Organisation 
development,  
Motivational leadership 
and teambuilding Total 
 8 hrs 
Discussion, 
demonstration, 
case study, 
guided 
Management 
Expert 
Organization and 
personnel management Do 
          Participant presenting after group exercise 
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leadership 
and 
management 
Values in administration exercise UMC 
Working philosophy in 
public administration KMC 
(IV) 
 
Personal 
effectiveness 
Communication skills in 
improving interpersonal 
relationship 
Total 9 
hrs 
Discussion, 
guided 
exercise, case 
study 
Management 
Expert 
Stress management 
UMC 
Time management 
Problem solving and 
decision making 
Management 
Expert 
Leadership competencies UMC 
(V) 
 Vertical interactive 
session and course 
evaluation 
3-4 hrs 
Open 
discussion 
and question- 
answer 
All faculties 
and KMC 
representative 
Total   32 hrs   
 
A total of 22 courses were conducted and 426 Assistant Managers were covered. Priority 
was given to good coordination between the teaching faculties to assess daily progress, 
and each day began with a recapitulation presentation by the participants to help 
consolidate learning. Some other key elements were as follows:   
 Since the courses were residential, the group was offered morning yoga-cum-
exercise session, for a refreshing start to the day.   
 Knowledge inputs were concentrated in the first half of the day. 
 Extending the afternoon session up to 5.30 pm was challenging for the 45-55 age 
group.  A small break of tea and snacks worked nicely in the evening, and a few 
of the sessions on motivational and 
attitudinal inputs extended until 
6.30 pm. 
 Seating arrangements were ‘U’ 
shaped to ensure eye contact and 
unobstructed interaction amongst 
participants and trainers.   
 It was suggested that KMC form 
mixed groups of male and female 
(13%) participants. 
 
 
 
Panel of faculty in a typical interactive session 
(author 4 far left, author 1 far right) 
ROY, GHOSH, 
CHAKRAVARTI, SOM: Attitudinal orientation of first level managers
 
 
 
            CJLG July 2010 113
 
 
5. Overcoming Learning Barriers 
Learning barriers as identified by Bhattacharya (1983) were addressed using various 
methods and with good results, as shown in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2: Method and Impacts of overcoming learning barriers 
 
Barriers Example Method Used  Impact/ Status 
Perceptual 
Trainees can’t 
understand citizens’ 
perception about service 
delivery 
Visual exercise on perception 
followed by group discussion on 
differences in interpretation 
 
Good 
Cultural 
Municipal service 
provision perceived 
predominantly as 
‘favours’ or ‘gratis’ not 
‘service’,  bureaucratic 
culture 
Deliberate 
 Discussion using example 
from individual’s 
experiences as citizen. 
 Role play 
 Case studies on service 
delivery 
 
Good 
Emotional Emotional attachment with the organization 
 Lecture session on history 
of KMC. 
 Best practices of 
organizations evolved, 
highlighted and appreciated 
 
Good 
Intellectual 
Discomfort with 
exercises and 
instruments in English 
language 
Translated and explained in 
vernacular language by trainers 
Good. 
Bengali version 
of material is 
being prepared.
Expressive 
Lack of participation due 
to: 
 Apathy towards 
training  
 Poor communication 
ability 
 Poor listening 
 Low motivation 
 Interactive participative 
session 
 Practice of presentation skill 
in recap session made 
mandatory 
 Personalised feedback by 
trainer on behavioural 
instruments data 
Good 
Environmental 
Scepticism on 
implementation of 
learning at KMC 
Issue addressed throughout 
sessions ( but need also for non-
training interventions) 
Positive 
attitudinal 
change 
confirmed 
through post-
training 
evaluation 
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6. Form and impact of ‘vertical interactive’ session 
 
The basic form of the vertical interactive 
session an open unstructured discussion. 
Tea and snacks were provided during 
what was a long session. Coordination 
and preparedness among senior KMC 
officials taking part and teaching faculty 
members was a pre-requisite.     
 
The course coordinator, after giving an 
introduction, remained almost silent and 
only facilitated the process.  A senior officer from KMC would start the discussion by 
taking feedback about the course and its applicability in the job situation once 
participants returned to their departments. During the response from a given participant, 
faculty present in the session would ask questions and elaborate on issues raised to 
reinforce learning.  Other participants were also allowed to participate in the exchange, 
and discussions were open-minded, transparent and candid. Figures 2 and 3 depict the 
process of the session and the roles of those involved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 A typical vertical interactive session 
                       
Faculties addressing in a vertical interactive session  
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Figure 2: Morphology of ‘vertical interactive’ session 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Roles of those involved 
 
 
Time  15 min 60 min 30 min 15 min 
Activity of:  Introduction 
(Stage A)  
Open discussion and 
identification of learning 
gaps (Stage B) 
Reinforcement 
of learning by 
faculty (Stage 
C) 
Conclusion 
(Stage D) 
Course 
Director     
KMC senior 
officer  
    
Expert faculty 1     
Expert faculty 2     
Participants     
 Key role  Optional role 
Stage A 
Stage B 
Stage C 
Stage D 
Introduction and quick sum up of 
previous five day proceedings of course 
and understanding thereof   
Key questions 
asked by 
senior officer 
to facilitate 
self-
expression 
about transfer 
of learning 
 
Response 
from one 
participant 
Allow others 
to respond 
and identify 
individuals to 
act upon the 
response 
 
 
 
Open 
discussion 
 
 
 
Draw 
conclusion 
 
Repeat key 
question if 
necessary 
Allow discussion to open 
up and let expert faculty 
draw the inferences 
 
Expert faculty to fill in gap 
by explanation and 
discussion 
 
Identification of gap in 
understanding 
 
Concluding remarks by senior officer/s 
and course director. Valediction  
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7. Evaluation of the course 
An evaluation of the course was conducted, as is usual, by a questionnaire survey on the 
final day as well as by verbal interaction 9see Table 3). It appears that in-service trainees 
awarded higher scores than those for induction courses.  This may be due to their greater 
understanding of managerial skills required for situations faced in job situations. It also 
appears that behavioural subjects and faculty had greater impact than technical subjects. 
Most participants were of the opinion that they could have performed better at work if 
they had undergone this course in the early years of their career. 
 
Table 3: Extracts from course evaluation 
No. of courses: 22 
No. of participants: 372(M)+54(F) 
Total 426 
Average score for  
in-service courses  
(scale 1-4) 
 
Average score for 
induction course 
(scale 1-4) 
 
Structural organization of the  
course 
3.46 3.37 
Usefulness of the training for future 
jobs 
3.33 3.29 
Benefits from interaction between 
participants 
3.12 2.91 
Overall impression 3.37 3.20 
Interaction with faculty 3.75 3.68 
Evaluation of Faculty (both visiting and in-house) 
Technical topics LU I & II 3.02 2.94 
Behavioural topics LU III & IV 3.20 3.19 
Source: Urban Management Centre 2006-08 
 
At the end of the week-long course, which reminded them of their own student life, 
participants talked about their failures, successes and frustrations in the job situation and 
even personal lives.  Many environmental constraints surfaced which needed to be 
addressed by organisational interventions other than training.  This made it a challenge to 
reorient them to a positive attitude towards service delivery.  
Subsequent feedback from KMC was that after the course participants were very eager to 
do better in their new leadership role, and that their performance was much improved, 
but organisational constraints remained a hindrance to capacity building.   
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8. Validation of Training 
Post-training self assessments as well 
as peer group assessments were 
sought after one and six months.  
Post-training evaluation cum transfer-
of-learning questionnaires were given 
to participants, who were asked to 
submit the completed forms at IUM 
after two months.  Supervising 
officers were asked separately about 
the performance of Assistant 
Managers later on.  Primary findings of these assessments are as follows. 
 
 55% of participants specifically indicated that they could improve their work 
efficiency in managerial roles after the training.  
 44% mentioned that the training helped them in the work.  
 62% stated that after the training they could form a good team at their workplace.  
 Almost all noted that their interface with citizens was improved and 58% were 
emphatic that the training improved their outlook towards citizens and helped a lot in 
interaction with citizens at large, resulting in good service delivery. 
 All identified improvements in time management, and 31% specifically mentioned 
this element. 
 Participants indicated that all subjects included in the training had helped them to 
improve their efficiency.  However, subjects like team building, communication and 
interpersonal relationships, values in administration, stress management, the Right to 
Information Act and Citizens’ Charter were seen as most effective. 
 Supervising officers identified a significant improvement in participants’ approach 
towards service delivery. It was reported that the Assistant Managers expressed 
much eagerness for better performance on the part of departmental heads.   
 
One to two years after this program, a series of follow-up and review workshops is 
proposed to be conducted by KMC. 
 
 
 
 
   Participants during group exercise 
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9. Discussion and conclusion 
For effective service delivery, a sound combination of working knowledge, skills and 
appropriate attitudes towards customer service is essential for functionaries of all 
municipalities/corporations and other public utility providers.  Both training and non-
training interventions can facilitate improved performance.  This study has identified the 
following pre-requisites for training intervention to bring about attitudinal change. 
 
1. The client authority must be convinced of the need for attitudinal change to 
achieve organizational excellence.  
2. The authority must identification the right group of staff, the right training needs 
and the right institute to deliver the training intervention.  In addition, there must 
be a committed senior-level coordinating officer, who will steer the whole 
process in a systematic manner and establish good relations with other 
departments and staff.   
3. Committed and accountable service from the training institute is essential.  There 
must be a dedicated staff member who can understand the training need, suggest 
suitable modules in a consultative way, monitor the implementation of those 
modules and make changes if necessary.  
4. Effective teaching faculty are required, who can deal with adult psychology well.  
Faculty who are effective in human relationships and possess excellent 
communication skills as well as in depth knowledge in the relevant subjects can 
do wonders.  The success of learning sessions depends on the situational 
understanding of a particular group and their entry behaviour, and fine-tuning of 
teaching accordingly.  Use of appropriate adult training methodologies and 
trainee-based experiential learning is necessary. 
5. Close coordination and strong relations between the client authority, training 
provider institute, and faculty (internal and visiting) is very important.  To bring 
about attitudinal change this has to go beyond a normal client-consultant 
relationship. 
6. Logistics such as residential accommodation, meal service etc. must be of good 
quality to provide a catalytic input for training interventions to improve service 
delivery – learning by seeing and experiencing.  
7. Periodic and appropriate follow-up action combined with complementary non-
training interventions must be in place, and post-training assessment and 
validation is strongly suggested for this type of program.    
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The basic learning as well as experience from this series of courses is that attitudinal 
change is possible for existing functionaries of an organization, provided the proper 
ambience for training is created; expert faculty, committed and accountable, are engaged; 
and the positive support as well as involvement of the senior management of the client 
organisation is ensured.   
 
Prof. Som of UMC, ATI giving the certificates 
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1. Introduction 
There is a popular belief among decentralists that if local governments have the power to 
generate and spend revenue, without relying on central government funding, their 
expenditure will be pro-poor and will improve the lives of local people.  Such views have 
influenced recent calls for greater decentralisation in developing countries in general and 
Africa in particular.   However, evidence from Ghana casts some doubts on this view.  A 
brief comparison of the expenditure and revenue patterns of the poorest and richest local 
governments there suggests that local governments are not inherently pro-poor and that 
locally generated funds might be used in ways that do not reflect the needs of the locality 
as a whole.  Thus the fiscal devolution view of decentralisation appears to be out of kilter 
with reality. To discuss this issue, the three sections in this paper summarise the 
assumptions and perceived benefits of decentralisation, describe decentralisation in 
Ghana, and analyse the revenue and expenditure patterns of the Kumasi Metropolitan 
Authority and the Kasena Nankana District Assembly.  
 
2. Decentralisation and local governance 
Decentralisation involves the transfer of power, whether political, administrative or 
fiscal in one of four forms: Deconcentration (the handing over of administrative or 
managerial responsibility to sub-national governments); Delegation (establishing public 
enterprises and other semi-autonomous bodies to manage sectors like utilities); 
Devolution (the transfer of decision-making authority); and Privatisation (the transfer of  
                                                 
1  PhD candidate. The author is grateful to Kenneth Wemochiga and Owusu Mensah for assisting in 
assembling the data used in this essay.  They are not responsible for the interpretation of the data. 
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hitherto state-managed corporations to the private sector) (Martinussen 1997:210-211).  
The underlying assumptions of decentralisation are:  
 Sub-national governments are closer to the people; 
 Sub-national governments know what their people want; 
 Sub-national governments have local information about resources, the incomes 
of their citizens, and local business conditions in their areas of jurisdiction; 
 Sub-national governments can be influenced in their decisions/actions by local 
stakeholders; and 
 Sub-national governments are accountable to their communities. 
 
Based on these assumptions, proponents believe that decentralisation leads to the 
following beneficial outcomes (See Smoke 2003; World Bank 2003 for detailed 
discussion): 
 
 Improved ‘allocative efficiency’ - what will best suit local people at least cost; 
 Improved service monitoring by both sub-national governments and local 
people; 
 Improved participatory governance;  
 Improved redistribution of income ; 
 Improved resource mobilisation; 
 Improved service provision and infrastructure; and 
 Improved local economic development and poverty reduction.  
 
Given the enormous support decentralisation and local governance enjoys among 
development planners, there is the need to periodically evaluate its impacts. One of the 
key propositions for decentralization (and recurrent desire among development planners) 
is its claimed ability to enhance revenue generation at the local level and, thus, to ensure 
that local governments are adequately resourced.  With enough resources, decentralists 
believe, local governments can provide the necessary infrastructure and services to 
ensure rapid poverty reduction (see, for example, UN-Habitat 2001; Bird 1995). 
However, several evaluations have concluded that in the Third World, especially in 
Africa, little revenue is generated at the local level.  Annually, sub-Saharan African cities 
generate only US$14 per capita compared to US$2,906 in the highly industrialised 
countries and US$153 in Asia (UN-Habitat 2001). As such, there is a current flurry of 
interest in how to increase local revenue mobilisation in Africa. What is often taken for 
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granted is how existing revenue is used and whether the expenditure and revenue patterns 
of local governments are pro-poor.  The prevailing assumption is that local revenue is 
used in ways that lead to the reduction of poverty levels.  Efficiency requires that the 
validity of this assumption be ascertained before rushing to generate more revenue.  
Ghana provides a good ‘laboratory’ to conduct this ‘experiment’ because it has a long 
history of decentralisation. 
 
3. Decentralisation in Ghana 
As part of the economic reforms that were implemented in Ghana in the 1980s, a new 
system of local governance was adopted.  There are currently 170 local governments 
charged with the responsibility of promoting local economic development.  Based on 
population size, these local governments may be regarded as metropolitan (settlements of 
over 250,000 people), municipal (settlements of over 95,000 people), or district 
assemblies (settlements of over 75,000 people).  There are 6 metropolitan authorities, 39 
municipal authorities and 125 district assemblies (Obeng-Odoom 2009).  These local 
governments face several problems, including the lack of requisite technocrats, especially 
planners; logistical constraints; and, the lack of autonomy from central government 
(Lentz, 2006; Mensah 2005).  Of all these problems, revenue generation is the most 
challenging, prompting many decentralists and planners (e.g. Mensah, 2005) to suggest 
possible ways of attaining more revenues for the assemblies.  But, again, how effectively 
the little revenue generated has been put to use remains an unanswered question.  
 
Financial trends: Two local governments compared 
The revenue and expenditure patterns of one of the richest local governments in Ghana – 
the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority – was analysed alongside one of the poorest, the 
Kasena Nankana District Assembly.  In the Kasena Nankana District Assembly, capital 
expenditure has decreased over time, from 83% in 2003 to 12.5% in 2006, while 
recurrent expenditure (internal costs of running the council) has increased from 17% to 
over 87% over the same period, as shown in table 1: 
 
Table 1: Capital and Recurrent Expenditure in Kasena Nankana District Assembly 
Year Capital expenditure as a share 
of Internally Generated Funds 
(IGF) 
Recurrent expenditure as a 
share of IGF 
2003 83.0% 17.0% 
2004 94.7% 5.3% 
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2005 90.0% 10.0% 
2006 12.5% 87.5% 
Source: Kasena Nankana District Assembly, 2007 
 
A similar trend can be observed in the revenue and expenditure patterns of the relatively 
rich local governments in Ghana.  These trends are the same in the richest local 
government too.  At the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority, there is insufficient effort to 
spend municipal funds in a way to ensure that the poor might benefit.  The revenue and 
expenditure statement for the year 2008 shows that total recurrent expenditure (49.4%) 
was almost the same as total capital expenditure (50.6%).  Such expenditure patterns 
evidently suggest that local governments are paying more attention to administrative 
issues like printing, photocopying and furnishing local government offices than direct 
capital investment in development projects that would ensure improving the living 
conditions of local people.  
 
Central government grants to local governments are also far from being spent in a pro-
poor manner.  Table 2 shows that until 2006, the Kasena Nankana District Assembly 
spent the bulk of its revenue on ‘good governance’, which, from the reports of the 
assembly, seems to be defined as the administration of local government offices.  
 
Table 2:  Distribution of expenditure from government grant in Kasena Nankana 
Year Education Health Good Governance 
2003 15.8% 2.7% 81.5% 
2004 10.4% 24.0% 65.6% 
2005 22.3% 11.5% 66.2% 
2006 17.1% 64.3% 18.6% 
Source: Kasena Nankana District Assembly, 2007 
 
Interestingly, there was a significant decline in the share of central government grant that 
is used for ‘good governance’ in 2006.  It is not immediately clear what might have 
caused this decline.  A possible explanation is that some items of expenditure had been 
incorrectly classified prior to 2006 and this error was corrected in 2006.  It may be asked 
whether that explanation represents the end of the evidence about the lack of pro-poor 
local governance? 
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Related concerns exist.  One other aspect of the nexus between local finance and poverty 
reduction that gives cause for concern is the nature of revenue collection.  One key area 
where government can influence the distribution of income in the local economy is 
through taxation.  Land taxation, for example, can serve as a vehicle for the redistribution 
of wealth because it falls on assets that are (disproportionately) owned by more wealthy 
citizens.  Revenue from land taxes could be invested in the provision of healthcare, 
agriculture and education to drive the local economy in ways in which the poor can 
benefit.  However, though local governments in Ghana have the power to levy property 
rates, little is actually collected.  
 
Tables 3 and 4 show the sources of funds to the Kasena Nankana District Assembly and 
the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority respectively.  In both cases, a government grant is 
the biggest source of revenue, accounting for an average of over 90% of revenue in 
Kasena and over 65% in Kumasi.  Other important sources of funds are fees from 
sources like lorry parks and street parking, and fines imposed by the law courts.  
Licenses extended to people, such as those who hawk their wares or display them in 
kiosks, also bring some income to the local governments.  Rates are very low in Kasena, 
accounting for less than 1% of revenue from 2003 to 2006.  
 
Table 3:  Sources of Funds to the Kasena Nankana District Assembly 
Source 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Grant 89.7% 95.3% 95.4% 94.4% 
Fees and Fines 8.1% 3.8% 3.3% 0.3% 
Miscellaneous 0.5% 0.0% 0.2% 0.6% 
Licenses 0.9% 0.3% 0.6% 0.8% 
Rent 0.5% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 
Investment 
Income 
0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 3.0% 
Lands 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
Rate 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 
Source: Kasena Nankana District Assembly, 2007 
  
Table 4:  Sources of Funds to the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority 
Source 2006 2007 20082 
Grants 75.9% 75.9% 44.6% 
Fees/Fines 9.3% 9.3% 17.5% 
Licenses 5.8% 5.8% 15.4% 
Rates 5.6% 5.6% 16.7% 
Rent 1.7% 1.7% 2.4% 
Lands 1.1% 1.1% 2.9% 
Miscellaneous 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
Investment 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 
Source:  Kumasi Metropolitan Authority, 2009 
                                                 
2  These are projections. 
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The implication is that the gap between rich and poor may be widening because the rich 
and owners of property are not paying as much in taxes as by law they should.  This 
situation has negative implications for the distribution of income in the country as a 
whole. Some recent surveys, conducted in 1998, 1999 and 2009, show that the income of 
the poorest 10% of the people in Ghana has reduced from 2.4% to 2.0% (UNDP 
2009:197; UNDP 2001:184).  Simultaneously, the share of the income of the richest 10% 
of the population has increased from 29.5% in 1998 to 30.1% in 1999 and 32.8% in 2009 
(UNDP 2001; 2002; 2009).  International evidence shows that such inequality has 
adverse effects for economic growth, happiness and poverty reduction (Fosu 2008; 
Birdsall et al. 1994; Stilwell and Jordan 2007).  
 
4. Conclusion 
So is decentralisation in Ghana pro-poor?  The evidence considered thus far cannot be 
said to be conclusive.  Nevertheless, it suggests that there are not sufficient compelling 
reasons to believe that the practice of decentralisation is propitious as far as equity and 
local economic development are concerned.  Clearly, the problem with local government 
finance in Ghana is not only increasing the amount of locally generated revenue but also 
ensuring that the existing ‘stock’ of local revenue is expended in ways to ensure a 
reduction in income inequality and poverty levels at the local level.  
 
To meet this aspiration, some lessons can be learnt from the participatory budgeting 
process in Porto Alegre, Brazil.  There, ordinary citizens lead the process of determining 
their local needs.  This system, according to informed observers (e.g. Social 
Development Family 2003), has radically changed a techno-bureaucratic budgeting 
procedure to a ‘techno-democratic’ process in which common people play a significant 
role in determining ways of generating resources and how resources already generated 
should be utilized to shape their future. 
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This paper addresses the statutory financial relations and financial autonomy of local 
government in Nigeria, and the freedom of local government to generate revenue from its 
assigned sources without external interference. It focuses particularly on a financial 
instrument called the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) and how its 
operations have positively or negatively affected the financial autonomy of local 
government councils and the inter-relations between state and local government in 
Nigeria.1 
 
Intergovernmental relations in Nigeria 
Local government in Nigeria is a product of decentralization and is established by law. 
As a federal state, Nigeria has three tiers of government (federal, state and local) whose 
intergovernmental relations (which include political, financial, judicial and 
administrative) are mainly established by the constitution. Each tier is required to operate 
within its area of jurisdiction, and any action to the contrary is null and void to the extent 
of its inconsistency with the law. This is meant to guarantee the autonomy of each tier. 
Intergovernmental relations may be defined as “the complex pattern of interactions, co-
operations and inter-dependence between two or more levels of government” (Ogunna 
                                                 
1  For further information about local government in Nigeria see: 
http://www.clgf.org.uk/index.cfm/pageid/112/Nigeria and 
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/YearbookHomeInternal/138917  
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1996: 350). According to Adamolekun (2002:60), intergovernmental relations “is the 
term commonly used to describe the interactions between the different levels of 
government within the state.” It can also be seen as “important interactions occurring 
between governmental institutions of all types and in all spheres” (Anderson 1960:3). It 
exists in all types of state but is more pronounced, complex, controversial and 
contentious in federal states. The level of development in a given state tends to be 
determined by the quality of its intergovernmental relations. 
 
The State Joint Local Government Account 
Under the Constitution of Nigeria, the SJLGA is a special account maintained by each 
state government “into which shall be paid allocations to the local government councils 
of the state from the Federation Account and from the Government of the State” (Section 
162 [6], 1999 Constitution of Nigeria). The Account is meant to be a mechanism that can 
implement the notion of ‘fiscal federalism’ at the local government level in Nigeria. 
Section 162 of the Constitution also provides for how public revenue shall be collected 
and distributed among the three tiers of government in the country. The following extract 
outlines the key elements of section 162:   
 
 
(1)  The Federation shall maintain a special account to be called “the Federation Account” into 
which shall be paid all revenues collected by the Government of the Federation, ….”  
 
(2)  The President, upon the receipt of advice from the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal 
Commission, shall table before the National Assembly proposals from the Federation Account, and 
in determining the formula, the National Assembly shall take into account, the allocation principles 
especially those of population, equality of states, internal revenue generation, land mass, terrain as 
well as population density.  Provided that the principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in 
any approved formula as being not less than thirteen percent of the revenue accruing to the 
Federation Account directly from any natural resources. 
 
(3)  Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall be distributed among the 
Federal and State Governments and the local government councils in each state on such terms 
and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
 
(4)  Any amount standing to the credit of the states in the Federation Account shall be distributed 
among the states on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National 
Assembly. 
 
(5)  The amount standing to the credit of local government councils in the Federation Account shall 
also be allocated to the States for the benefit of their local government councils on such terms and 
in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
 
(6)  Each State shall maintain a special account to be called “State Joint Local Government 
Account” into which shall be paid all allocations to the local government councils of the state from 
the Federation Account and from the Government of the state. 
 
(7)  Each state shall pay to local government councils in its area of jurisdiction such proportion of 
its total revenue on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National 
Assembly. 
 
(8)   The amount standing to the credit of local government councils of a state shall be distributed 
among the local government councils of that state on such terms and in such manner as may be 
prescribed by the House of Assembly of the state.
 
Section 162, 1999 Constitution of Nigeria [extract] 
 
OKAFOR: Local government financial autonomy in Nigeria
 
 
 
 
             CJLG July 2010                                          126 
 
Local Government Financial Autonomy 
Local government autonomy can be defined as “the freedom of the local government to 
recruit and manage its own staff, raise and manage its own finances, make by-laws and 
policies, and discharge its functions as provided by law without interference from the 
higher governments” (Ogunna 1996: 350). This includes political, financial and 
administrative autonomy. Financial autonomy of local government is the “freedom to 
impose local taxation, generate revenue within its assigned sources, allocate its financial 
and material resources, determine and authorize its annual budget without external 
interference. It must be noted that local government autonomy is not absolute; the third 
tier of government retains functional and fiscal relations with the higher tiers of 
government, however, the relationship must function within the relevant law. 
 
Transfer of Revenue Resources 
There are reasons why transfers of revenue resources from higher to lower levels of 
government occur in a federation.  Firstly, this relates to the nature of the functions and 
revenue resources of the three tiers of government. These may be determined either 
traditionally, constitutionally or administratively, and may exhibit an imbalance between 
responsibility and revenue which requires the higher tier of government to ‘make good’ 
such imbalance by executing transfers of financial resources. These are referred to as 
‘deficiency’ transfers (Okafor 2001:49).  Secondly, lower levels of government may have 
variations in revenue raising capacities. Due to the fact that it is desirable for every state 
or locality to attain given levels of service delivery, states or localities whose revenue 
raising capacities are low need to impose a heavier tax burden than those with higher 
revenue-raising capacities. In order to eliminate this burden in the former, the latter 
(more well-resourced states or localities) make transfers of resources to them. This type 
of transfer is called an ‘equalization’ transfer (Graham 1964: 8). These two types of 
resource transfers are commonly referred to as ‘unconditional intergovernmental grants-
in-aid’. We can now turn to the processes of statutory funding of local government in 
Nigeria. 
 
Statutory Funding of Local Government in Nigeria 
For local government to serve as a powerful instrument for rapid community and rural 
development it must possess a solid and sound financial base. To ensure that local 
government performs the numerous functions assigned to it (Section 7, Schedule 4, 1999 
Constitution of Nigeria), the Constitution makes provision for statutory funding of local 
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government. Specifically, Section 7(1) mandates the government of every state to make 
provisions for the financing of local government councils in the state. Key provisions of 
this section are: 
 (a)  The National Assembly shall make provisions for statutory 
allocation of public revenue to local government councils in the 
Federation; and 
 
(b)  The House of Assembly of a state shall make provisions for 
statutory allocation of public revenue to local government councils 
within the state. 
 
In addition, section 162 states that: 
 
(3)  Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall 
be distributed among the Federal and State Governments and the local 
government councils in each state on such terms and in such manner as 
may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
 
(5)  The amount standing to the credit of local government councils in 
the Federation Account shall also be allocated to the states for the 
benefit of their local government councils on such terms and in such 
manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
 
(7)  Each state shall pay to local government councils in its area of 
jurisdiction such proportion of its total revenue on such terms and in 
such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
 
To give effect to the above provisions for statutory funding of local governments, 20% of 
the amount standing in the Federation Account is paid to them on a monthly basis, while 
10% of each state’s internally generated revenue is also paid to the local government 
councils in the state. It must be noted that the percentage allocations to local government 
councils are not quantitatively certain. They depend at any given time on the amount 
standing in the Federation Account and the amount internally generated by each state 
respectively. 
 
The bulk of the revenues of most local government councils in Nigeria comes from the 
federal government. In some cases, especially in rural local governments, the grant 
constitutes as much as 80% of their revenue (Obi, 2001:89). The state statutory allocation 
to local government councils is usually small and in most cases unreliable. 
 
Operation of the State Joint Local Government Account 
To distribute the amount standing in the SJLGA to the local government councils in each 
state, section 162 (8) of the Constitution directs that: 
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The amount standing to the credit of local government councils of a state 
shall be distributed among the local government councils of that state on 
such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the House of 
Assembly of the state. 
 
State Houses of Assembly have passed SJLGA laws to give effect to the above 
constitutional provisions, however, evidence has shown that such laws are usually tend to 
further compound the already distressed financial position of local government councils. 
This results from various forms of deductions and diversions of funds intended for local 
government.   State governments that are constitutionally required to fund local 
government councils have instead used the SJLGA mechanism (or Account) to hold local 
governments hostage and make them appendages of the state. In practice, the operation 
of the SJLGA has denied local government councils their financial autonomy.  
 
It should be noted that the state government is not intended to be a beneficiary of the 
SJLGA, rather, it is a trustee of the Account. It is required to maintain the Account for 
the benefit of the local governments by ensuring that the amount allocated for this third 
tier of government is equitably and fairly shared among the councils, adhering strictly to 
constitutionally stipulated criteria. However, reports across the country indicate that most 
state governments are using SJLGA laws contrary to this intention.  
 
Dlakwa (2004:119-122) has outlined this problem in the case of Borno State. He states 
that under the Borno SJLGA Distribution and Fiscal Committee Law 2002, a committee 
was set up to administer the Account. It comprised:  
  the Commissioner of the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs 
(Chairman) 
 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs 
 Accountant-General of the State 
 all Local Government Councils’ Chairmen in the State  
 a representative of the Borno State Primary Education Board 
 a representative of the Board of Internal Revenue, and  
 the Director of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs (Secretary). 
 
It should be observed that the key officers of the committee are state government 
officials and, in the view of this author, the committee was structured from the outset to 
disadvantage the Local Government Councils (LGCs). Moreover, the Borno SJLGA Law 
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2002 empowers the committee to effect the following deductions before distributing 
funds from the Account to LGCs:  
1. 3% of the fund of each council due to the emirate councils 
2. 15% of the total personnel emolument of those retired in each council 
3. 1% as a training fund 
4. 5% of the total allocation of each council as a stabilization account 
5. 2% of the total allocation of each council as an administrative charge 
6. 1.5% of the allocation of each council to the department of local government  
7. 0.5% of the allocation to the local government audit department. 
 
Thus the Borno state government effectively deducted and diverted funds meant for 
development of local areas, contributing significantly to the abysmal performance of 
local governments in providing good governance for the community. According to 
Dlakwa (2004:121), between March 2002 and March 2003 a total of N13.3bn2 was 
available for councils in Borno State. Out of this amount the state government deducted 
almost half (see Table 1).  
 
Aggrieved by this incessant interference in local government’s financial autonomy, 26 
LGC Chairmen (with the exception of Maiduguri Metropolitan Council) sued the Borno 
state government for passage of the SJLGA Law 2002, challenging the right of the state 
government to deduct local government funds at source. The High Court held that the 
state government had power to pass the law under section 162(8) of the Constitution, but 
declared unconstitutional the specific provisions that empower the committee to deduct 
funds at source. This judgment was delivered in June 2002. However, as indicated in 
Table 1 the deductions continued. The Borno example is a reflection of the situation 
affecting other local government councils across Nigeria. 
                                                 
2  The Nigerian dollar is the Naira. 
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Table 1: Deductions at source from LGC funds by Borno State Government  
(March 2002 – March 2003) in Nigerian dollars (millions) 
 
LGC  Gross Allocation  Total Deduction (source)  Net Allocation 
                                           
Abadam  437.1   165 (37.7%)   272.1  
Askira/Uba 504   325 (64.5%)   179 
Bama  627   300 (47.8%)   327.2 
Bayo  390   156 (40.0%)   234 
Biu  558.0   303.4 (54.4%)   252 
Chibok  361   185.4 (51.4%)   175.4 
Damboa  632   293  (46.3%)   339 
Dikwa  444   207.2 (46.7%)   236.4 
Gubio  410   143.1 (35.0%)   266.3 
Guzamala 420   161.2 (35.0%)   259 
Gwoza  540   314 (58.1%)   226.3 
Hawul  500   356 (71.2%)   144.2 
Jere  753.2   339.4 (45.1%)   414 
Kaga  431.2   213.4 (49.5%)   218 
Kala Balge 343.1   167.3 (48.8%)   176 
Konduga  646.1   293 (45.3%)   353.1 
Kukawa  501   207.3 (41.4%)   294 
Kwaya Kusar 364   198 (54.4%)   166 
Mafa  419   183 (43.6%)   236.3 
Magumeri 487.1   192.4 (39.5%)   295 
MMC  993   599.3 (65.0%)   323.4 
Marte  457   209 (45.7%)   248 
Mobbar  450.3   171 (37.9%)   280 
Monguno  441   207 (47.0%)   234 
Ngala  473   212.2 (44.9%)   261 
Nganzai  385   150 (38.9%)   235.1 
Shani  421   189.1 (44.9%)   232 
 
TOTAL  13388.1    6440.7 (48.4%)         6876.8 
 
(Dlakwa 2004: 121) 
 
Conclusion 
Intergovernmental relations are supposed to play a ‘bridge building’ role to bring a 
degree of coordination and cooperation to divided powers (Okafor 2007:16). Following 
from this, the operation of the SJLGA as provided for in the constitution should 
contribute to cooperative administration, accountability and transparency in local 
governance within the principle of separation of powers and the rule of law. However, 
the reality in Nigerian local government indicates the opposite. As evident from the 
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Borno example, state governments interfere with the financial autonomy of local 
governments through the instrument of the SJLGA. This has greatly hampered the 
developmental efforts of local government councils. As a remedy to this most 
unsatisfactory situation, Sections 162(6) and (8) should be expunged from the 1999 
Constitution of Nigeria.   
 
It is also suggested that, via a constitutional amendment, the sub-sections on SJLGA 
should be replaced with (a) direct allocations to local government councils and (b) the 
establishment of an independent audit agency comprising federal, state, local government 
and private representatives. These members must have a proven track record of financial 
management to supervise, inspect and audit the use of statutory allocations by local 
government councils. This would provide ‘checks and balances’ on local government 
officials’ administration of finance matters to ensure accountability and transparency in 
the use of local government funds. 
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1. Introduction 
Solomon Islands is a chain of 922 islands in the South Pacific, spread over 1,450kms 
from Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) in the north to Vanuatu in the south, and 
covering an area of 27,450 kms². The country is home to some 520,000 people, with 74 
different languages and dialects. It is divided into nine provinces, each centred on a main 
island.  Effectively, there are nine different peoples with strong allegiance to family, 
village and province, but little common national identity upon which to effectively build 
a state. 
 
Honiara, located on the island of Guadalcanal and surrounded by the province of the 
same name, is the national capital, seat of government, centre of administration and 
commerce, and the nation’s window to the world.  The city has a population of 79,000, 
including an estimated 20,000 or so inhabiting informal settlements in the urban and 
peri-urban areas.  Honiara has one of the highest urban growth rates in the Pacific region, 
estimated at 4% per year2.  Made up of indigenous peoples from all provinces (Malaitans 
being particularly numerous), expatriates and a large Chinese community, the city is a 
                                                 
1  Formerly Regional Adviser, Commonwealth Local Government Forum Pacific Project. 
2  Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2007. 
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melting pot of the diverse ethnic groups that are the Solomon Islands.  In practical terms, 
however, Honiara is a somewhat artificial social construct.  There is no genuine local 
identity or ownership of the place; although people may reside in Honiara, and may have 
for all their lives, their roots remain in their home village or province. 
 
Honiara City Council is the governing local authority3 for the capital.  The council 
comprises 20 members (12 elected, 8 appointed) and is mandated to deliver the typical 
range of standard municipal infrastructure and social services, with added responsibilities 
for primary health care (including 9 clinics) and education (14 schools).  It employs over 
400 staff in its service delivery operations. 
 
This paper is based largely on a presentation made by the Lord Mayor of Honiara and the 
author to a technical seminar entitled Local Government and Basic Service Delivery in 
Conflict Affected Areas, held jointly by UNDP and UNESCAP in Bangkok, Thailand in 
June 2009.4  It will focus on the complex role and place of the Honiara City Council in 
improving its institutional legitimacy and service delivery capacity following a period of 
national instability, and the partnership with the Commonwealth Local Government 
Forum (CLGF) Pacific Project which has supported the Solomon Islands Government 
and the council in these endeavours.  It will draw the important linkage between delivery 
of equitable basic services and the potential for prevention of conflict. 
 
2. The Conflict 
Known locally as ‘the tensions’, the conflict situation that has most notably impacted on 
Solomon Islands society began in 1998 when militant youths from the island of 
Guadalcanal attacked settlements of islanders from other provinces, mainly from the 
neighbouring island of Malaita, close to Honiara. Issues of land linked with indigenous 
rights, and the failure of authorities to address articulated concerns, provided the 
motivation.  The conflict has been seen by some analysts as a spill-over from the crisis in 
Bougainville, given the socio-cultural similarities. 
 
                                                 
3  Although classed as a local government, the City Council operates effectively as a province. 
4  Refer http://www.unescap.org/pdd/calendar/ESCAP_UNDP_governance/index.asp  The author 
gratefully acknowledges the contributions to this paper by Lord Mayor Andrew Mua, an outstanding 
local leader who inspires faith in the future of local government in the region, along with background 
material provided by the former City Clerk, Wayne Hart. 
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The action of the Guadalcanal militants resulted in the displacement of over 30,000 
people.  The conflict escalated in early 2000 when a resistance group claiming to 
represent the interests of displaced Malaitans, armed themselves and took control of 
Honiara.  This resulted in a breakdown of law and order, instability and collapse of the 
institutions of government. 
 
Peace was eventually restored through several initiatives, some more successful than 
others.  The Townsville Peace Accord in October 2000, followed by the intervention of 
the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003 under the 
auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum, achieved some degree of restoration of peace and 
normality.  A Local Peace Monitoring Council and International Peace Monitoring Team 
supported these efforts.  A proactive policy of national reconciliation and rebuilding 
reinforced the peace building initiatives.  A constitutional review process and the 
establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission followed more recently. 
 
The role of women in the peace building initiatives, both during and after the tension 
warrants special mention.  Organised women’s groups took a proactive stance against the 
violence, which plainly was perpetrated by men, and mobilised support for children and 
other vulnerable groups, particularly during the worst of the conflict.  This was an 
example of where women are not simply victims of conflict situations but can in fact 
contribute to reducing fragility and strengthening social cohesion.  
 
The fragility of the peace was, however, revealed in April 2006 when riots broke out in 
Honiara after the election of a new Prime Minister, who was perceived by the rioters to 
be in the pocket of certain sectoral interests.  This resulted in the targeted burning of 
businesses in the Chinatown district.  Again, the root causes of the riots were attributed 
by a Commission of Inquiry to amongst others, inequitable access to land, failure of 
government to deliver development to settlements in Honiara and bad governance.5   
Significantly for this paper, the Commission established a linkage between inadequate 
service delivery and the more recent conflict.  
 
The 18th April 2006 civil unrest and riot in Honiara took place against a 
backdrop of infrastructure weakness and non-delivery of the essential 
government services to the people from all over the country, who by 
accident or desire, have made Honiara their home. In search of a better 
prospect in education, health and employment, these people have settled in 
                                                 
5  Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the April 2006 Civil Unrest in Honiara, 2009, p2. 
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distinctive original provincial or island ethnic settlements in and around 
Honiara in near squalor conditions because government services were not 
reaching them. 
 
High hopes and expectations of a better life from the rural areas from 
where they had migrated into Honiara had not materialised as many cannot 
find employment.  The poor access roads into the settlements, the lack of 
proper sewerage, water supply and electricity, high costs of school fees, 
lack of adequate health facilities and the high incidence of drunkenness are 
some of the daily woes settlement dwellers had to deal with, often with no 
government support.   
 
It is in the context of this daily hardship that settlement dwellers are highly 
vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation, and the national elections for 
a new Solomon Islands Parliament in early April 2006 became the catalyst 
for them to let out their anger and frustration against the government in 
particular, and society in general.6 
 
 
A vehicle set fire in the commercial district of Honiara during the April 2006 riots  
  
Crowds in the main commercial district of Honiara during the April 2006 riots  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6  ibid p8. 
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The Pacific Casino Hotel on fire after the April 2006 riots. This hotel was one of the commercial buildings 
targeted by the rioters. Right, Commercial building in the main street of Honiara after the April riots.   
 
 
3. Honiara City Council and the Tensions 
Honiara City Council itself was certainly not immune from breakdown of the institutions 
of governance as a result of the tensions.  The violence and destruction was most intense 
in Honiara, given its diverse ethnic mix.  The results were a disintegrated and divided 
community; destruction of physical and social infrastructure; openly corrupt practices; 
political leaders opportunistically capitalising on people’s ignorance for personal gain; 
huge debts; and a dysfunctional Council, which was dissolved by the responsible 
Minister in 2004 and replaced by an appointed authority pending fresh elections.  
Technically the authority had the same powers as the council, but its limited mandate 
reduced its effectiveness. Thus, after the tensions of the early 2000s the Honiara City 
Council had lost its institutional integrity, legitimacy and much of its service delivery 
capacity.  The Commission of Inquiry later concluded that “there had been major failings 
within the Honiara City Council to coordinate, organise and deliver development in the 
Honiara settlements,”7  and even went so far as recommending permanent replacement of 
an elected council with a statutory commission.  
 
A newly elected council had taken the place of the appointed authority in August 2006.  
This new council faced several challenges, in addition to those attributed to the tensions 
and the aftermath of the April riots.  Issues that impacted on service delivery in such an 
environment included: 
                                                 
7  ibid p43. 
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 Urban drift and growth in informal and peri-urban settlements, resulting in 
increased demand for services, revenue gaps, cultural segregation, youth 
unemployment etc 
 Cultural obligations and expectations, particularly the renewed influence of the 
‘wantok’ system,8  and the need to maintain neutrality and equity in decision 
making and operations 
 Absence of common national and local identity, a precondition for inclusive 
community building 
 Inadequate revenue relative to high service delivery expectations 
 The emerging challenge of the effect of the global economic downturn on 
Solomon Islands and the likely severe impact on the urban poor and informal 
settlements. 
 
4. Honiara City Council Institutional Capacity Building Project 
As early as 2003, in the immediate aftermath of the tensions, the government of the 
Solomon Islands recognised the need for an operational Honiara City Council as an 
essential component of the reconciliation and rebuilding process.  However, the 
government also acknowledged that assistance would be needed.  A request was 
subsequently made to the Commonwealth Secretariat for technical assistance to help 
rebuild the Honiara City Council institutions.  
 
This task was passed to the Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF), as the 
Designated Commonwealth Organisation for local government, through its Pacific 
Regional Project based in Suva, Fiji Islands.  CLGF Pacific Project works with local 
government and other stakeholders in the region to strengthen local democracy, 
institutions and service delivery capacity of sub-national governments in nine Pacific 
Island Commonwealth countries, including Solomon Islands.  This is done through 
several inter-related projects founded on Commonwealth principles of local democracy 
and good governance.  
 
The request by the Solomon Islands Government and a subsequent investigation and 
preparatory process by CLGF and several of its partners,9 Honiara City Council and the 
                                                 
8  Literally ‘one talk’, loosely defined as those speaking the same language or from the same family or 
clan, and can be expanded to include provincial areas.  Essentially a social contract of obligation to 
assist each other in times of need.  The system has been compared to nepotism and favoritism, however 
can also provide an essential safety net in the absence of other social security options.  
 
PARKER: Improving institutional and service delivery capacity: Honiara
 
 
 
 
   CJLG July 2010               138  
 
Ministry of Home Affairs, resulted in the Honiara City Council Institutional Capacity 
Building Project.  This is a five year (2006 to 2011), broad-based technical partnership 
aimed at supporting the council and its stakeholders to improve institutional and basic 
service delivery capacity.  It is targeted towards achieving the council’s vision of an 
inclusive and well serviced capital city in order to support sustainable urban development 
and the maintenance of peace and stability. 
 
The project recognises that the council operates in a changing and complex environment, 
facing the challenges of increasing urbanisation, and high expectations versus inadequate 
resources.  Priority issues such as informal settlements, urban security and stability 
underpin the project design which aims to strengthen the council’s capacity to respond 
effectively to these challenges and to deliver adequate local government services.   
 
The goal of the Project is to bring about substantial improvements in quality of life for 
all citizens of the City of Honiara through sound city management, improved local 
services, planned urban development and good governance.  Key objectives and a wide 
range of project activities support attainment of this goal, grouped under four themes: 
 Strengthened council management capacity and processes 
 Improved quality and delivery of essential services 
 Coordinated and well-planned urban development 
 Good governance and local democracy 
 
Funding, as well as guidance and moral support for the project is provided by the New 
Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID), which as a development 
partner genuinely understands the important role local government can play in social 
development and nation building.  This belief by NZAID, and maintaining faith during 
challenging times, was a crucial element in rolling out the project.  NZAID agreed to 
fund the project to the extent of some NZ$5.4 million over the five year period.  Support 
for the project was also provided by the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation 
through funding the CLGF Regional Adviser position. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
9  Including UTS Centre for Local Government, Sydney; Local Government New Zealand; Local 
Government Managers Australia; Papua New Guinea Urban Local level Government Association; 
Kapiti Coast District Council (New Zealand); Maryborough City Council (now Fraser Coast District 
Council, Australia); UN Habitat and INGENIUM New Zealand. 
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A mix of approaches and activities is being applied to effect the required capacity 
development.  These include direct support for external in-line senior staff appointments, 
with local counterparts; financial assistance for materials and equipment to enhance 
service delivery; technical support from the CLGF Pacific Project and partners; technical 
staff exchanges with New Zealand and Australian councils; and direct technical 
assistance for specific assignments.  
The project is founded on partnerships at several levels, with local government 
authorities and professional colleagues sharing knowledge and experience.  Conflict 
sensitivity underpins strategic decisions as the project proceeds.  It is a complex, 
complicated and evolving project, having experienced several challenges and setbacks 
along the way.  Even when they are made, gains can be fragile given the operating 
environment and could be lost or undermined if the factors contributing to progress are 
reversed.  However the risks associated with a project such as this are the very reasons 
why it is so necessary. 
 
5. Improving Service Delivery in a Post-Conflict Environment 
In view of the range of challenges inherent in delivering quality local government 
services to all citizens of Honiara, the council and its project partners understood and 
accepted the realities and accordingly factored in socio-cultural dimensions, 
inclusiveness and conflict sensitive strategies into its governance and service delivery 
policies and practices. In particular the council’s strategy encompassed: 
 Genuine recognition of informal and squatter settlements – they are all Solomon 
Islanders and ‘our people’, having rights to equal access to services irrespective 
of ethnicity, socio-economic status, location or political persuasion 
 Neutrality in professional operations by accepting expatriates as senior advisers 
and in-line managers and later choosing to appoint an expatriate as City 
Clerk/Chief Executive Officer, with local counterparts and succession plans 
 A formal and real commitment to openness, transparency, fairness and 
inclusiveness in decision making and service delivery 
 Consultative and representative processes for all citizens – through public 
consultations and Ward Advisory Committees, participatory community events 
such as clean up campaigns, community outreach programs etc 
 Establishment of a Council of Chiefs for Honiara as a forum to address ethnic 
issues and potential conflicts, and to recognise and bring on board the influence 
of traditional leaders as partners in the City Council’s initiatives 
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 Involving unemployed youth as a valuable source of social capital through 
community based works projects 
 A better trained, led and informed elected body 
 Developing a roadmap for the future development of Honiara – the City Vision.  
 
However, this strategic approach required a significant paradigm shift, time, and 
substantial support to realise the changes sought. 
 
Some noteworthy achievements have resulted so far.  The council’s own source revenues 
(principally local taxes, property rates and service charges) have increased more than six-
fold, management systems have been enhanced and service delivery capacity improved, 
particularly in the areas of solid waste management, roading, markets and health clinics.  
Now that the council has greater capacity to deliver better services and improved 
governance, working relationships with central government agencies have improved and 
cooperation as not seen before on key strategic issues such as land, decentralisation, 
urbanisation, security and conflict prevention is happening.  Leadership development 
programmes have been carried out, with a focus on the complexities of conflict and 
fragile situations, and local economic development initiatives, focussing on the lower 
socio-economic groups and the ‘parallel’ economy, which is more immune from the 
global economic slowdown, are in place.  Community engagement strategies are being 
implemented and progress, albeit slow, is being made on developing working 
relationships with the informal settlements which in the past have been openly hostile to 
the council. 
 
The CLGF project is now in the final stages of the current phase.  Dialogue is underway 
with NZAID and other key stakeholders on the next stage, given that there is an 
undeniable need for continuation of support to Honiara City Council in the foreseeable 
future and the project model is beginning to show evidence that with solid input an 
organisation can be lifted. There is much work still to be done, particularly on the various 
dimensions of community development.   
 
6. Lessons Learned 
An external review of the project was carried out in August/September 2009, which 
concluded: 
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The Project was and remains highly relevant to the needs of Honiara, to 
development strategies for the Solomon Islands, and to related programs of 
donors including NZAID, AusAID and RAMSI. It is also contributing 
significantly to addressing key cross-cutting issues. 
 
After a slow start, over the past year the Project has made excellent 
progress. This reflects in particular the work of the new Mayor and City 
Clerk. HCC has made great strides, including repaying debts and greatly 
enhancing service delivery. The dramatic increase in its own-source 
revenues is an outstanding Project achievement, and is now being 
augmented by the council’s own efforts. Overall, it is fair to say that directly 
and indirectly the Project has restored HCC’s institutional legitimacy and 
integrity, and has demonstrated that effective city government is achievable, 
albeit that much remains to be done.10 
 
This review, together with a recent project re-design exercise undertaken by NZAID, will 
inform the decision making processes in respect to future support to Honiara City 
Council.  As stated earlier, the project is broad based, covering a variety of policy, 
strategic, implementation and review phases.  At its inception, the project did not 
specifically target conflict prevention and peace building, but as it progressed, the 
importance of Honiara City Council and service delivery to community reconciliation, 
consensus building and nation rebuilding became increasingly apparent.  It is clearly a 
cross-cutting issue that required focus. 
 
It is realistically too early to assess if the initiatives of the council and the project have 
resulted in any specific benefits in terms of conflict prevention.  In particular there has 
not been any monitoring as yet of the response of householders to improved services, 
particularly in the ‘hot spots’. However the external review noted that there is widespread 
recognition of the importance of providing basic services as a way to reduce the 
likelihood of conflict,11 and several key messages that can be drawn from Honiara City 
Council’s and CLGF’s efforts thus far. 
 
 There is a clear link between effective and equitable municipal service delivery, 
physical and social, particularly to informal settlements, and conflict prevention.  
The understanding and acceptance of the lack of a common national and local 
‘identity’ in Solomon Islands makes this variable even more important.  In 
particular, mainstreaming conflict prevention strategies into service delivery plans 
is critical.  In this context, perceptions of the diverse ‘communities’ in Honiara as 
                                                 
10  Sansom, G. and Whitaker, K. 2009 Honiara City Council Institutional Capacity Building Project 
Mid Term Review, Commonwealth Local Government Forum Pacific Project and New Zealand Agency 
for International Development, p3. 
11  ibid p17. 
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to the parity of service delivery are equally important as the actual delivery itself.  
Accordingly, it is incumbent on the council  to ensure not only that services are in 
fact being fairly distributed across the city, but also that the community is made 
aware of this equitable delivery.  The same can apply to regulatory 
responsibilities. 
 
 It was important to achieve visible ‘quick wins’ at the beginning of the 
development process to strengthen ties among stakeholders and build support for 
the council’s rebuilding initiatives.  This particularly applied to communities 
previously excluded from equitable service provision.  The legitimacy of the 
institution is strengthened through evidence of actual delivery of services.  
Citizens once they are better empowered to exercise their rights, recognise and 
appreciate action, not just rhetoric. 
 
 Sound financial management, governance and accountability are critical. For 
example, the substantial increase in property rates revenue has afforded additional 
capacity for service delivery and inclusiveness.  Prudent application of the 
additional resources has resulted in significant improvements.   
 
 Delays were experienced when the complexity and depth of the problems at 
Honiara City Council were properly revealed after the project funded personnel 
began work – the ‘unknown unknowns’ of development work.  The post-conflict 
operating environment did not assist.  This meant that significantly more time was 
needed to effect any meaningful change than was first anticipated. 
 
 Community empowerment through wide-ranging consultation and engagement of 
both formal and informal settlements, youth and women, traditional and church 
leaders is critical for ‘ownership’, sustainability, community cohesion and 
building the legitimacy of the City Council.  
 
 Honiara as the national capital needs to be better embraced by the Solomon 
Islands government, with urban management and local governance reflected 
higher on the policy agenda given the realities and impacts of urban growth. 
 
 Stability of government and administration at both national and local level is 
conductive to quality service delivery.  Political instability experienced at national 
level in 2006/07 and at local level up until the tenure of the current Lord Mayor, 
presented a major diversion to effective governance at all levels.  Similarly, 
several changes in Honiara City Clerks since the intervention began had a 
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destabilising effect until the expatriate appointed in 2008 came to grips with the 
position. 
 
 Working in partnership with community, national government, civil society and 
development agencies, and delivering through those partnerships will help win 
back credibility and institutional respect.   
 
 It is not easy and there is a long way to go, but much can be achieved with 
political will and commitment. 
 
CLGF has also learned much in delivering its support project.  Working in conflict 
affected environments reveals a special role for a development partner.  Sustainability of 
gains in such an environment can be fragile.  The dilemma often faced is in adapting 
accepted social development principles, such as local ownership of the process, in a 
dysfunctional environment.  In such situations there is a tendency for a development 
partner to apply a leveraging style in order to get the job done.  In the case of this project, 
the concept of ‘power sharing’ was agreed by all partners, where project direction and 
day to day implementation decisions are made collaboratively within the framework of 
the intervention, and based on collective responsibility.  This has proven to work well, 
with growing engagement by project partners and a gradually increasing rate of progress. 
 
During this process the question as to the most appropriate governance system for 
Honiara has been raised.  The dynamics of the city and the conflict experiences have led 
to some reflection as to whether the existing ‘western style’ local government structure in 
Honiara is the way to go, or whether a more indigenous system that may take account of 
the socio-cultural construct of the city, particularly informality and ethnicity, would be 
better.  The current national constitutional review is actively examining this issue of the 
place of Honiara, particularly in the context of a federal system that is being considered.  
However, given the volatility of the Solomon Islands political system and for the 
purposes of this piece, it may be better to reserve this debate for another day. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Across the Commonwealth, the role of effective local government in helping to 
strengthen the state as a whole is being more widely recognised.  Local government 
provides many of the basic services that are essential to reducing poverty and improving 
the livelihoods and quality of life of citizens.  The Honiara City Council scenario affords 
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evidence of the importance of providing equitable basic services to the prevention of 
conflict.  In order to improve institutional and service delivery capacity at local level in 
conflict affected areas local governments need to factor socio-cultural and conflict 
sensitive strategies into governance and service delivery policies and practices.  Local 
governments are well placed to promote community reconciliation, and as such proactive 
community engagement post conflict is critical.  The key role of women it this process 
should not be ignored. 
 
The importance of strong local leadership underpins all these efforts.  Helping build and 
maintain good local government leaders should be a focus of any technical support 
program.  However, at the end of the day, the individuals involved need to have the right 
personal motivation – as the participants in the recent UNDP/UNESCAP Technical 
Seminar noted, there are many examples in conflict affected areas where the heroes of 
today can be the tyrants of tomorrow. 
 
Although some meaningful progress has been made by the City Council with the support 
of the CLGF project, in implementing the agreed strategic approach, there is some way 
to go and the overall situation in the city remains fluid.  The circumstances are best 
summed up by the 2009 review that concluded: 
....although the general situation in the Solomon Islands is currently 
calm, many of the underlying factors that brought about the ‘tensions’ 
and the more recent civil unrest in Chinatown are still present. For 
example, squatter communities are still growing as more people move 
into Honiara City. This calls for not only ongoing improvements in the 
City Council’s own performance – and people’s perceptions of that 
performance – but also a closer and more productive working 
relationship with Solomon Islands Government agencies and 
Guadalcanal Province on the underlying strategic issues.12 
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In 2008-2009, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities and the Capacity and Institution 
Building Working Group (CIB) of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) led the 
development of a UCLG Position Paper on Aid Effectiveness and Local Government.1 
The position paper was adopted unanimously by UCLG World Council members at their 
annual meeting in Guanghzou, China in November 2009. It seeks to give voice to the 
local government perspective in the continuing deliberations on aid effectiveness. The 
paper also provides specific policy recommendations for the international donor 
community, national governments and local governments themselves geared towards 
better incorporating local governments into the design and delivery of development 
programs and processes.  
 
The issue: Local governments are agents of development  
As politically legitimate and accountable community leaders, local governments play a 
valuable convening role that brings together development stakeholders (civil society, 
community groups, policy-makers) to help shape and implement development policies 
and programs.2  Given their responsibility to ensure equitable delivery of essential 
services, including in many cases social services around health, welfare, and housing, 
combined with their ability to replicate successes for community-wide benefit, local 
                                                 
1  Local government refers to a governing institution which has authority over a sub-national territorially 
defined area; in federal systems, a sub-state territorially defined area. These include towns, cities, counties, 
districts and regions governed in most cases by locally elected officials. Local governments’ jurisdictional 
and administrative authority varies depending on the degree of decentralization and the national governance 
structure in a given country.   
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governments occupy an important niche and must be recognized as valued partners by 
the development community.3 
 
Furthermore, local governments, through decentralized cooperation,4 are playing an 
important role in the delivery of aid through peer-to-peer cooperation. Local 
governments and their associations mobilize community assets and significant resources 
that complement the financial contributions from donors. The delivery of these resources 
through programs and projects that are co-managed by ‘southern’ and ‘northern’ partners 
promote mutual accountability and enhance local capacity to plan, manage, implement 
and report on results.  
 
Awareness about the role of local governments in development cooperation is gradually 
increasing. The Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), which was the result of the mid-term 
3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, Ghana (2-4 September 2008), 
includes specific timelines and recognizes the importance of democracy, improvement of 
governance, social progress and environmental challenges as prime engines of 
development. The role of local governments has explicitly been recognized in the 
development of national development policies. The AAA also recognizes the need to 
support capacity building initiatives of local authorities and emphasizes the importance 
of local resources in the provision of technical cooperation.   
 
Why invest in local governments?  
Approximately half the world’s population currently lives in urban areas and it is 
estimated that this will grow to as much as 60% by 2015. Virtually all of this growth will 
occur in the developing world, resulting in severe social and economic inequities and 
escalating rates of poverty. This extraordinary rate of urban growth is transpiring 
alongside widespread rural exodus, placing an enormous burden upon both rural and 
urban local governments, as they struggle to put in place responses to deal with the 
effects of these unprecedented demographic shifts. In this context, local and regional 
authorities will become both key development actors and the target of development 
cooperation. In addition, fast growing urbanization is giving rise to a major and pressing 
                                                 
3  UN Millennium Development Goal 8 calls for a global partnership that brings together the private sector, 
non-governmental organizations, civil society and foundations to help leverage resources for the 
implementation of pro-poor urban and rural development strategies. Local governments should play a central 
role as partners in development.  
4  Decentralized cooperation is used here to describe the publicly and privately funded aid provided by and 
through local authorities, local government associations, networks and other local actors. 
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need for future infrastructure projects that are expected to cost some USD 200 billion per 
year over the next 25 years. However, these infrastructure needs are currently being 
unmet. Failure to invest in infrastructure has already impacted severely upon the daily 
lives of millions of citizens in developing countries. The achievement of the main 
international development commitments such as the Millennium Development Goals5 
and the global fight against climate change and its impacts will be won or lost in the 
urban areas of the planet, and particularly in the slums where one out of five persons will 
live by 2020.  
 
Policy recommendations 
Donors, multilateral and bilateral financial institutions, central governments and 
international organizations are called on to:  
1. Formally recognize local governments as development actors in future development 
compacts and promote their participation in a systematic way in all stages of the 
development process.  
2. Support the recognition of local governments and their associations (LGAs) as 
legitimate development partners in the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, and welcome 
the recognition of the World Organization of United Cities and Local Governments 
to become members of the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and the 
Advisory Board of the UN Development Cooperation Forum. This recognition 
should be expanded to all national and donor led consultations.  
3. Attach a fundamental importance to decentralization as an important building block 
for good governance and effective development assistance at the local level.  
4. Given its relevance as an indicator of a country’s development performance, 
governance6 should be a cross-cutting theme for central governments and donors in 
the same manner as gender equality, human rights and environmental sustainability 
so that it receives greater consideration during policy and program development.  
5. Adopt a more integrated approach to strengthening local governance that combines 
working locally, nationally, regionally and globally. This approach will facilitate the 
scaling-up of successful practices and enable local community leaders to engage in 
                                                 
5  The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by the United Nations in 2000 are eight time-bound 
targets to end extreme poverty by 2015.  
6   Governance refers to the process or approach for managing political, economic and administrative 
authority. The system of governance will determine how governments are selected or changed and the 
process through which citizens and groups define their interests and interact with institutions of authority, as 
well as with each other. Good governance accomplishes this in a manner that is essentially free of abuse and 
corruption and with due regard for the rule of law. 
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dialogue at the national level to positively influence public policies that will lead to 
transformative change and sustainable development at the local level.  
6. Put in place formal consultation mechanisms to strengthen coordination between 
local and national governments and donors, particularly with respect to policy 
formulation, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of national 
development strategies. 
7. Offer a balance of aid delivery mechanisms (e.g. projects, program based 
approaches, budget support and technical assistance) to support governance and 
decentralization that will ensure that local authorities have the mechanisms to 
respond with sufficient flexibility in different contexts. Aid channeled through 
budgetary support and sector-wide approaches (SWAps) must be designed in a 
manner that recognizes and reinforces the legitimate role of local authorities as 
credible public institutions and agents of development.  
8. In the context of decentralized cooperation, put in place mechanisms that allow local 
governments and/or local government associations to directly manage international 
cooperation programs that focus on: strengthening the capacity of the local 
government sector; promoting democracy at the local level, and; supporting 
decentralization.7 
9. Strengthen the capacity and strategic partnering role of local governments to engage 
in multi-stakeholder dialogue on national development strategies and in policy 
discussions with the OECD Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and the United 
Nations Development Cooperation Forum. 
10. Strengthen the resources accessible to local authorities. It is proposed that 20% of 
international aid (currently provided in the form of budgetary support and sector 
wide approaches) be earmarked to support decentralization processes and the 
capacity building of local government.8 
11. Improve the transparency of aid management, such that resource flows to various 
sectors, including local government, can be monitored.  
 
Local governments and local government associations are called on to:  
 
                                                 
7  Consultation with local government can help ensure closer alignment of central government and donors’ 
plans and programs with community needs, particularly where local governments are involved in 
participatory municipal planning and budgetary processes. 
8  UCLG proposes that at least 20% of public development aid (about USD 20 billion) be allocated directly 
to local governments or through decentralized cooperation. UCLG Policy Paper on Local Finances, UCLG 
(2008:13) 
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12. Engage in a dialogue with donors and central governments to ensure that the needs 
and concerns of local governments are clearly understood and supported by relevant 
policies and programs. 
13. Ensure that the voices of the full diversity of the community are heard by promoting 
participatory processes further applying this principle to decentralized co-operation 
which should be based on strong demand from the beneficiary. 
14. Ensure that decentralized cooperation approaches, such as municipal international 
cooperation (MIC) and association capacity building (ACB), are well coordinated 
and developed within the framework of southern-driven agendas that take into 
account the local cultural context, country processes and governance reform 
programs, concretized in country strategies for municipal sector development.  
15. Strengthen the voice of national and regional associations, as well as the World 
Organization of United Cities and Local Governments, to advocate local 
governments’ interests internationally.  
16. Develop a community of practice that will facilitate the sharing of knowledge, tools 
and lessons learned in the areas of MIC and ACB, which builds on the experience of 
the existing Committees and Working Groups of UCLG, particularly the CIB 
(Capacity and Institution Building Working Group).  
17. Promote long-term partnerships between local governments and partner countries, 
international organizations, bilateral and multilateral donors, in addition to other key 
stakeholders such as parliamentarians and civil society.  
 
 
Future Work 
UCLG’s continued work in this area, through its Capacity and Institution Building 
Working Group, will:  
 assist local governments and local government associations in taking forward the 
approved position; 
 maintain its dialogue with multilateral institutions in preparation for the 4th High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Seoul, Korea in 2011; and  
 continue to provide a platform for strengthening program coordination and aid 
effectiveness among local governments and local government associations active in 
decentralized cooperation.  
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For a more detailed overview of how the local government sector contributes to each of 
the Paris Declaration principles, see the support paper that accompanies the UCLG 
Position Paper on Aid Effectiveness and Local Government. The paper also includes 
several case studies that demonstrate how local governments are contributing to the 
effective delivery of aid.9  
 
This Commentary first appeared in March 2010 as an FCM Issue Briefing paper on that 
organization’s website:< http://www.cities-
localgovernments.org/upload/doc_publications/9243688416_(EN)_uclgpositionpaperen.pdf> 
 (696KB) 
 
 
                                                 
9  Available online on the UCLG website: www.cities-localgovernments.org 
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BOOK REVIEW: Local Government and 
Metropolitan Regions in Federal Systems  
Edited by Nico Steytler (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2009) 
 
 
This is the sixth volume in an impressive series published 
as A Global Dialogue on Federalism. The series is 
published on behalf of the Forum of Federations 
(forumfed.org) and the International Association of Centers 
for Federal Studies (iacfs.org). This is the first volume in 
the series to explore the role and position of local and regional governments in federal 
systems. The volume consists of a dozen case studies plus introductory and concluding 
chapters by the editor. 
 
That this series turned its attention to regional and local governments is itself 
noteworthy. Most people understand federations (or confederations) as constitutional 
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schemes for dividing, sharing and limiting powers between national and sub-national 
states. This is called dual or dyadic federalism, and examining power allocation with 
local governments has traditionally been considered scarcely relevant. But with growing 
appreciation for the complexity of 21st century governance, it is refreshing that this 
volume views the division, sharing and limitation of power as it actually presents itself: 
through the national and sub-national institutions that are the ordinary focus of studies in 
federalism and thence more deeply into the maze of regional and local governments that 
citizens engage on a daily basis. 
 
This particular volume contains an interesting mixture of case studies, from north and 
south of the equator. There is a group of Commonwealth countries (Australia, Canada, 
India, Nigeria, South Africa), a group of European countries (Austria, Germany, Spain, 
Switzerland), and a group of North and South American countries (Brazil, Mexico, 
United States). This selection covers half of the recognized federal political systems 
world-wide. Some are large in population and/or area; others much smaller by both 
measures. Included are some of the richest countries in the world, measured by per capita 
GDP; others are vastly less wealthy. All are highly urbanized or rapidly urbanizing.  
 
The individual articles are the outcome of an elaborate process that forms part of the 
Global Dialogue program. As for other books in the series, a theme coordinator was 
chosen (in this case, Nico Steytler of the University of the Western Cape in South Africa) 
whose main responsibility was to create a theme template for each contributor to follow. 
The various contributors convened a roundtable with practitioners and scholars in their 
country – impressively, about 275 individuals are named as participants in the dialogue 
preceding this volume – to discuss the issues raised in the theme template. The twelve 
contributors then came together in a global roundtable to discuss their findings and to 
learn from one another. The result is a collection of articles that are densely packed with 
information and insights, of uniform arrangement of topics, and of very high quality. 
 
For example, in Ribeiro and Garson Braule Pinto’s case study of Brazil, we learn that 
despite being a federation since 1889, the movement toward decentralization is a recent 
phenomenon linked to the fiscal crisis for the national government and the 
democratization wave of the 1980s. Brazil has a population of 184 million and is 
comprised of 26 states, including the city-state of Brasilia, and well over 5500 
municipalities (as of 2005). The 1988 constitution entrenched local government 
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autonomy as a characteristic of the Brazilian federation. The constitution divided some 
powers along clear lines while others are considered to be the shared jurisdiction of all 
three orders of government (e.g. education and health). Innovations in municipal 
governance include the development of participatory budgeting and local councils that 
combine citizens and civil society. Some of the issues that local governments are 
currently struggling with include the constraint on creativity and autonomy imposed by 
fiscal supervision by the federal government and the need for coordinating action across 
local boundaries. In regard to coordination, there is an extended discussion of some 28 
urban agglomerations in Brazil legally (but not constitutionally) formed as metropolitan 
regions. Despite their economic and social importance, the authors conclude that there is 
a notable gap between deep social needs in the metropoles and the institutional capacity 
of metropolitan regions.  
 
Considering the case studies as a whole, a handful of observations became apparent to us 
as Canadian practitioners in the field of local government. One observation is that the 
population represented by a local government varies significantly from one jurisdiction 
to the next. To take just three examples, in South Africa, approximately 250 lower-tier 
municipal units represent an average of 200,000 people each. In Australia, about 560 
local government areas represent an average of about 35,000 people each. Meanwhile, 
about 2350 Austrian municipalities represent an average of only 3500 people each. 
Comparing South Africa to Austria reveals a near 60:1 gap in average municipal 
population. One suspects there is a world of difference in the capacity of the median 
municipality in the systems being compared. 
 
Few will be surprised to find that in most of the local government systems profiled, small 
remains beautiful – large numbers of tiny municipal units are a key characteristic of at 
least nine of the case studies. Half of Swiss municipalities are under 1000 in population, 
for example, while three-quarters of Austrian municipalities have populations of less 
than 2500. This factor is shown to create systemic stresses. On the one hand, smaller 
municipalities struggle with their capacity limitations and with financial sustainability. 
On the other hand, large cities tend to struggle with a quite different set of concerns, 
including demands for increased autonomy and resources, national and sub-national state 
mandates, and the pressure to improve horizontal connectivity. This leads to major 
internal questions of symmetry and asymmetry within individual systems of local 
government. Different federations have come up with different responses, from Austria’s 
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insistence on structural uniformity (with the exception of Vienna) to evidence of high 
degrees of experimentation with local institutions, especially at the regional level, in 
Canada, Germany and the US. Readers can expect to learn a great deal about how 
different states have responded to widely varying needs of their municipal sector – but 
should not expect to find a single perfect solution. 
 
The high degree of variation in the organization of sub-national territory is also evident 
in the functional division of constitutional authorities. For example, the constitutional 
division of authority with respect to health and education is different from one country to 
the next – and often from one sub-national state to the next. What does this tell us about 
federations and the role of local governments within them? One interpretation is that the 
lack of consistency regarding which order of government is best positioned to respond to 
a particular issue points to the multi-scalar and complex nature of many policy spheres 
today. For example, while it may be feasible to divide healthcare responsibility between 
the national (e.g. standards, codes of practice), sub-national (e.g. infrastructure provision, 
training of healthcare workers) and local (e.g. managing healthcare delivery, place-based 
innovations) orders of government – there is nothing to say that an alternative allocation 
of power/responsibility would not be equally sound. Although one might expect 
federations to be adept at allocating power, the book shows that most are still grappling 
with the challenge of managing issues at an appropriate scale. Following the Canadian 
scholar, Thomas Courchene, one wonders if the practice of federalism isn’t in the end 
more about ‘process’ than ‘structure’. 
 
This volume, however, tends to maintain a strong focus on structures. In this regard, 
when we begin to broaden our understanding of federalism to include local government, 
other actors also begin to enter the equation. In the German context, Burgi notes that the 
supra-national European Union can also impact local government by implementing 
policies that restrict municipal autonomy or stimulate cross-border regionalism and 
cooperation. Pagano notes the rise of a variety of ‘public authorities’ in the United States, 
the most famous being the Port Authority of New York. While these other actors may not 
be expressly recognized constitutionally, they nevertheless play an important role in 
understanding place-based circumstances and in customizing policies across national, 
sub-national and regional space.  
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Overwhelmingly, none of these federal states – which contain some of the world’s 
largest conurbations (Lagos, Mexico City, Mumbai, New York, São Paulo) – have a 
strong or clear sense of how to encourage cooperation across metropolitan regions. 
German states have been consolidating smaller municipalities; Brazilian metropoles have 
been forming ‘consortia’ to deal with individual services; some Canadian provinces have 
pursued consolidation while others maintain a two-tiered approach; and special purpose 
bodies have been on the rise in the United States to help provide leverage on cross-
cutting issues. Additionally, experimentation with customized regional institutions seems 
prevalent in such countries as Brazil, Germany and the US.  
 
Steytler provides an extremely useful summary of the governance challenges facing 
metropoles in his concluding chapter to this volume (his summary deftly corrects for the 
fact that some of the chapters appear to treat metropolitan-scale organization of local 
government as something of an afterthought – perhaps because they are not expressly 
recognized in federal constitutions). Steytler identifies three broad approaches to the 
struggle for good metropolitan governance: 
 
 Formation of large metropolitan governments either through coordinating 
structures or outright consolidation or merger (at different times, Toronto 
illustrates both forms) 
 Less ambitious schemes for achieving scale economies over selected services or 
through agreements for interlocal cooperation (many US examples of special 
districts and regional councils of government)  
 Bypassing local governments altogether in favour of locating metropolitan 
governance in the hands of the sub-national state (for example, Australia). 
 
Clearly, this is an extremely broad range of responses to the challenges of governing the 
world’s biggest cities, and many readers will be intrigued to examine the comparative 
outcomes. They will also come away convinced there is much more work to be done in 
this particular policy arena.  
 
Bottom line? That this is a volume of praiseworthy density means it is not a volume for a 
casual reader. However, for specialists either in academia or in governmental practice, 
this is an important volume that fills a gap in the literature on federalism – exploring the 
strategies and challenges in what may be termed ‘deep federalism’ or how power is 
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divided, shared and limited across the whole spectrum of governance institutions. This 
extends the appeal of the book since readers in unitary states will find value in learning 
how selected federal states have tackled their particular regional, metropolitan and civic 
challenges; all states face those challenges. Overall, the chapters are near uniform in 
quality and are organized to invite inter-jurisdictional comparison. Importantly, the 
findings are synthesized in an exceptionally thorough concluding chapter by the editor, 
Nico Steytler. We recommend Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal 
Systems for a specialized audience. 
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It is fitting that Canada, as one of the world's leading 
federations, should play host to important ventures in the 
study of federal capitals, and in the analysis of how these 
capitals are governed and financed.  A generation ago it 
was Canadian professor of political science Donald Rowat 
who produced the first anthology of these capitals.  His edited book, with 17 case studies 
contributed by leading scholars of the time, provided excellent coverage of its subject 
and has remained the major text in the field for over 30 years. But there have been 
important developments in the field since Rowat's book was published by University of 
Toronto Press (Rowat 1973), and we can be thankful that another Canada-based team has 
produced a sequel volume that brings the story up-to-date and extends it in significant 
ways (Slack & Chattopadhyay 2009). 
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The new book is a product of the Ottawa-based Forum of Federations, which has a range 
of relevant conference, publishing, educational and consulting activities. It has 
previously comprehensively explored the subject of local government and metropolitan 
regions in federal countries, leading to a range of conferences and publications.  The 
Canadian enterprise in this general area is further demonstrated in the hosting of a 
broader study of capital cities – not just federal capitals – with an important book 
published in 1993 (Taylor et al 1993). 
 
Rowat's 17 federal capitals were Belgrade, Bern, Bonn, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Canberra, 
Caracas, Delhi, Islamabad, Kuala Lumpur, Lagos, Mexico City, Moscow, Ottawa, 
Vienna, Washington and Yaoundé (Cameroon). But political changes over the 30-year 
period have eliminated at least one federation (Yugoslavia) and seen others relocate their 
capitals in major metropolises (Bonn to Berlin) or away from them (Lagos to Abuja). 
The new anthology focuses on just eleven, making these adjustments and as well 
replacing Yaoundé with Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), adding Cape Town and Pretoria (which 
share the capital function in South Africa), and dropping the two South Americans and 
Moscow as well.  Does that mean that their countries have ceased to be federations?   
 
There can be no absolute answer to that question, because federal status is not always a 
black-and-white matter. Certainly the Soviet Union has gone, but Russia still calls itself a 
federal republic. Through the 1970s and '80s we were often told that Spain was 
decentralising so substantially that it was turning itself into a federation, but it is Belgium 
that gets the nod as a new European federation, not Spain. And what about the United 
Arab Emirates? They look more like a federation than a union, but they do not appear in 
any of the collections under consideration here. 
 
Donald Rowat visited Canberra several times, and in an exercise commemorating the 
first anniversary of self-government in the Australian Capital Territory he repeated his 
original list with one change: Cameroon, he said, had turned itself into a unitary state, so 
the number now stood at 16 (Rowat 1991: 28).1 He was a committed scholar in the best 
sense, and I cannot resist intruding a personal note into this review.  I found myself 
sitting next to him at a congress of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences 
in Mexico City in 1974.  Federation was under discussion, and an Italian professor made 
                                                      
1  In the 1993 capital cities study noted above, he contributed a chapter on federal capitals, now featuring 
Washington, Canberra, Delhi and Ottawa as his case studies (Rowat 1993). 
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this remarkable declaration: "Everyone knows that federalism is dead and buried."  As a 
good Canadian federalist, Donald was incensed, and as a good Australian federalist I was 
not far behind.  However we were both upstaged, for our Mexican hosts protested even 
more vehemently than we could have done.  We may previously have entertained some 
doubts about the strength of Mexican federalism, but this experience prompted serious 
reconsideration! 
 
This review is mainly about the new book, but it too acknowledges Rowat's pioneering 
work in the field.  His opening paragraph in the 1973 book, quoted in the Introduction to 
the new book, provides the necessary clothes-hanger for all subsequent work in the field:  
the federal government, ‘…wants to control and develop the capital in the interests of the 
nation as a whole, while the people of the capital naturally wish to govern themselves to 
the greatest extent possible’, (Rowat 1973: xi; quoted in Slack & Chattopadhyay 2009: 
4). 
 
So, as the editors of the new book point out, federal governments have experimented 
with a variety of governance structures all reflecting the desire to treat the federal capital 
in a manner different from that used for the governance of other cities within the country.  
The relationship between the federal government and the capital city government 
becomes a hugely significant issue: while the interests of the local inhabitants are 
important, they need to be weighed against the interests of states and major cities in the 
federation, against the special symbolic value to the nation of its lead city, and against 
the need to ensure the smooth running of the federal government itself.  There will be 
costs arising from the very fact of being the federal capital that will not be experienced 
by other cities, and dealing with them will present delicate policy problems. Questions 
that emerge from all this (from Slack & Chattopadhyay 2009: 4-5) include: 
 
 Who is responsible for making decisions? 
 Is the capital city responsible to a provincial or state government or directly to 
the federal government? 
 Who is responsible for providing which services? 
 How are these services financed? 
 Does the federal government compensate the capital city for the costs associated 
with being the capital? 
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Questions such as these are surveyed comprehensively in the case studies in the 
Slack/Chattopadhyay volume, as they were in the Rowat volume 30 years ago.  Where 
cities covered by Rowat get fresh attention, there is much updating in the new work; and 
of course there are (as indicated above) several newcomers receiving this attention for 
the first time.  Though they were far from neglected by Rowat and his colleagues, 
arguably the financial issues receive fuller treatment in Slack/Chattopadhyay.  And each 
case study in Slack/Chattopadhyay concludes very usefully with a discussion of 
‘emerging issues’ for that capital. 
 
The case studies in Slack/Chattopadhyay are arranged alphabetically according to 
country rather than city names, and so the Australia-Canberra study by University of 
Technology Sydney (UTS) academic Graham Sansom takes pride of place.  The chapter 
(Sansom 2009) opens with a historical overview, followed by major sections on 
governance structure, the distribution of roles and responsibilities between the federal 
government and the city government (which in this case is of course that of the 
Australian Capital Territory, or ACT),2 and financing, all leading up to the ‘emerging 
issues’ conclusion.  This sequence is repeated in the other case studies (with minor 
adaptations), facilitating comparisons among the eleven cities. 
 
Sansom traces the origins of Canberra in the Australian federal compact of 1901, the 
critical provision for present purposes requiring that the city be situated between 
Melbourne and Sydney, not closer than 100 miles to Sydney and in a special federal 
territory to be excised from the surrounding state and placed under federal 
administration.3  Some significant statements of the early period – through to the laying 
of a foundation stone and the naming of the city in 1913 – are quoted, demonstrating the 
high symbolism quotient built into the early planning initiatives.4  The slow early 
                                                      
2  For non-Australian readers, it should be explained that the federal territory, now the Australian Capital 
Territory, consists of the City of Canberra, a small agricultural area, and a much larger mountainous rump 
arranged as a national park. 
3  The story of the selection of the site for the federal capital, the slow development of federal territory 
thereafter under what amounted to a form of colonial administration, and the eventual move to self-
government (in 1989) is told in detail in Grundy et al 1996.  From an administrative point of view, the site 
had to be virtually virgin territory:  New South Wales would not join the federation if Melbourne became 
the capital, Victoria would not join if Sydney became the capital, and the other four prospective states 
would not join if either Sydney or Melbourne became the capital.  
4  It is likely that flamboyant minister King O'Malley trumped those quoted, when he declared (1903): 
"this is the first opportunity we have had of establishing a great city of our own ... I hope that ... the 
children of our children will see an Australian federal city that will rival London in population, Paris in 
beauty, Athens in culture, and Chicago in enterprise".  However others like Prime Minister Alfred Deakin 
had a much more frugal view:  see Chapter 3 of Grundy et al 1996 ("Creating a National Place"). 
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development and the post-World War II speed-up are covered, along with all the 
planning challenges that speed-up brought about.  Any semblance of conventional local 
government disappeared when New South Wales transferred the territory to the 
Commonwealth, and the governmental structure remained comparatively uncomplicated 
(though not trouble-free!) after the conferring of self-government in 1989, with a single 
ACT government performing both state-type and municipal functions and relating 
closely to the Commonwealth government, co-located in the same city as the ACT 
government. The chapter includes an excellent survey of the financial aspects of 
Canberra governance, the discussion noting inter alia transfer problems resulting from 
the myriad cross-border connections between the ACT and surrounding areas of New 
South Wales and the heavy dependence on Commonwealth financial support.5 
 
Across the eleven federal capitals surveyed in the Slack/Chattopadhyay book, there are 
many similarities and many points of difference, and at least half-a-dozen ways of 
attempting to sort them emerge. Were they long-standing administrative centres which 
simply assumed federal-capital duties at some stage during their evolution, or were they 
established from the start as federal capitals, at some distance from other administrative 
centres? Are they big or small in relation to other cities in the country concerned? Are 
their communities mono-lingual or bi/multi-lingual, and mono-cultural or bi/multi 
cultural? In governance terms, do they remain part of the surrounding province or state or 
are they constituted as a special federal district.  If the latter, do they have their own 
separate governing institutions or are they governed as a part of the federal 
administration?  And if they do have their own institutions, how are powers and 
responsibilities distributed between them and the federal institutions? Within them, is 
there or is there not a subordinate tier of local governments? And, in finance terms, are 
they capable of raising most of their own revenues or, if not, how are the dependencies 
on federal payments arranged?  In particular, to what extent are the federal payments 
aimed at compensating them for the additional costs they occur in functioning as federal 
capitals? 
                                                      
5 Among the ‘emerging issues’, the chapter observes that a "more important question for the ACT is how 
it will fare in the evolution of Australia's federal system as a whole" (Sansom 2009: 31).  Amen to that!  
But what it does not do is to note a view first expressed around the time that the Northern Territory was 
gaining self-government and the ACT slowly evolving towards it:  that the two internal territories could 
provide a model for a possible reconstruction of the whole edifice of Australian government, involving 
elimination of the states and their replacement by a set of (say 100) regional governments with significant 
governmental power in their own right but lacking the sovereignty of the foundation states and all that 
went with that (see eg Power & Wettenhall 1976: 124-125; Wettenhall 2009: 59). 
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The eleven case studies provide a wealth of information on such issues, and only a few 
highlights emphasising some points of comparison are noted here.  Thus Addis Ababa, 
Brussels, Berlin and Mexico City are the largest cities and major economic centres in 
their respective countries.  New Delhi is also a large metropolis, but not the largest in 
India.  In contrast, Canberra, Bern, Ottawa and Washington are relatively small within 
their national contexts, their character largely determined by their federal capital role.  
Brasilia would be in this group too, but it is strangely omitted from this collection.  
Brussels and Ottawa are notable as multi-lingual, multi-cultural cities, and Brussels is 
fairly distinctive (with Addis Ababa, not often noted in federalism studies) as a host to 
many international institutions. 
 
Brussels figures again with what is probably the most highly complex governing 
structure, with separate but overlapping region and community governments and a 
subsidiary network of 19 municipalities – described rather softly as a "somewhat 
cumbersome governance arrangement" (van Wynsberghe 2009: 48). Mexico City, New 
Delhi and some others either have a smaller number of internal local governing units or a 
single local government structure separate from the capital territory structure and sharing 
powers with it. At the other end of this spectrum, Berlin, Canberra and Washington have 
no internal local government structure separate from the territorial government system – 
though Donald Rowat several times urged that the Canberra "solution" was defective for 
this reason (Rowat 1990: 483; 1991: 42-43; 1993: 157; 1997: 549-550). Ottawa and Bern 
present another pattern: they are established local government units within one of the 
regular provinces of the federation. But in the matter of federal capitals, nothing can ever 
be quite so simple:  on the one hand, Ottawa is a conurbation that extends effectively into 
a neighbouring province with separate municipal arrangements, and it shares with others 
the strong interest and supervision of a national government development or planning 
commission. 
 
In the matter of federal-capital city financial arrangements, Brussels is again fairly 
distinctive, with a "cooperation agreement" providing for federal funding to promote its 
international role and its performance of capital city functions (van Wynsberghe 2009: 
42-43).  The pattern may not be as clear for some of the other capitals, but there is 
usually some sort of compensatory arrangement (for comparisons, see Table 22.6 in 
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Slack & Chattopadhyay 2009: 316-317).6  Here Washington is distinctive and possibly 
more heavily controlled:  after a spell of notably unsound fiscal practices leading to the 
insolvency of the District of Columbia in 1995, the federal government took over the 
district's finances and established a position of Chief Financial Officer independent of the 
DC government (Gandhi et al 2009: 264). 
 
A final classification offered by the editors is that which distinguishes between federal 
districts, city-states, and "cities in a state" (Slack & Chattopadhyay 2009: 297-304).  
Ottawa, Bern and the South African twins are fairly obvious examples of the last.  
Washington and some of the others are also fairly obviously federal districts, while 
Brussels and Berlin qualify under their countries' constitutions as states – hence it is 
appropriate to regard them as city-states.  Where does this leave Canberra?  The editors 
see it also as a federal district, but in the view of this reviewer (Wettenhall 1998a, 1998b; 
Halligan & Wettenhall 2002 – noted and I think largely accepted by the contributor of 
the Canberra case study, Sansom 2009: 16), it deserves to be classified as a city-state (or 
at least a quasi-state).  Its governance arrangements bring it, and for this purpose the 
companion Northern Territory, close in most respects to an Australian constitutional 
state. But this is a minor quibble. 
 
There is all this and much more in the Slack-Chattopadhyay book.  It is a mine of 
information and insights about the governance and financing of federal capitals, and so a 
worthy successor to Rowat's path-breaking book written and published almost 40 years 
ago.  But Rowat's book is still important, and it should be retained, valued, and shelved 
alongside Slack & Chattopadhyay in any serious library. 
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